Logic and Philosophy of Science Seminar
Department of Logic, Institute of Philosophy
Eötvös Loránd University Budapest
Múzeum krt. 4/i Room 224
_____________________________________________
P R O G R A M
The seminar is held in hybrid format, in person (Múzeum krt. 4/i Room 224)
and online. Zoom Meeting link:
https://us02web.zoom.us/j/889933315?pwd=Q3U3V3VQdXpXckhJYWRrcWRiMUhhQT09
15 November (Friday) 4:15 PM Room 224 + ONLINE
Krzysztof Krawczyk
Department of Logic, Institute of Philosophy, Jagiellonian University,
Cracow
Structural completeness in quasivarieties of Sugihara algebras
______________________________
Abstract is available from the seminar website: http://lps.elte.hu/lps
The seminar is open to everyone, including students, visitors, and
faculty members
from all departments and institutes! Format: 60 minute lecture, coffee
break, 60 minute discussion.
Organizers: Márton Gömöri and Zalán Molnár
Logic and Philosophy of Science Seminar
Department of Logic, Institute of Philosophy
Eötvös Loránd University Budapest
Múzeum krt. 4/i Room 224
_____________________________________________
P R O G R A M
The seminar is held in hybrid format, in person (Múzeum krt. 4/i Room 224)
and online. Zoom Meeting link:
https://us02web.zoom.us/j/889933315?pwd=Q3U3V3VQdXpXckhJYWRrcWRiMUhhQT09
15 November (Friday) 4:15 PM Room 224 + ONLINE
Krzysztof Krawczyk
Department of Logic, Institute of Philosophy, Jagiellonian University,
Cracow
Structural completeness in quasivarieties of Sugihara algebras
______________________________
Abstract is available from the seminar website: http://lps.elte.hu/lps
The seminar is open to everyone, including students, visitors, and
faculty members
from all departments and institutes! Format: 60 minute lecture, coffee
break, 60 minute discussion.
Organizers: Márton Gömöri and Zalán Molnár
Logic and Philosophy of Science Seminar
Department of Logic, Institute of Philosophy
Eötvös Loránd University Budapest
Múzeum krt. 4/i Room 224
_____________________________________________
P R O G R A M
The seminar is held in hybrid format, in person (Múzeum krt. 4/i Room 224)
and online. Zoom Meeting link:
https://us02web.zoom.us/j/889933315?pwd=Q3U3V3VQdXpXckhJYWRrcWRiMUhhQT09
8 November (Friday) 4:15 - 6:15 PM Room 224 + ONLINE
Fabio Lampert
Department of Philosophy, University of Vienna
A priori knowledge and our limits
Abstract: There is a venerable argument stated and defended in multiple
ways, since the Early Middle Ages, which attempts to show that there is no
free will or moral responsibility if human actions were infallibly
predicted in the past – by a divine being, supercomputer, or what have you.
The Spanish philosopher and theologian Luis de Molina (1535-1600)
formulated one of the clearest versions of this argument, only to reject
its main inferential move without any argument. For this reason, Molina’s
’solution’ to the puzzle was by and large ignored. I will argue, however,
that technology stemming from the works of Saul Kripke (in particular, the
thesis of the necessity of identity and some instances of contingent a
priori knowledge) provides the tools to generate an argument motivating the
Molinist solution to the puzzle in question. Molina didn’t have an argument
because he didn’t have Kripke. But we did.
______________________________
Seminar website: http://lps.elte.hu/lps
The seminar is open to everyone, including students, visitors, and
faculty members
from all departments and institutes! Format: 60 minute lecture, coffee
break, 60 minute discussion.
Organizers: Márton Gömöri and Zalán Molnár
Dear All,
The CEU Department of Cognitive Science and the Center for Cognitive Computation (CCC) invites you to the upcoming event of the Budapest Computational Neuroscience Forum<https://ccc.ceu.edu/budapest-computational-neuroscience-forum>.
Speaker: József Konczer<https://konczer.github.io/>
Title: Statistical Games, Playful approach to statistics
Abstract: This work contains the mathematical exploration of a few prototypical games in which central concepts from statistics and probability theory naturally emerge. The first two kinds of games are termed Fisher and Bayesian games, which are connected to Frequentist and Bayesian statistics, respectively. Later, a more general type of game is introduced, termed Statistical game, in which a further parameter, the players' relative risk aversion, can be set. In this work, we show that Fisher and Bayesian games can be viewed as limiting cases of Statistical games. Therefore, Statistical games can be viewed as a unified framework, incorporating both Frequentist and Bayesian statistics. Furthermore, a philosophical framework is (re-)presented -- often referred to as minimax regret criterion -- as a general approach to decision making.
