Conference announcement and Call For Posters
SOCIAL COGNITION, ENGAGEMENT, AND THE SECOND-PERSON-PERSPECTIVE
Interdisciplinary Conference, University of Cologne (Germany), May 25-27,
2012
What are the psychological processes and neural mechanisms enabling social
cognition? How might social cognition be modulated depending on whether
one is actively engaged in social interaction with someone or merely
observing others interact? What is the impact of this distinction for
research methodologies in social psychology and social neuroscience as
well as for our understanding of conditions like autism? In particular,
this conference brings together experts from various fields to promote the
prospects of a second-person approach for future research into the
foundations of social cognition.
Speakers and Discussants
Cristina Becchio (Torino), Alan Costall (Portsmouth), Chris Frith
(London), Uta Frith (London), Thomas Fuchs (Heidelberg), Shaun Gallagher
(Memphis), Tobias Grossmann (Leipzig), Riita Hari (Helsinki), Günther
Knoblich (Budapest), Agnes Kovacs (Budapest), Joel Krueger (Kopenhagen),
Cade McCall (Leipzig), Victoria McGeer (Princeton), Albert Newen (Bochum),
Vasudevi Reddy (Portsmouth), Erik Rietveld (Amsterdam), Norihiro Sadato
(Tokyo), Leonhard Schilbach (Cologne), Tobias Schlicht (Bochum), Natalie
Sebanz (Nijmegen), Corrado Sinigaglia (Milan), Nikolaus Steinbeis
(Leipzig), Bert Timmermans (Cologne), Kai Vogeley (Cologne), Wako Yoshida
(London).
Call for Posters
We invite submissions of high quality posters from any discipline on
topics related to the main theme of the conference. Posters should be
directly submitted in pdf format or by way of an abstract of approx. 500
words. Contact details authors names, postal address, affiliation and
e-mail address should be given separately. Please submit your posters by
email to Nike Zohm (nike.zohm (at) rub.de) before March 1st, 2012!
Organization
Prof. Dr. Tobias Schlicht (Ruhr-Universität Bochum), Dr. Leonhard
Schilbach (Uniklinik Köln), Dr. Nikolaus Steinbeis (MPI for Human
Cognitive and Brain Sciences, Leipzig), Dr. Bert Timmermans (Uniklinik
Köln)
Further Information http://www.rub.de/philosophy/2ppconference
This conference is part of the research project Being addressed as You
(http://www.rub.de/philosophy/socialcognition), funded by the Volkswagen
Foundation within their funding initiative European Platform
(http://www.volkswagenstiftung.de/foerderung/herausforderungen/european-plat…).
Prof. Dr. Tobias Schlicht
Professor for Philosophy of
Consciousness & Cognition
Institut für Philosophie II
Ruhr-Universität Bochum
Universitätsstr. 150, GA3/29
44780 Bochum
Email: tobias.schlicht(a)rub.de
The Department of Linguistics and English Language of the
University of Manchester is seeking to appoint FOUR new
lecturers (assistant professors) from 1 September 2012: one
in Linguistics and three in English Linguistics.
LECTURER IN LINGUISTICS (one post)
http://tinyurl.com/82chvqg
Candidates with a research specialism in any area of
Linguistics are encouraged to apply. A specialism in
psycholinguistics and/or child language acquisition
may be an advantage.
LECTURER IN ENGLISH LINGUISTICS (three posts)
http://tinyurl.com/brmenc3
Candidates with a research specialism in any area of English
Linguistics are encouraged to apply. A specialism in historical
linguistics, child language acquisition,
psycholinguistics, or corpus-based and quantitative methods
of data analysis may be an advantage.
We should be grateful if you would distribute this information
widely and encourage applications by any eligible candidates
who may be interested.
Dear Dr. Qwerty:
We are writing you to announce that BBS has just accepted an article for open peer commentary in BBS. The article was already reviewed, and we are now accepting commentary proposals. If you are interested in writing a commentary, you are welcome to submit a short proposal (see instructions below). No action is required if you aren't interested.
Please DO NOT submit a full commentary article unless you are formally invited---AFTER you submit a commentary *proposal*. We will review all commentary proposals and issue invitations between the middle and end of January. Also, please be aware that we typically receive far more commentary proposals than we can accommodate with formal invitations. When choosing invitations, we balance over multiple factors, including the interest of the commentary itself, the commentator's expertise, whether the commentator's work has been discussed in the target article, and other considerations.
NOW PROCESSING COMMENTARY PROPOSALS ON:
Target Article: "A mutualistic approach to morality"
Authors: Nicolas Baumard, Jean-Baptiste André, and Dan Sperber
Deadline for Commentary Proposals: December 30, 2011
Abstract: What makes humans moral beings? This question can be understood either as a proximate 'how' question or as an ultimate 'why' question. The 'how' question is about the mental and social mechanisms that produce moral judgments and interactions, and has been investigated by psychologists and social scientists. The 'why' question is about the fitness consequences that explain why humans have morality, and has been discussed by evolutionary biologists in the context of the evolution of cooperation. Our goal here is to contribute to a fruitful articulation of such proximate and ultimate explanations of human morality. We develop an approach to morality as an adaptation to an environment in which individuals were in competition to be chosen and recruited in mutually advantageous cooperative interactions. In this environment, the best strategy is to treat others with impartiality and to share the costs and benefits of cooperation equally. Those who offer less than others
will be left out of cooperation; conversely, those who offer more will be exploited by their partners. In line with this mutualistic approach, the study of a range of economic games involving property rights, collective actions, mutual help and punishment shows that participants' distributions aim at sharing the costs and benefits of interactions in an impartial way. In particular, the distribution of resources is influenced by effort and talent, and the perception of each participant's rights on the resources to be distributed.
