A BME Kognitív Tudományi Tanszék szeretettel vár mindenkit tanszéki
szeminárium sorozatának következő hétfői előadására
<http://cogsci.bme.hu/Esem.php?esemIndex=66>:
The Department of Cognitive Science at BME cordially invites you to the
next talk <http://cogsci.bme.hu/Esem.php?esemIndex=66> in its lecture
series:
* *
*Nádasdy Zoltán
*
Post-Doctoral Fellow
The Andersen Lab
California Institute of Technology **
<http://www.vis.caltech.edu/%7Ezoltan/cv2007v2.htm>
<http://www.vis.caltech.edu/%7Ezoltan/cv2007v2.htm>
<http://biology.caltech.edu/>
/*The neuronal phase code*
(Encoding and decoding information by the phase of action potentials)///
December 8., hétfő - 15:00. BME, XI., Stoczek u. 2., St. ép., 320.-as terem.
Monday, December 8th, 15:00. BME, Budapest, Stoczek u. 2, St. building,
room 320.
*Abstract: *
Experimental evidence, such as task-dependent coherency between
single-unit activity and local field potentials (LFPs), together with
the dependency of action potential (AP) initiation on the subthreshold
membrane oscillation (SMO) suggest that: i) the probability of action
potentials is controlled by a common oscillatory mechanism; ii) the SMOs
across individual neurons are not independent but rather form a coherent
field of oscillations; and iii) nearly-synchronized SMOs may propagate
through neuronal connections, creating a constant-phase gradient of SMO
between neighbor neurons. Based on these assumptions, we formulated a
model in which neurons encode information by the phase of APs relative
to the SMO. The model consists of four stages: encoding with phase,
gamma alignment, information transfer, and reconstruction. We
demonstrated by means of simulations that information encoded by the
phase of APs can reliably be transferred and reconstructed at distant
target areas. Moreover, since the phase code is a compressed
representation of the spatio-temporal features of the stimulus, it
enables the transfer of information in parallel pathways without
distortion from conductance differences. We illustrate by examples how
phase coding may account for a number of unresolved physiological
observations related to sparse coding, motion processing, phase
precession, and invariance detection, as well as anatomical principles,
such as the columnar organization and grid cell architecture.
Furthermore, we show empirical evidence for stimulus-dependent phase
coding in V1 from simultaneous single-unit and LFP
recordings.* *
Keresztes Attila
BME-Kognitív Tudományi Tanszék
BME-Cognitive Science Department
akeresztes(a)cogsci.bme.hu <mailto:akeresztes@cogsci.bme.hu>
keresztes.attila(a)gmail.com <mailto:keresztes.attila@gmail.com>
THEORETICAL PHILOSOPHY FORUM
Institute of Philosophy
Faculty of Humanities, Eotvos University
Room 226 Monday 4:00 PM Muzeum krt. 4/i, Budapest
Web site: http://phil.elte.hu/tpf
8 December 4:00 PM Room 226
Natalie Ross
Philosophy, Australian Catholic University
Emmanuel Levinas and Imre Lakatos’ Approaches to Human Action as
Applicable to Methodology in the Natural and Human Sciences
Abstract: http://phil.elte.hu/tpf/2008-2009/December/#2
___________________________________
The Forum is open to everyone, including students,visitors, and faculty
members from all departments and institutes!
Format: 60 minute lecture, 10 minute coffee break, followed by a 30-60
minute discussion. The language of presentation is English or Hungarian.
A printable poster is available from here:
http://phil.elte.hu/tpf/2008-2009/December/poster.pdf
Please feel free to post it in your institution!
The organizer of the Forum: Laszlo E. Szabo
(leszabo(a)phil.elte.hu)
--
L a s z l o E. S z a b o
Department of Logic, Institute of Philosophy
Faculty of Humanities, Eotvos University, Budapest
http://phil.elte.hu/leszabo
Tisztelt kollégák!