The main motivation for this work was to embed Bayesian statistics into a broader decision-making framework, where, based on collected data, actions with consequences have to be made, which can be translated to utilities (or rewards/losses) of the decision-maker. The work starts with the simplest possible toy model, related to hypothesis testing and statistical inference. This choice has two main benefits: i.) it allows us to determine (conjecture) the behaviour of the equilibrium strategies in various limiting cases ii.) this way, we can introduce Statistical games without requiring additional stochastic parameters. The work contains game theoretical methods related to two-player, non-cooperative games to determine and prove equilibrium strategies of Fisher, Bayesian and Statistical games. It also relies on analytical tools for derivations concerning various limiting cases.
Time: 17:30 Tuesday, 5 November 2024.
Location: CEU Budapest (1051 Budapest, Nádor u. 15.) N15. room 203.
Zoom: Meeting ID: 976 1541 3014<https://ceu-edu.zoom.us/j/97615413014?pwd=BbaIDK56amazlaex84ukFP3MEurhMX.1> Passcode: 525888
Should you have any inquiries about the series, please contact Mihály Bányai<mailto:mihaly.s.banyai@gmail.com>.
Please, be informed that video/photo recording might take place at the event and the edited version of the video material might be published to communicate or promote CEU's activities. Please, find our Privacy Notice here<https://www.ceu.edu/privacy>.
Best regards,
Ildikó Varga
Department Coordinator (Budapest)
Department of Cognitive Science
[cid:ccecb7df-0ac9-4d85-9b7f-73dad69412e4]
H-1051 Budapest
Nádor u. 15. FT room 404.
tel: +36-1 327-3000 2941
http://www.ceu.edu<http://www.ceu.edu/>
http://cognitivescience.ceu.edu<http://cognitivescience.ceu.edu/>
______________________________________________
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Logic and Philosophy of Science Seminar
Department of Logic, Institute of Philosophy
Eötvös Loránd University Budapest
Múzeum krt. 4/i Room 224
_____________________________________________
P R O G R A M
The seminar is held in hybrid format, in person (Múzeum krt. 4/i Room 224)
and online. Zoom Meeting link:
https://us02web.zoom.us/j/889933315?pwd=Q3U3V3VQdXpXckhJYWRrcWRiMUhhQT09
8 November (Friday) 4:15 - 6:15 PM Room 224 + ONLINE
Fabio Lampert
Department of Philosophy, University of Vienna
A priori knowledge and our limits
Abstract: There is a venerable argument stated and defended in multiple
ways, since the Early Middle Ages, which attempts to show that there is no
free will or moral responsibility if human actions were infallibly
predicted in the past – by a divine being, supercomputer, or what have you.
The Spanish philosopher and theologian Luis de Molina (1535-1600)
formulated one of the clearest versions of this argument, only to reject
its main inferential move without any argument. For this reason, Molina’s
’solution’ to the puzzle was by and large ignored. I will argue, however,
that technology stemming from the works of Saul Kripke (in particular, the
thesis of the necessity of identity and some instances of contingent a
priori knowledge) provides the tools to generate an argument motivating the
Molinist solution to the puzzle in question. Molina didn’t have an argument
because he didn’t have Kripke. But we did.
______________________________
Seminar website: http://lps.elte.hu/lps
The seminar is open to everyone, including students, visitors, and
faculty members
from all departments and institutes! Format: 60 minute lecture, coffee
break, 60 minute discussion.
The organizers: Márton Gömöri and Zalán Molnár
Logic and Philosophy of Science Seminar
Department of Logic, Institute of Philosophy
Eötvös Loránd University Budapest
Múzeum krt. 4/i Room 224
_____________________________________________
P R O G R A M
The seminar is held in hybrid format, in person (Múzeum krt. 4/i Room 224)
and online. Zoom Meeting link:
https://us02web.zoom.us/j/889933315?pwd=Q3U3V3VQdXpXckhJYWRrcWRiMUhhQT09
25 October (Friday) 4:15 - 6:15 PM Room 224 + ONLINE
Ferenc Csatári
Aleido, Budapest
Two Conceptions of Truth for Constructive Logic
Abstract:
Two notable semantical readings of intuitionistic logic are examined: the
so called BHK-interpretation and the two-truths approach. We address a
couple of arguments in the literature against constructivism to see how
well these interpretations fare in answering them.
