koglist February 2013

koglist@maillist.ttk.hu

11 participants
24 discussions

[koglist] invitation to a talk on`Aristotle on Perceptual Content`by Victor Caston - 26 February, 5.30 PM

by Krisztina Biber

The CEU Department of Philosophy cordially invites you to a talk (as part of its Departmental Colloquium series) by Victor Caston (University of Michigan) on ` Aristotle on Perceptual Content` Tuesday, 26 February, 2013, 5.30 PM, Zrinyi 14, Room 412 ABSTRACT There is a certain tension in Aristotle’s theories, at least prima facie, between the nature and role of perception. Aristotle gives a prominent role to perception not just in the acquisition of knowledge, but also in the explanation of human action and the behavior of animals more generally. For these purposes, perceptual content needs to be fairly rich. Perception must inform an animal about features of the environment that are significant for it, even animals with a very crude and limited behavioral repertoire. But it is unclear whether his theory of perception has the resources to deliver content of the sort he needs. In the past, scholars have worried whether the causal mechanisms he describes in his psychological works are sufficient to explain anything more than the most basic perception of sensible qualities like colors or tones. But before we can tackle this problem, we must answer a prior one, about whether perception essentially involves perceiving something as belonging to a certain kind or perceiving that something is of a certain character. According to the predominant line of interpretation, it does not: perception, for Aristotle, is of particulars and not universals. Consequently, we cannot perceive anything as being of a certain sort without the aid of other faculties that go beyond it (if not conceptual thought, then at least what Aristotle calls phantasia or empeiria). In this paper, I challenge this line of interpretation in various forms and eventually reject it, arguing instead that taking an object to be a certain sort of thing is essential to perception as such, in all its forms, for Aristotle. Perception in his theory can be seen to have a de re content, which exhibits both extensional and nonextensional features. It also commits him to a certain view about nonconceptual content as well. On this basis, we can offer more precise reconstructions of the central notions in Aristotle’s theory of perception.

13 years, 2 months

[koglist] Theoretical Philosophy Forum, Peter Fekete

by Laszlo E. Szabo

THEORETICAL PHILOSOPHY FORUM Institute of Philosophy Faculty of Humanities, Eötvös University Address: Múzeum krt. 4/i, Budapest 20 February (Wednesday) 5:00 PM Room 226 Peter Fekete Former Headmaster of Black's Academy, Jersey, Channel Islands On the Continuum ___________________________________ Abstracts and printable program (poster) are available from the web site of the Forum: http://phil.elte.hu/tpf (Please feel free to post the program in your institution!) The Forum is open to everyone, including students, visitors, and faculty members from all departments and institutes! Format: 60 minute lecture, coffee break, 60 minute discussion. The organizer of the Forum: László E. Szabó (leszabo(a)phil.elte.hu) -- L a s z l o E. S z a b o Professor of Philosophy DEPARTMENT OF LOGIC, INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY EOTVOS UNIVERSITY, BUDAPEST http://phil.elte.hu/leszabo

13 years, 2 months

[koglist] szakdolgozat - kerdoiv

by gabor szarka

Sziasztok, pszichológia szakdolgozatomhoz kutatást végzek a Szegedi Egyetemen, melyhez kérem a segítségeteket.A téma a kiégés és egyes személyiségjegyek kapcsolata. Legyetek szívesek kitölteni az alábbi (egyébként érdekes) kérdőívet. A kitöltés kb. 10 percet vesz igénybe és teljesen anonim, én csak az eredményeket kapom meg, melyeket együttesen fogok elemezni:https://docs.google.com/spreadsheet/viewform?formkey=dF9wODVoNlo1e… a segítséget előre is, már csak néhány kitöltőre van szükségemGábor

