koglist December 2011

koglist@maillist.ttk.hu

16 participants
26 discussions

by Agnes Kovacs

Conference announcement and Call For Posters SOCIAL COGNITION, ENGAGEMENT, AND THE SECOND-PERSON-PERSPECTIVE Interdisciplinary Conference, University of Cologne (Germany), May 25-27, 2012 What are the psychological processes and neural mechanisms enabling social cognition? How might social cognition be modulated depending on whether one is actively engaged in social interaction with someone or merely observing others interact? What is the impact of this distinction for research methodologies in social psychology and social neuroscience as well as for our understanding of conditions like autism? In particular, this conference brings together experts from various fields to promote the prospects of a second-person approach for future research into the foundations of social cognition. Speakers and Discussants Cristina Becchio (Torino), Alan Costall (Portsmouth), Chris Frith (London), Uta Frith (London), Thomas Fuchs (Heidelberg), Shaun Gallagher (Memphis), Tobias Grossmann (Leipzig), Riita Hari (Helsinki), Günther Knoblich (Budapest), Agnes Kovacs (Budapest), Joel Krueger (Kopenhagen), Cade McCall (Leipzig), Victoria McGeer (Princeton), Albert Newen (Bochum), Vasudevi Reddy (Portsmouth), Erik Rietveld (Amsterdam), Norihiro Sadato (Tokyo), Leonhard Schilbach (Cologne), Tobias Schlicht (Bochum), Natalie Sebanz (Nijmegen), Corrado Sinigaglia (Milan), Nikolaus Steinbeis (Leipzig), Bert Timmermans (Cologne), Kai Vogeley (Cologne), Wako Yoshida (London). Call for Posters We invite submissions of high quality posters from any discipline on topics related to the main theme of the conference. Posters should be directly submitted in pdf format or by way of an abstract of approx. 500 words. Contact details authors names, postal address, affiliation and e-mail address should be given separately. Please submit your posters by email to Nike Zohm (nike.zohm (at) rub.de) before March 1st, 2012! Organization Prof. Dr. Tobias Schlicht (Ruhr-Universität Bochum), Dr. Leonhard Schilbach (Uniklinik Köln), Dr. Nikolaus Steinbeis (MPI for Human Cognitive and Brain Sciences, Leipzig), Dr. Bert Timmermans (Uniklinik Köln) Further Information http://www.rub.de/philosophy/2ppconference This conference is part of the research project Being addressed as You (http://www.rub.de/philosophy/socialcognition), funded by the Volkswagen Foundation within their funding initiative European Platform (http://www.volkswagenstiftung.de/foerderung/herausforderungen/european-plat…). Prof. Dr. Tobias Schlicht Professor for Philosophy of Consciousness & Cognition Institut für Philosophie II Ruhr-Universität Bochum Universitätsstr. 150, GA3/29 44780 Bochum Email: tobias.schlicht(a)rub.de

14 years, 4 months

[koglist] four linguistics assistant professor jobs, U of Manchester

by Anne Tamm

The Department of Linguistics and English Language of the University of Manchester is seeking to appoint FOUR new lecturers (assistant professors) from 1 September 2012: one in Linguistics and three in English Linguistics. LECTURER IN LINGUISTICS (one post) http://tinyurl.com/82chvqg Candidates with a research specialism in any area of Linguistics are encouraged to apply. A specialism in psycholinguistics and/or child language acquisition may be an advantage. LECTURER IN ENGLISH LINGUISTICS (three posts) http://tinyurl.com/brmenc3 Candidates with a research specialism in any area of English Linguistics are encouraged to apply. A specialism in historical linguistics, child language acquisition, psycholinguistics, or corpus-based and quantitative methods of data analysis may be an advantage. We should be grateful if you would distribute this information widely and encourage applications by any eligible candidates who may be interested.