December 3-án, szerdán fél 11-kor az MTA KFKI RMKI tanácstermében elõadást
tart:
Sidney Wiener
CNRS-Collège de France LPPA, Paris, France
Elõadásának témája:
Neural correlates of learning in the hippocampo-prefrontal pathway
The Wisconsin Card Sorting task is used to diagnose prefrontal damage in
human patients. This task requiring self-generating set-shifting and rule
creation was adapted for rats. Then we recorded local field potentials
(LFPs) in hippocampus and prefrontal cortex as well as multichannel unit
recordings in prefrontal areas PL/IL during learning and shifting between
spatial and cue-guided strategies in a Y maze. The prefrontal neurons
changed behaviorally correlated activity after rule changes and as the rat
acquired new rules. Furthermore, during rule acquisition there was increased
coherence of prefrontal and hippocampal LFPs in the theta band when the rat was
at the fork of the Y maze, during response selection. With a new principal
components analysis of unit ensemble co-activations permitting high temporal
resolution, we determined that during slow wave sleep (SWS) that there was
replay of prefrontal neural ensemble coactivations appearing during the awake
learning experience. This mostly occurs during hippocampal sharp wave ripples,
which correspond to periods of replay in the hippocampus also. Examination of
prefrontal neuron modulation by hippocampal LFP theta oscillations demonstrated
a subpopulation that had increased modulation during high coherence of
hippocampal and prefrontal LFPs. Moreover, prefrontal cell assemblies formed
during high coherence periods are reactivated during ripples occurring during
sleep after learning the task. This suggests a new mechanism of increased
inter-region communication during high LFP oscillatory coherence periods,
facilitating selection of relevant
information to be stored in long term memory.
Cím: Bp. Csillebérc, Konkoly-Thege Miklós út 29-33, III. épület 2. emelet
A 90-es busz csillebérci végállomásánál.
Minden érdekõdõt szeretettel várunk.
Somogyári Zoltán
MTA KFKI RMKI,
Biofizikai osztály
The CEU Philosophy Department cordially invites you to a talk (as part
of its Departmental Colloquium series)
by
Ferenc Huoranszki (CEU)
on
The Contingency of Causal Relations
Tuesday,2 December, 5.30 PM, Zrinyi 14, Room 412
One of the most puzzling issues about causation is its modal character.
On the one hand, causation makes the occurrence of certain events
non-accidental and it supports the truth of the corresponding
counterfactuals, both of which imply that the relation between cause and
effect is not contingent. On the other hand, most philosophers have been
persuaded by Hume’s arguments that causal relations are contingent.
Traditional answers to the puzzle assume either - as Hume did - that
‘necessity is not in the objects’ or, alternatively, that there are
different sorts of necessities and hence, although causation is
contingent in one sense (in the sense of ‘absolute’ or ‘metaphysical’
necessity), it can be nevertheless necessary in another ‘nomological’
sense. The first solution is, however, unbelievable to most of us,
whereas the second has never managed to provide a non-circular account
of the notion of nomological necessity as distinct from the metaphysical
one.
In the talk I shall suggest a different understanding of the
contingency of causal relations that may account for all the Humean
insights without endorsing Humean metaphysics. In arguing against the
view that causal relations are necessary Hume formulated two different
claims. On the one hand, he claimed that there is not a necessary
connection between certain powers and (different species of) objects. On
the other hand, he argued that we do not have an idea of powers which
imply necessary connection between distinct existences. The latter claim
is, however, too strong. It seems that we do have a notion of power-like
properties as functions from (kinds of) circumstances to (kinds of)
effects. If causal relations are indeed contingent, they are contingent
for a different reason. The reason is that causation is not always a
transitive relation. I shall argue that there is no single ‘yes or no’
answer to the question concerning the transitivity of causal relations
and that the issue of transitivity - contrary to what most Humeans hold
- is not independent of the issue of contingency. In fact, it is with
reference to intransitivity that we can explain in which sense causation
is contingent.
Kriszta Biber
Department Coordinator
Philosophy Department
Tel: 36-1-327-3806
Fax: 36-1-327-3072
E-mail: biberk(a)ceu.hu
The CEU Philosophy Department cordially invites you to a talk (as part
of its Departmental Colloquium series)
by
Ferenc Huoranszki (CEU)
on
The Contingency of Causal Relations
Tuesday,2 December, 5.30 PM, Zrinyi 14, Room 412
One of the most puzzling issues about causation is its modal character.
On the one hand, causation makes the occurrence of certain events
non-accidental and it supports the truth of the corresponding
counterfactuals, both of which imply that the relation between cause and
effect is not contingent. On the other hand, most philosophers have been
persuaded by Hume’s arguments that causal relations are contingent.
Traditional answers to the puzzle assume either - as Hume did - that
‘necessity is not in the objects’ or, alternatively, that there
are different sorts of necessities and hence, although causation is
contingent in one sense (in the sense of ‘absolute’ or
‘metaphysical’ necessity), it can be nevertheless necessary in
another ‘nomological’ sense. The first solution is, however,
unbelievable to most of us, whereas the second has never managed to
provide a non-circular account of the notion of nomological necessity as
distinct from the metaphysical one.