______________________________
Seminar website (currently under construction): http://lps.elte.hu/lps
The seminar is open to everyone, including students, visitors, and
faculty members
from all departments and institutes! Format: 60 minute lecture, coffee
break, 60 minute discussion.
The organizers: Márton Gömöri and Zalán Molnár
by DUCOG - Dubrovnik Conference on Cognitive Science
Dear All,
We are pleased to announce the XVI. Dubrovnik Conference on Cognitive
Science devoted to Understanding the Self and the Other. The conference
will take place between *22 and 25 May 2025* in Dubrovnik, Croatia.
Distinguishing oneself from others is a precursor to the development of
many social skills, including coordination and communication. Representing
others’ perspectives, while still distinguishing it from our own is an
essential part of human interactions, and therefore of our mental lives.
This supports our understanding of ourselves and others around us – it
helps us make sense of what we are doing, make predictions, and plan our
subsequent actions appropriately. How do we learn to distinguish our bodies
and minds from those of other people, and what are the mechanisms and
relation between understanding ourselves and others? In this conference, we
will bring together researchers that have attempted to address this broad
question from different angles such as social-, developmental- and
comparative cognition and philosophy, to explore the topic of how we
understand and distinguish our own and others’ intentions, actions,
thoughts, and ultimately, self and other.
*Invited speakers will include:*
Josep Call (University of St Andrews)
Senay Cebioglu (MPI EVA)
Arvid Guterstam (Karolinska Institutet)
Marlene Meyer (Radboud University)
Elisabeth Pacherie (Institut Jean-Nicod, CNRS, EHESS, ENS-PSL)
Philippe Rochat (Emory University)
For more information please visit https://ducog.cecog.eu
or email us at: ducog(a)cecog.eu
*Poster abstract submissions will be open between 1 January and 28 February
2025.*
On behalf of the organisers,
*Louise Goupil (CNRS / University Grenoble Alpes) & Dora Kampis (University
of Copenhagen)*
*- Conference chairs*
Begin forwarded message:
From: Agnes Bendik <BendikAg(a)ceu.edu>
Subject: Invitation - Katalin Balog: Consciousness, Illusion, and Value - 30 October, 12:30 p.m.
Date: 21 October 2024 at 13:22:30 GMT+2
The Institute for Advanced Study at CEU is pleased to invite you to the next lecture in the Institute`s Wednesday Seminars
Katalin Balog
Senior Core Fellow at IAS CEU
Consciousness, Illusion, and Value
Wednesday, 30 October, 12:30 p.m.
Nádor u. 15, Room 103 (Tiered Room) and online
The belief that we are conscious is the last remnant of the premodern concept of the mind. Not so long ago, most people in the West thought of the body as mortal flesh commanded by the soul. They thought of the soul as immortal, free in its action, and exempt from the laws of nature. Creativity and intelligence were believed to be traits of the soul that no mere mechanism could replicate. But over the course of the last couple of hundred years, and especially in the 20th century, it has become common understanding that all of our behavior has a purely physical explanation and, as the principle of the causal completeness of physics became mainstream among philosophers and scientists, it also became common understanding that all of our behavior has a purely physical explanation. There is not much about the premodern conception that survived these changes except the view that we are conscious, i.e., that there is something it is like to be us, of which we can be directly aware. It is precisely this view that has come under attack lately by a movement that their adherents in philosophy, neuroscience, and AI call ‘illusionism’. According to illusionism, the qualitative character of our experience that we seem to be directly aware of is a mere illusion. It appears to be an innocent theoretical claim; however, I argue that it has potent practical consequences regarding what we value and how we relate to human beings that demand consideration.
[image001.jpg]
Image: Digital Asset Library, Rutgers University
Katalin Balog is a philosopher of mind interested in the self, consciousness, subjectivity, and value, as well as the history of these concepts. She writes scholarly articles and essays for a general audience. Her public-facing work has appeared in The New York Times and in the magazine 3 Quarks Daily. Currently she is working on a book called What is left of the mind. She has come to the US to study philosophy from her native Budapest in 1989. Katalin Balog got her PhD at Rutgers, New Brunswick, she has been teaching at Rutgers University–Newark since 2010, before that, she taught at Yale for 10 years.
RSVP Agnes Bendik at bendikag(a)ceu.edu<mailto:bendikag@ceu.edu>
AGNES BENDIK
Senior Administrative Officer
[image002.png]
[image003.png]
OFFICE ADDRESS: Nador u.13., Fourth floor, Room 403 | 1051 Budapest, Hungary
MAILING ADDRESS: IAS CEU, Nádor u. 9. | 1051 Budapest, Hungary
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