14 years, 5 months

[koglist] BBS Call for Commentary Proposals: Baumard

by Behavioral and Brain Sciences

Dear Dr. Qwerty: We are writing you to announce that BBS has just accepted an article for open peer commentary in BBS. The article was already reviewed, and we are now accepting commentary proposals. If you are interested in writing a commentary, you are welcome to submit a short proposal (see instructions below). No action is required if you aren't interested. Please DO NOT submit a full commentary article unless you are formally invited---AFTER you submit a commentary *proposal*. We will review all commentary proposals and issue invitations between the middle and end of January. Also, please be aware that we typically receive far more commentary proposals than we can accommodate with formal invitations. When choosing invitations, we balance over multiple factors, including the interest of the commentary itself, the commentator's expertise, whether the commentator's work has been discussed in the target article, and other considerations. NOW PROCESSING COMMENTARY PROPOSALS ON: Target Article: "A mutualistic approach to morality" Authors: Nicolas Baumard, Jean-Baptiste André, and Dan Sperber Deadline for Commentary Proposals: December 30, 2011 Abstract: What makes humans moral beings? This question can be understood either as a proximate 'how' question or as an ultimate 'why' question. The 'how' question is about the mental and social mechanisms that produce moral judgments and interactions, and has been investigated by psychologists and social scientists. The 'why' question is about the fitness consequences that explain why humans have morality, and has been discussed by evolutionary biologists in the context of the evolution of cooperation. Our goal here is to contribute to a fruitful articulation of such proximate and ultimate explanations of human morality. We develop an approach to morality as an adaptation to an environment in which individuals were in competition to be chosen and recruited in mutually advantageous cooperative interactions. In this environment, the best strategy is to treat others with impartiality and to share the costs and benefits of cooperation equally. Those who offer less than others will be left out of cooperation; conversely, those who offer more will be exploited by their partners. In line with this mutualistic approach, the study of a range of economic games involving property rights, collective actions, mutual help and punishment shows that participants' distributions aim at sharing the costs and benefits of interactions in an impartial way. In particular, the distribution of resources is influenced by effort and talent, and the perception of each participant's rights on the resources to be distributed. Keywords: Evolution of cooperation; moral cognition; fairness; experimental games; punishment; cultural variability Download Target Article Preprint:http://journals.cambridge.org/BBSJournal/Call/Baumard_preprint COMMENTARY PROPOSALS *MUST* INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING 1. What aspect of the target article or book you would anticipate commenting on. 2. The relevant expertise you would bring to bear on the target article or book. Please include names and affiliations of your co-authors, if applicable, in the text of your commentary proposal. SUGGESTING COMMENTATORS AND NOMINATING BBS ASSOCIATES Commentators must be BBS Associates, or suggested by a BBS Associate. If you are not a BBS Associate, please follow the instructions below. To suggest others as possible Commentators, or to nominate others for BBS Associateship status, please email bbsjournal(a)cambridge.org. http://journals.cambridge.org/BBSJournal/Inst/Assoc HOW TO SUBMIT A COMMENTARY PROPOSAL If you would like to nominate yourself for potential commentary invitation, you must submit a Commentary Proposal via our BBS Editorial Manager site: 1. Log-in as Author Username: CQwerty-545 Password: Qwerty875632 Log-in to your BBS Editorial Manager account as an author: http://www.editorialmanager.com/bbs If you do not have an account, please visit the site and register. You can also submit a request for missing username and password information if you have an existing account. 2. Submit New Manuscript Within your author main menu please select Submit New Manuscript. 3. Select Article Type Choose the article type of your manuscript from the pull-down menu. Commentary Proposal article types are temporarily created for each accepted target article or book. Only select the Commentary Proposal article type that you wish to submit a proposal on. For example: "Commentary Proposal (Baumard)" 4. Enter Title Please title your proposal submission by indicating the relevant first author name of the target article or book. For example: "Commentary Proposal on Baumard" 5. Add Co-Authors If you are proposing to write a commentary with any co-authors, the system will not allow you to enter their information here. Instead, include their names in the commentary proposal document you upload. These potential co-authors need not contribute to the Commentary Proposal itself. 6. Attach Files The only required submission Item is your Commentary Proposal in MSWord or RTF format. In the Description field please add the first author name of the target article or book. For example: "Commentary Proposal on Baumard" 7. Approve Your Submission Editorial Manager will process your Commentary Proposal submission and will create a PDF for your approval. On the "Submissions Waiting for Author's Approval" page, you can view your PDF, edit, approve, or remove the submission. (You might have to wait several minutes for the blue "Action" menu to appear, allowing you to approve. Once you have Approved the Submission, the PDF will be sent to the editorial office. **It is VERY important that you check and approve your Commentary Proposal manuscript as described above. Otherwise, we cannot process your submission.** 8. Editorial Office Decision At the conclusion of the Commentary Proposal period, the editors will review all the submitted Commentary Proposals. An undetermined number of Commentary Proposals will be approved and those author names will be added to the final commentary invitation list. At that time you will be notified of the decision. If you are formally invited to submit a commentary, you will be asked to confirm your intention to submit by the commentary deadline. Note: Before the commentary invitations are sent, the copy-edited and revised target article will be posted for invitees. In the case of Multiple Book Review, invitees will be sent a copy of the book to be commented upon if requested. With Multiple Book Reviews, it is the book, not the précis article that is the target of commentary. Please do not write a commentary unless you have received an official invitation! BEING REMOVED FROM THE CALL EMAIL LIST If you DO NOT wish to receive Call for Commentary Proposals in the future, please reply to bbsjournal(a)cambridge.org, and type "remove" in the subject line. Regards, Gennifer Levey Managing Editor, BBS Cambridge University Press bbsjournal(a)cambridge.org http://journals.cambridge.org/bbs http://bbs.edmgr.com/

