Csaba Pléh professor of psychology presently: Collegium de Lyon 15 parvis Rene Descartes ENS Recherche R 147 69007 Lyon France T: 33437376596 Fax: 33437376273 Mobile: 36303493735, csaba.pleh(a)ens-lyon.fr Eszterhazy Karoly College Eger H-3300 editor in chief, Hungarian Review of Psychology member, Academia Europaea and the Hungarian Academy of Sciences ----- Original Message ----- From: Krisztina Biber To: whatson(a)ceu.hu ; mafla(a)phil.elte.hu Sent: Wednesday, February 06, 2013 9:23 AM Subject: [koglist] invitation to a talk on`Merleau-Ponty and his „primacy of perception“ thesis`by Jakub Čapek - 12 February, 5.30 PM The CEU Department of Philosophy cordially invites you to a talk (as part of its Departmental Colloquium series) by Jakub Čapek (Charles University, Prague) on `Merleau-Ponty and his „primacy of perception“ thesis` Tuesday, 12 February, 2013, 5.30 PM, Zrinyi 14, Room 412 ABSTRACT In Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy, perception is not just a possible philosophical issue. The analysis of perception largely determines the way other philosophical issues, such as consciousness, time, language or ideal objects, should be approached. Merleau-Ponty repeatedly affirms the priority of perceiving, as, for instance, in his 1946 lecture The Primacy of Perception and Its Philosophical Consequences or in his masterpiece Phenomenology of Perception (1945), where he regards perception as our “primordial knowledge” of the real. In my work on Merleau-Ponty, I do two things: (1.) I try to state as clearly as possible, what meaning the primacy of perception has, and (2.) what philosophical consequences it implies. In my lecture, I proceed in three steps. Since the thesis of the primacy of perception – in all its possible meanings – presupposes a certain idea of what perception is, I briefly outline Merleau-Ponty’s theory of perception. Secondly, I come back to the primacy of perception thesis. I propose to distinguish its three possible meanings. This enables us to formulate our question more precisely. Thirdly, I focus on one area of application of Merleau-Ponty’s fundamental thesis, viz. on his analysis of consciousness. I will interpret his statement: “All consciousness is, in some measure, perceptual consciousness.”