13 years, 2 months

[koglist] [CDC Seminars] CogSci CEU Departmental Colloquium: Febr. 20., 2013. Wednesday: John Dewey: (MSU) - Sensory prediction and the sense of agency, from individual to joint action

by Gyorgyne Finta

The CEU Department of Cognitive Science cordially invites you to a talk (as part of its Departmental Colloquium series) by John Dewey Michigan State University, Dept of Psychology Central European University - Department of Cognitive Science Date: Wednesday, February 20, 2013 - 17:00 - 18:30 Location: Department of Cognitive Science, CEU, Frankel Leó út 30-34., Room G15 Title: Sensory prediction and the sense of agency, from individual to joint action During voluntary action, forward models in the brain pre-activate representations of the predicted sensory consequences. These forward models are believed to play important roles in motor control and the sense of agency (SA), i.e. registration that one was the initiator or controller of the action. The majority of the literature on sensory prediction and its relation to SA has focused on individual action. An open question is whether, during joint actions, such forward models can be re-purposed to predict the additive consequences of multiple actors, for example two individuals trying to steer a moving object by coordinating their motor inputs, and how this relates to each actor’s SA. In this talk, I will present an overview of previous research, and outline plans for two upcoming studies to investigate sensory prediction and SA in the joint action context. The first study will investigate the impact of joint action on implicit and explicit measures of agency, by testing whether the additive consequences of two actors’ actions are attenuated by expectation (as would be expected by a forward model), and by comparing explicit agency judgments in the individual and joint action contexts. The second study will investigate whether SA for joint actions depends primarily on the match between one’s individual action and the sensory consequences, or alternatively, on the satisfaction of joint action goals. The proposed research would combine insights from the agency and joint action literatures to develop theories for why people may feel more or less responsible for the outcomes of group actions. We're looking forward to see you there (Frankel Leo u. 30-34) ! Cognitive Science Events at CEU: http://cognitivescience.ceu.hu/events _______________________________________________ Subscribe by sending an empty mail to seminars-subscribe(a)cdc.ceu.hu Unsubscribe by sending an empty mail to seminars-unsubscribe(a)cdc.ceu.hu

13 years, 2 months

[koglist] Meghívó a Társas-Kognitív Nyelvészeti Kutatócsoport 2013. évi tavaszi előadás-sorozatára

by Tamás Kis

*MEGHÍVÓ* A *Társas-Kognitív Nyelvészeti Kutatócsoport * és a *DAB Nyelvtudományi Munkabizottsága*** meghívja *2012. évi tavaszi társas-kognitív nyelvészeti előadás-sorozatára.* A Debreceni Egyetem Magyar Nyelvtudományi Tanszékének Társas-Kognitív Nyelvészeti Kutatócsoportja és a DAB Nyelvtudományi Munkabizottsága a DE BTK Hallgatói Önkormányzata támogatásával 2013 februárjában folytatja<http://mnytud.arts.unideb.hu/tkny/ea2.html>nyitott, nyilvános előadás-sorozatát a társas-kognitív nyelvészet témaköréből. *Helyszín: *MTA Debreceni Területi Bizottság (DAB) székháza (Debrecen, Thomas Mann u. 49. <http://mnytud.arts.unideb.hu/tkny/de-dab_map.html>), I. emelet *Időpont: *hétfőnként, 16 órától *Előadások:* 1. *Kálmán László *(MTA Nyelvtudományi Intézet; MTA-ELTE Elméleti Nyelvészeti Kihelyezett Tanszék): *Mi a szabályos, és mi a szabálytalan? *(2013. február 25.) 2. *Szabó Tamás Péter* (MTA Nyelvtudományi Intézet): *Szabály, vélemény vagy hagyomány? Nyelvi értékítéletek nyomában* (2013. március 4.) 3. *Békés Vera* (MTA Filozófiai Intézet; EKF Filozófia Tanszék): *Réger Zita hagyatéka* (2013. március 11.) 4. *Tompa Tamás* (ME Preventív Medicina Tanszék; Department of Neuroscience, Medical University of South Carolina, Charleston): *Van képünk hozzá? Avagy mire KÉPes a posztmodern idegtudomány társas környezetben *(2013. március 18.) 5. *Wéber Katalin *(PTE, Idegen Nyelvi Titkárság): *Igévé vált tettek. Az igeragozás megjelenése a magyar gyermeknyelvben *(2013. március 25.) 6. *Gyarmathy Zsófia *(Applied Logic Laboratory, Budapest):* A bizonytalanság két arca: hiány és variáció a fonológiában* (2013. április 8.) 7. *Nemes László *(DE DEOEC Magatartástudományi Intézet): *A moralitás fogalma társas-intuícionista megközelítésben* (2013. április 15.) Az előadásokon minden érdeklődőt örömmel lát a Társas-Kognitív Nyelvészeti Kutatócsoport és a DAB Nyelvtudományi Munkabizottsága. Ha előadás-sorozatunk vagy kutatásaink felkeltették érdeklődését, látogasson el honlapunkra (http://mnytud.arts.unideb.hu/tkny/), és regisztráljon hírlevelünkre (https://mail.unideb. hu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tarskogny/), vagy kövesseen bennünket a Facebookon <https://www.facebook.com/tarskogny>, hogy a későbbiekben is értesítést kapjon előadásainkról, publikációinkról. Az előadásokat nem sokkal elhangzásuk után megtekintheti a Videotoriumon is hasonlóan a 2011. évi<http://videotorium.hu/hu/events/mydetails/340,Bevezetes_a_tarsas-kognitiv_n…>és tavalyi<http://videotorium.hu/hu/events/mydetails/589,A_Tarsas-Kognitiv_Nyelveszeti…>előadás-sorozatunkhoz. Debrecen, 2012. március 2. Kis Tamás Fehér Krisztina Tóth Valéria A Társas-Kognitív Nyelvészeti Kutatócsoport alapító tagjai A DAB Nyelvtudományi Munkabizottságának elnöke