14 years, 5 months

[koglist] Guenther Fleck: Psychology of Science eloadasai

by Ropolyi Laszlo

Kedves Kollégák! Ajánlom szíves figyelmükbe az alábbi előadássorozatot! Az előadó és a szervezők minden érdeklődőt örömmel fogadnak. Üdvözlettel: Ropolyi László ------------------------------------------------- Günther Fleck, Ph.D. Seminar in Psychology of Science Time: 12-15 December 2011 Venue: BME Filozófia és Tudománytörténet Tanszék, 1111 Bp. Egry József utca 1., E épület 6. emelet 612. Schedule Monday, 12th of Dec.: 13.30-15.00 and 15.30-17.00 Tuesday, 13th of Dec.: 10.30-12.00, 13.30-15.00 and 15.30-17.00 Wednesday, 14th of Dec.: 10.30-12.00, 13.30-15.00 and 15.30-17.00 Thursday, 15th of Dec.: 10.30-12.00, 13.30-15.00 and 15.30-17.00 Topics Monday: - Psychology of Science - Contributions to Metascience - Scientific Thinking and its Mental Infrastructure Tuesday: - The Rationality of Science - Passions of the Scientist - Varieties of Human Relatedness in Scientific Explorations: Impact on Knowledge Construction Wednesday: - Reality Testing and Knowledge Production: A Psychological View of the Realism-Antirealism Controversy - Altered States of Consciousness, Scientific Creativity, and Possible Benefits of State-Specific Knowledge - Participatory Epistemology: Basics, Applications and a Practical Introduction Thursday: - World Views and the Meaning of Truth: Dogmatic versus Hypothetical Interpretations - The Anti-Science Phenomenon: Psychological Roots of Risky Developments Concerning Science - Systematic Self-Reflection for Scientists: Transformations of Belief Systems Abstracts Scientific Thinking and its Mental Infrastructure In the Western (academic) world scientific thinking is generally viewed as the most powerful means to tackle different problems and to find the most effective solutions for them. The ability to create good theories in order to describe and explain the phenomena is acknowledged as central to scientific thinking. Accordingly, a kind of objectivity and pure rationalism are attributed to it. But scientific thinking is neither a pure cognitive process nor does it take place in an empty space. In this chapter it is argued that scientific thinking just like any other normal every day type of thinking is to be understood as a cognitive-affective process embedded in a mental infrastructure. This thesis will be elaborated in detail. Every scientist engaged in constructing a theory (or a model or a hypothesis) starts from some kind of pre-knowledge in order to formulate his or her first considerations concerning a scientific problem. These considerations have to be transformed into a consistent pattern so that they are amenable to further elaboration. Scientists have their own special theoretical orientation (e.g., a psychodynamic or behavioral one in psychology) which constitutes the explicit frame for their reasoning, and provides the major components which function as a guide for research. But there is something more behind the explicit theoretical orientation affecting theory building. Researchers have adopted various ways of thinking (e.g., formalistic, mechanistic, organismic and contextualist thinking), have developed basic belief systems (mindscapes, root metaphors) about how things are (e.g., man as machine or man as a living organism), have made decisions in regard to a special epistemology (e.g., objectivist or constructivist), have demonstrated preferences for a special philosophy of science (e.g., positivism, critical rationalism or hermeneutics) and its corresponding scientific methodology (quantitative and/or qualitative) and methods (e.g., observation, experiment, simulation, biography). These mental characteristics of researchers may be conceived and conceptualized as the mental infrastructure of theory building. The mental infrastructure is characteristic for the individual and reflects his or her cognitive, motivational, affective and personality characteristics. The basic argument is that every kind of theory building needs an infrastructure of this kind which, on the one hand, enables theory building, and on the other hand, constrains theory building. Thus, the mental infrastructure of theory building represents the basic ingredients of all researchers' theorizing. In this chapter an attempt is made to reconstruct these ingredients in detail and to render them explicit. This is necessary since most