In the talk I shall suggest a different understanding of the
contingency of causal relations that may account for all the Humean
insights without endorsing Humean metaphysics. In arguing against the
view that causal relations are necessary Hume formulated two different
claims. On the one hand, he claimed that there is not a necessary
connection between certain powers and (different species of) objects. On
the other hand, he argued that we do not have an idea of powers which
imply necessary connection between distinct existences. The latter claim
is, however, too strong. It seems that we do have a notion of power-like
properties as functions from (kinds of) circumstances to (kinds of)
effects. If causal relations are indeed contingent, they are contingent
for a different reason. The reason is that causation is not always a
transitive relation. I shall argue that there is no single ‘yes or
no’ answer to the question concerning the transitivity of causal
relations and that the issue of transitivity - contrary to what most
Humeans hold - is not independent of the issue of contingency. In fact,
it is with reference to intransitivity that we can explain in which
sense causation is contingent.
Kriszta Biber
Department Coordinator
Philosophy Department
Tel: 36-1-327-3806
Fax: 36-1-327-3072
E-mail: biberk(a)ceu.hu
Wednesday 26 Nov, 4.30pm
Ádám Miklósi & Edina Pfandler (Ethology, ELTE)
Comprehension of pointing gestures in a comparative perspective:
The case of dogs and humans
Venue:
Room 137, Institute for Psychology, Hungarian Academy of Sciences
Victor Hugo u. 18-22, 1132 Budapest
Everyone is welcome to attend.
---
Gergely Csibra
THEORETICAL PHILOSOPHY FORUM
Institute of Philosophy
Faculty of Humanities, Eotvos University
Room 226 Monday 4:00 PM Muzeum krt. 4/i, Budapest
Web site: http://phil.elte.hu/tpf
1 December 4:00 PM Room 226
Marton Gomori
Department of Logic, Institute of Philosophy
Eotvos University, Budapest
Az elektrodinamika kovarianciaja – logikai-empirista rekonstrukcio
(Covariance of electrodynamics – a logico-empiricist reconstruction)
Abstract: http://phil.elte.hu/tpf/2008-2009/December/#1
___________________________________
The Forum is open to everyone, including students, visitors, and faculty
members from all departments and institutes!
Format: 60 minute lecture, 10 minute coffee break, followed by a 30-60
minute discussion. The language of presentation is English or Hungarian.
A printable poster is available from here:
http://phil.elte.hu/tpf/2008-2009/December/poster.pdf
Please feel free to post it in your institution!
The organizer of the Forum: Laszlo E. Szabo
(leszabo(a)phil.elte.hu)
--
L a s z l o E. S z a b o
Department of Logic, Institute of Philosophy
Faculty of Humanities, Eotvos University, Budapest
http://phil.elte.hu/leszabo
Kedves Kollegak,
Lionel Nowak (Cerveau & Cognition, CNRS Universite Paul Sabatier, Toulouse,
France, http://www.cerco.ups-tlse.fr/fr_vers/annuaire/lionel_nowak.htm)
<http://www.cerco.ups-tlse.fr/fr_vers/annuaire/caroline_fonta.htm>
alabbi eloadasra varunk minden erdeklodot december 2.-en kedden 14.00-kor a
SOTE Anatomia konyvtaraban (1094 Tűzoltó u. 58).
Mechanisms and consequences of contrast adaptation in the visual cortex
Reig, R. Gallego, R., Nowak, L. G., and Sanchez-Vives, M. V. (2006)
Impact of cortical network activity on short-term synaptic depression.
Cerebral Cortex 16, 688-695.
Descalzo, V. F., Nowak, L. G., Brumberg, J. C., McCormick, D. A. and
Sanchez-Vives, M. V. (2005) Slow adaptation in fast spiking neurons of
visual cortex. Journal of Neurophysiology 93, 1111-1118.
Nowak, L. G., Sanchez-Vives, M. V. and McCormick, D. A. (2005) Role of
synaptic and intrinsic membrane properties in short term receptive field
dynamics in cat area 17. Journal of Neuroscience 25, 1866-1880.
Sanchez-Vives, M. V., Nowak, L. G. and McCormick, D. A. (2000) Membrane
mechanisms underlying contrast adaptation in cat area 17 in vivo. Journal of
Neuroscience 20, 4267-4285.
Sanchez-Vives, M. V., Nowak, L. G. and McCormick, D. A. (2000) Cellular
mechanisms of long lasting adaptation in visual cortical neurons in vitro.
Journal of Neuroscience 20, 4286-4299.
udvozlettel,
Negyessy Laszlo
Neurobionics Research Group,
Hungarian Academy of Sciences -
Peter Pazmany Catholic University - Semmelweis University
Tuzolto u. 58
H-1094 Budapest
Hungary
Tel.: +36-12156920 ext. 53712
Fax: +36-12176937
E-mail: negyessy(a)ana.sote.hu,
negyessy(a)gmail.com