13 years, 2 months

[koglist] invitation to a talk on`Conscious Agency`b Elisabeth Pacherie - 19 February, 5.30 PM

by Krisztina Biber

The CEU Department of Philosophy cordially invites you to a talk (as part of its Departmental Colloquium series) by Elisabeth Pacherie (CNRS Institut Jean-Nicod, Paris – CEU IAS Fellow 2013) on `Conscious Agency` Tuesday, 19 February, 2013, 5.30 PM, Zrinyi 14, Room 412 ABSTRACT On a traditional philosophical view of the structure of agency, intentions, conceived as conscious mental states, are the causes of actions. In recent times, this traditional view has come under attack from both philosophers and cognitive scientists. Two main worries have been raised. The first worry concerns the causal efficacy of intentions qua conscious states. The second worry concerns the nature of the relation between intentions and action, and whether this relation is best described as a causal relation rather than as a control relation. Current scientific evidence provides strong support for the view that action is hierarchically organized and involves several levels of intentions, action representations and action control processes. I shall argue that the traditional philosophical view, but also some of the objections levelled against it, rest in part on an over-simplified conception of the structure of agency and that taking into account the hierarchical nature of intentions and control processes can lead to a reassessment of the relation between intentions and action and of the role of conscious agency in action production.

13 years, 2 months

[koglist] Emlékeztető - BME Kognitív Szemináriumsorozat / Reminder - BME Cognitive Seminar Series

by Attila Keresztes

Szeretettel látunk mindenkit sorozatunk következő előadására! We cordially invite you to the next lecture of the BME Cognitive Seminar Series Időpont/Date & Time: February 11, Hétfő/Monday, 11:00-12:00 Helyszín/Location: BME, XI., Egry József utca 1., T. ép 515. ***EEG- fMRI integration and its application in the analysis of epileptic data and cognitive paradigms * *Hunyadi Borbála* Dept. Electrical Engineering, ESAT/SCD Katholieke Universiteit Leuven* *http://homes.esat.kuleuven.be/~biomed/person.php?persid=434* * -- Attila Keresztes Junior research fellow Budapest University of Technology and Economics Dept. of Cognitive Science, Egry József u. 1., Budapest 1111, Hungary +36 1 4633525 akeresztes(a)cogsci.bme.hu

13 years, 2 months

[koglist] Invitation to a seminar by Vincent Descombes on`Delineating the Content of the Mind`- 15 February, 10.00 - 12.00

by Krisztina Biber

The CEU Department of Philosophy and the Human Project cordially invite you to a seminar organized jointly with the Institute Français de Budapest by Vincent Descombes (EHESS, Paris) on Delineating the Content of the Mind Friday, 15 February, 2013, 10 – 12 AM, Nádor u 13, Room 001 ABSTRACT "Externalism about the mind” is the view that mental states and attitudes cannot be attributed to a subject in abstraction from her/his exterior environment. This paper will revisit the issue of externalism from the perspective of a social philosophy of action.