scientists most of the time are not aware of their mental infrastructure. Becoming aware of it may enable the investigator to recognize its impact on one's theorizing. This may be helpful for overcoming scientific dead ends and for finding new solutions to problems. Varieties of Human Relatedness in Scientific Explorations: Impact on Knowledge Construction With very few exceptions human beings are always embedded in some kind of social relationship. This is true of both laymen and scientists. Thus, skilful personal boundary management in every day life and scientific laboratories is required to cope successfully with the various social demands. In this paper an attempt is made to provide a framework of human relatedness in the context of scientific explorations and its central role in knowledge construction. It is argued that knowledge construction cannot be grasped as a purely rational process since scientific thinking never takes place in emotionally neutral space. Additionally, the kind of relationship a scientist creates between his or her research object strongly determines the outcome, especially in the human and social sciences. Unfortunately, scholars are often not aware of this influence and even deny it. Hence, every scientist should become very sensitive to his or her scientific relatedness. To do this in a good way one has to look at one.s own mode of perception and critically reflect it. Knowledge construction has to be understood as the result of the transaction of the kind of relatedness of the scientist to his or her research object based on his or her perceptual mode. Reality Testing and Knowledge Production: A Psychological View of the Realism-Antirealism Controversy There are two basic positions in regard to knowledge about the world and reality which can be traced as far back as the times of the philosophers of ancient Greece. On the one hand, there is the position of those who believe that there exists a way of knowing allowing an objective access to the structures of the world and reality beyond observation. On the other hand, there is the position of those who argue that no such way of ontological knowing exists. The former is known as (scientific) realism, the latter as antirealism. Both positions provide a lot of good reasons for their stance and against the contrary one. From a philosophical point of view the disputation seems to be held on a pure rational level. However, empirical evidence shows that in (scientific) reasoning emotional factors are always involved and that pure rationalism is nothing but a big myth. Starting with a psychological analysis of human reality testing ability as an important adaptation principle in every day life, an attempt is made to identify the implicit emotional factors underlying scientific reasoning and co-determining the preferences for epistemological positions. Altered States of Consciousness, Scientific Creativity, and Possible Benefits of State-Specific Knowledge It is argued that there exists a trans-cultural natural trance capacity in every human that renders possible the experience of different states of consciousness and awareness, regardless of whether they are produced spontaneously or voluntarily. These induced altered states of consciousness often show not only dramatic alterations in subjective experiences, but also include from time to time some kind of knowledge, different from our normal day by day knowledge. Since this special kind of knowledge often appears only in altered states of consciousness, we will refer to it as "state-specific knowledge". In this lecture criticism will be levelled against the still often practised stance of interpreting knowledge produced by altered states of consciousness as trivial and unimportant. Alternatively, an approach regarding knowledge produced by altered states of consciousness with special reference to Charles Tart.s concept of state-specific sciences as a potentially meaningful resource for human development and personal growth will be presented. First, an integrative account of altered states of consciousness, states of awareness and emerging patterns of experience will be provided. After considering the manner in which people induce altered states, the various kinds of emerging experiences will be classified into a typology of knowledge patterns. Finally, the potentialities of these knowledge types to contribute to human development and personal growth will be outlined and discussed. Various experiential phenomena and types of knowledge produced by altered states of consciousness may function as important resources for human development and personal growth. Thus, the devaluation of this knowledge is rejected. It depends on the individual's ability to critically reflect on the emerging contents of consciousness and to integrate them into every life or scientific practice. World Views and the Meaning of Truth: Dogmatic versus Hypothetical Interpretations Every human being needs a kind of orientation to cope with the challenges of life. This general frame, the subjective world view helps to bring order into the complexity and variety of events and things. With regard to the individual.s world view two basic differences may be distinguished. On the one hand, more and more people become able to recognise that their personal world views have to be understood as mental constructions offering different accesses to reality, and that there doesn.t exist a last absolute kind of truth which can be grasped rationally. On the other hand, more and more people tend to become convinced that their personal world views (e.g., political or religious belief systems) represent the absolute truth. This kind of polarisation can be observed all over the world, in all cultures and societies and leads to conflicts or even wars. It is argued that the preference of dogmatic or hypothetical world views with respect to the meaning of truth cannot be understood in a poor rational way. In this lecture an attempt is made to reconstruct the underlying generating mechanisms being responsible to produce and maintain dogmatic or hypothetical meanings of truth. The Anti-Science Phenomenon: Psychological Roots of Risky Developments Concerning Science In recent years we have been witnessing various movements attacking the position of science. These attacks originated in different domains, such as political and religious fundamentalism, esotericism, or relativism. They all share a more or less radical rejection of science emphasizing their own brand of world view as absolute truth. Some of these attacks on science (e.g., the New Age Movement) may be considered as a reaction against the extreme version of science . scientism. Viewing science as the only way of gaining genuine (true) knowledge, scientism has provoked and promoted anti-scientific movements. Unsatisfied with the position of scientism, even many students and young graduates in the Western culture have become susceptible to modern versions of superstition and pseudo-science. The obvious side-effects are the loss of the ability of critical thinking and the increase of superstitious thinking. This lecture offers an attempt to analyse and to understand these movements from a psychological perspective. Systematic Self-Reflection for Scientists: Transformations of Belief Systems Every scientist needs some kind of philosophical orientation to guide his or her research intentions and projects. This orientation is based on some fundamental assumptions about the world and its phenomena. Assumptions of this kind, often called root metaphors, are considered to be largely implicit. Thus, most scientists are unaware of their basic belief systems in regard to science. Various authors have stressed the function of these belief systems as structuring and simultaneously limiting research and theory construction. With respect to scientific creativity researchers are advised to take an interest in transcending their mental scope, gaining new insights into problems and finding new solutions for them. Since root metaphors are below the level of conscious awareness it is necessary to make some special effort or apply a specific method to render them explicit. Such a method, systematic self-reflection, will be presented in this paper. Systematic self reflection is regarded as a special way to tackle important areas of science systematically, characterized by intentionality and regularity. Following a survey of the theoretical background, the rationale of systematic self-reflection will be discussed, thereby focussing on its goals ("What should be reached via self-reflection?"), contents ("What should one reflect about?") and formal aspects ("How should one reflect?"). Finally, possibilities and limits of systematic self-reflection are considered.