13 years, 3 months

[koglist] Meghívó - BME Kognitív Szemináriumsorozat / Invitation - BME Cognitive Seminar Series

by Attila Keresztes

Szeretettel látunk mindenkit sorozatunk következo" elo"adására! We cordially invite you to the next lecture of the BME Cognitive Seminar Series Ido"pont/Date & Time: February 11, Hétfo"/Monday, 11:00-12:00 Helyszín/Location: BME, XI., Egry József utca 1., T. ép 515. ***EEG- fMRI integration and its application in the analysis of epileptic data and cognitive paradigms * *Hunyadi Borbála* Dept. Electrical Engineering, ESAT/SCD Katholieke Universiteit Leuven* *http://homes.esat.kuleuven.be/~biomed/person.php?persid=434* * -- Attila Keresztes Junior research fellow Budapest University of Technology and Economics Dept. of Cognitive Science, Egry József u. 1., Budapest 1111, Hungary +36 1 4633525 akeresztes(a)cogsci.bme.hu

13 years, 3 months

[koglist] Fw: invitation to a talk on`Merleau-Ponty and his „primacy of perception“ thesis`by Jakub Čapek - 12 February, 5.30 PM

by Csaba Pléh

Csaba Pléh professor of psychology presently: Collegium de Lyon 15 parvis Rene Descartes ENS Recherche R 147 69007 Lyon France T: 33437376596 Fax: 33437376273 Mobile: 36303493735, csaba.pleh(a)ens-lyon.fr Eszterhazy Karoly College Eger H-3300 editor in chief, Hungarian Review of Psychology member, Academia Europaea and the Hungarian Academy of Sciences ----- Original Message ----- From: Krisztina Biber To: whatson(a)ceu.hu ; mafla(a)phil.elte.hu Sent: Wednesday, February 06, 2013 9:23 AM Subject: [koglist] invitation to a talk on`Merleau-Ponty and his „primacy of perception“ thesis`by Jakub Čapek - 12 February, 5.30 PM The CEU Department of Philosophy cordially invites you to a talk (as part of its Departmental Colloquium series) by Jakub Čapek (Charles University, Prague) on `Merleau-Ponty and his „primacy of perception“ thesis` Tuesday, 12 February, 2013, 5.30 PM, Zrinyi 14, Room 412 ABSTRACT In Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy, perception is not just a possible philosophical issue. The analysis of perception largely determines the way other philosophical issues, such as consciousness, time, language or ideal objects, should be approached. Merleau-Ponty repeatedly affirms the priority of perceiving, as, for instance, in his 1946 lecture The Primacy of Perception and Its Philosophical Consequences or in his masterpiece Phenomenology of Perception (1945), where he regards perception as our “primordial knowledge” of the real. In my work on Merleau-Ponty, I do two things: (1.) I try to state as clearly as possible, what meaning the primacy of perception has, and (2.) what philosophical consequences it implies. In my lecture, I proceed in three steps. Since the thesis of the primacy of perception – in all its possible meanings – presupposes a certain idea of what perception is, I briefly outline Merleau-Ponty’s theory of perception. Secondly, I come back to the primacy of perception thesis. I propose to distinguish its three possible meanings. This enables us to formulate our question more precisely. Thirdly, I focus on one area of application of Merleau-Ponty’s fundamental thesis, viz. on his analysis of consciousness. I will interpret his statement: “All consciousness is, in some measure, perceptual consciousness.”

13 years, 3 months

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koglist February 2013