14 years, 5 months

[koglist] Theoretical Philosophy Forum, Andras Benedek

by Laszlo E. Szabo

THEORETICAL PHILOSOPHY FORUM Institute of Philosophy Faculty of Humanities, Eötvös University Address: Múzeum krt. 4/i, Budapest 14 December (Wednesday) 5:00 PM Room 226 András G. Benedek Institute for Philosophical Research, HAS, Budapest Dynamic Models of the Growth of Knowledge ___________________________________ Abstracts and printable program (poster) are available from the web site of the Forum: http://phil.elte.hu/tpf (Please feel free to post the program in your institution!) The Forum is open to everyone, including students, visitors, and faculty members from all departments and institutes! Format: 60 minute lecture, coffee break, 60 minute discussion. The organizer of the Forum: László E. Szabó (leszabo(a)phil.elte.hu) -- L a s z l o E. S z a b o Professor of Philosophy DEPARTMENT OF LOGIC, INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY EOTVOS UNIVERSITY, BUDAPEST http://phil.elte.hu/leszabo

14 years, 5 months

[koglist] [CDC Seminars] REMINDER: CDC Seminar, Sarah-Jane Leslie, THURSDAY, December 8, 2011, 5 PM

by Marian Chen

PLEASE NOTE: This talk will take place on a different day than usual. Our seminar room has a limited capacity so please arrive early to ensure you will get a seat! The talk will start promptly at 5 PM. The next talk in the CDC Seminar series will be given by: Sarah-Jane Leslie, Princeton University Date: THURSDAY, December 8, 2011, 5 PM Location: Cognitive Development Center, Hattyú u. 14, 3rd floor *Generics as cognitive defaults * Abstract: Generic sentences express generalizations about kinds, such as "tigers are striped", "ducks lay eggs", and "ticks carry Lyme disease". I present and review emerging evidence from adults and children that suggests that generics articulate cognitively default generalizations -- i.e., they express basic, early-developing inductive generalizations concerning kinds. Further evidence suggests that these generalizations don't depend solely on information about prevalence. For example, "ticks carry Lyme disease" is accepted, but "books are paperbacks" is not, despite the fact - well-known and acknowledged by participants - that paperbacks are much more prevalent among books than Lyme-disease-carrying is among ticks. Similarly, both adults and preschoolers understand that, e.g., only female ducks lay eggs, yet they are more likely to accept "ducks lay eggs" than "ducks are female". Rather than depending solely on information about prevalence, these primitive generic generalizations are sensitive to a number of content-based factors, such as whether the property in question is dangerous or otherwise striking (as in "ticks carry Lyme disease"), or is an essential or characteristic property of the kind (as in "ducks lay eggs"). This suggests that our most basic means of forming inductive generalizations about kinds is not guided by prevalence alone, but also reflects our nature as learners. Cognitive Science Events at CEU: http://cognitivescience.ceu.hu/events _______________________________________________ Subscribe by sending an empty mail to seminars-subscribe(a)cdc.ceu.hu Unsubscribe by sending an empty mail to seminars-unsubscribe(a)cdc.ceu.hu

14 years, 5 months

[koglist] CALL FOR PAPERS - Aspects of Self and Agency - 4th International Philosophy Graduate Conference - March 30-31, 2012, Central European University, Budapest

by Krisztina Biber

CALL FOR PAPERS Aspects of Self and Agency 4th International Philosophy Graduate Conference March 30-31, 2012 Central European University, Budapest The 4th International Philosophy Graduate Conference at the Central European University concerns two rich topics in the philosophy of mind and moral philosophy: the self and agency. Keynote speaker: Lucy O'Brien (UCL), second keynote to be confirmed. The topic includes self-awareness, embodiment, first-person authority, various aspects of agency, such as the connection between agency and reasons (and practical rationality), as well as ontological problems about the self/agency and historical takes on any of these subjects. We welcome papers that discuss linguistic self-reference, self-awareness, selfconsciousness, embodiment, first-person authority, self-attribution of agency as well ontological problems about the self. We also welcome papers about various aspects of agency, such as the connection between agency and reasons (and practical rationality), the authorship account of actions, agency and autonomy, implications of theories of personal identity and moral philosophy, normative ethics and applied ethics. In addition, we welcome papers about historical takes on any of these topics. Submission deadline: January 20, 2012. SUBMISSION GUIDELINE AND ONLINE APPLICATION AT PHILOSOPHY.CEU.HU/GRADCONF CEU`s Philosophy Department is internationally recognized as one of the top analytic philosophy programs in continental Europe. The Department uniquely combines analytic, historical and continental approaches to philosophy. This feature of our program allows for a fruitful dialogue between contemporary philosophy and its history as well as between analytic and continental approaches.

14 years, 5 months

[koglist] Karl Edlinger eloadasa az ELTE-n

by Ropolyi Laszlo

Meghívó Kedves Kollégák! Az ELTE Tudománytörténet és Tudományfilozófia Tanszékén előadást tart Karl Edlinger Museum of Natural History, Vienna, Austria karlfranz.edlinger(a)gmail.com What is life - the need for a consistent theory of the organism címmel. Az előadás helyszíne: 1117 Budapest Pázmány sétány 1/c, Déli tömb 1.711 terem Időpontja: 2011. december 12, hétfő 18 óra Az előadáson minden érdeklődőt szívesen látunk! Abstract The biological disciplines show us a curious situation, which sets an important distinct mark between biology on one hand and astronomy, physics, chemistry, mineralogy, and geology on the other. The development of the non-biological sciences gave rise to a high level of mathematical sophistication and physical explanation. They were seen under the perspective of experimental testing and reliable prediction. In contrast the biological disciplines show this trend in a restricted way and only in such sections which are overlapping with other sciences, especially physics and chemistry. However, the very subject of biology, the living organism as a functioning whole, is not taken into consideration, it excludes the access of usual scientific procedures. Attempts to solve this problem were made by formulating new models and theories on the basis of thermodynamics, synergetics, traditional systems theories, the theory of chaos or, last but not least, on a new variant of vitalism, called holism. However these models and theories are helpful for explaining processes of physics and technology and are of a general importance for a multitude of natural phenomena, but in no way specific for organisms. Systems theory refers to interactions and interdependencies of complex entities in general. It does not provide acceptable definitions of organisms and the special features of living beings. Holism is also not acceptable because it must postulate forces and mechanisms which cannot be studied by the methods of natural sciences. It can easily be shown, that science must be founded on a solid theoretical basis. This basis is achieved by a fundamental analysis of acts (Handlungen) and above all by a succession of acts, performed by a craftsman or a scientist. Each succession of acts enacts a theoretical assumption, a hypothesis about the nature of the object of handling. From this presupposition physicians handle living organisms. If they keep up their living functions, they must conceive of organisms as hydraulic and mechanic systems, containing other subsystems which are partially of chemical nature. In accordance with this approach the theory of organismic constructions configures organisms as hydraulic systems, consisting of a mechanical frameworks and a fluid filling. Form and organization are enforced by a complex system of elements, acting in an antagonistic way. This framework comprises additional mechanical and chemical mechanisms. The action of all of these are highly coordinated and function in accordance to the requirements of the system as a functioning whole. This concept is consistent with the constructional demands of the mechanical framework, which allow only a certain order of procedures. As shown by construtvistic philosophers of science the results of empirical science are compatible with this view. The same methodological procedures should apply to biological research but are not yet worked out in a sufficient way. Üdvözlettel: Ropolyi László

14 years, 5 months

[koglist] The Problems of the Self - CEU Summer University June 25 - July 5, 2012

by Gergely Csibra

14 years, 5 months

[koglist] CEU PhD in Cognitive Science-Call for Applications

by Gyorgyne Finta

Dear Professors, Central European University is announcing a Call for Application for its PhD program in Cognitive Science. The application deadline is 25 January, 2012. For further information please visit www.ceu.hu/admissions Please distribute/circulate this information among your students-colleagues. Thank you and Kind regards, Györgyné Finta (Réka) Department Coordinator ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Central European University Department of Cognitive Science H-1023 Budapest Frankel Leó út 30-34. tel: (36-1) 887-5138 fax: (36-1) 887-5010 http://www.ceu.hu http://cognitivescience.ceu.hu email: szabor(a)ceu.hu

14 years, 5 months

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koglist December 2011