Keywords: Evolution of cooperation; moral cognition; fairness; experimental games; punishment; cultural variability
Download Target Article Preprint:http://journals.cambridge.org/BBSJournal/Call/Baumard_preprint
COMMENTARY PROPOSALS *MUST* INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING
1. What aspect of the target article or book you would anticipate commenting on.
2. The relevant expertise you would bring to bear on the target article or book.
Please include names and affiliations of your co-authors, if applicable, in the text of your commentary proposal.
SUGGESTING COMMENTATORS AND NOMINATING BBS ASSOCIATES
Commentators must be BBS Associates, or suggested by a BBS Associate. If you are not a BBS Associate, please follow the instructions below. To suggest others as possible Commentators, or to nominate others for BBS Associateship status, please email bbsjournal(a)cambridge.org.
http://journals.cambridge.org/BBSJournal/Inst/Assoc
HOW TO SUBMIT A COMMENTARY PROPOSAL
If you would like to nominate yourself for potential commentary invitation, you must submit a Commentary Proposal via our BBS Editorial Manager site:
1. Log-in as Author
Username: CQwerty-545
Password: Qwerty875632
Log-in to your BBS Editorial Manager account as an author:
http://www.editorialmanager.com/bbs
If you do not have an account, please visit the site and register. You can also submit a request for missing username and password information if you have an existing account.
2. Submit New Manuscript
Within your author main menu please select Submit New Manuscript.
3. Select Article Type
Choose the article type of your manuscript from the pull-down menu. Commentary Proposal article types are temporarily created for each accepted target article or book. Only select the Commentary Proposal article type that you wish to submit a proposal on. For example: "Commentary Proposal (Baumard)"
4. Enter Title
Please title your proposal submission by indicating the relevant first author name of the target article or book. For example: "Commentary Proposal on Baumard"
5. Add Co-Authors
If you are proposing to write a commentary with any co-authors, the system will not allow you to enter their information here. Instead, include their names in the commentary proposal document you upload. These potential co-authors need not contribute to the Commentary Proposal itself.
6. Attach Files
The only required submission Item is your Commentary Proposal in MSWord or RTF format. In the Description field please add the first author name of the target article or book. For example: "Commentary Proposal on Baumard"
7. Approve Your Submission
Editorial Manager will process your Commentary Proposal submission and will create a PDF for your approval. On the "Submissions Waiting for Author's Approval" page, you can view your PDF, edit, approve, or remove the submission. (You might have to wait several minutes for the blue "Action" menu to appear, allowing you to approve. Once you have Approved the Submission, the PDF will be sent to the editorial office.
**It is VERY important that you check and approve your Commentary Proposal manuscript as described above. Otherwise, we cannot process your submission.**
8. Editorial Office Decision
At the conclusion of the Commentary Proposal period, the editors will review all the submitted Commentary Proposals. An undetermined number of Commentary Proposals will be approved and those author names will be added to the final commentary invitation list. At that time you will be notified of the decision. If you are formally invited to submit a commentary, you will be asked to confirm your intention to submit by the commentary deadline.
Note: Before the commentary invitations are sent, the copy-edited and revised target article will be posted for invitees. In the case of Multiple Book Review, invitees will be sent a copy of the book to be commented upon if requested. With Multiple Book Reviews, it is the book, not the précis article that is the target of commentary.
Please do not write a commentary unless you have received an official invitation!
BEING REMOVED FROM THE CALL EMAIL LIST
If you DO NOT wish to receive Call for Commentary Proposals in the future, please reply to bbsjournal(a)cambridge.org, and type "remove" in the subject line.
Regards,
Gennifer Levey
Managing Editor, BBS
Cambridge University Press
bbsjournal(a)cambridge.org
http://journals.cambridge.org/bbshttp://bbs.edmgr.com/
Kedves Kollégák!
Ajánlom szíves figyelmükbe az alábbi előadássorozatot!
Az előadó és a szervezők minden érdeklődőt örömmel fogadnak.
Üdvözlettel:
Ropolyi László
-------------------------------------------------
Günther Fleck, Ph.D.
Seminar in Psychology of Science
Time: 12-15 December 2011
Venue: BME Filozófia és Tudománytörténet Tanszék, 1111 Bp. Egry József utca 1.,
E épület 6. emelet 612.
Schedule
Monday, 12th of Dec.: 13.30-15.00 and 15.30-17.00
Tuesday, 13th of Dec.: 10.30-12.00, 13.30-15.00 and 15.30-17.00
Wednesday, 14th of Dec.: 10.30-12.00, 13.30-15.00 and 15.30-17.00
Thursday, 15th of Dec.: 10.30-12.00, 13.30-15.00 and 15.30-17.00
Topics
Monday:
- Psychology of Science - Contributions to Metascience
- Scientific Thinking and its Mental Infrastructure
Tuesday:
- The Rationality of Science
- Passions of the Scientist
- Varieties of Human Relatedness in Scientific Explorations: Impact on
Knowledge
Construction
Wednesday:
- Reality Testing and Knowledge Production: A Psychological View of the
Realism-Antirealism Controversy
- Altered States of Consciousness, Scientific Creativity, and Possible Benefits
of State-Specific Knowledge
- Participatory Epistemology: Basics, Applications and a Practical Introduction
Thursday:
- World Views and the Meaning of Truth: Dogmatic versus Hypothetical
Interpretations
- The Anti-Science Phenomenon: Psychological Roots of Risky Developments
Concerning Science
- Systematic Self-Reflection for Scientists: Transformations of Belief Systems
Abstracts
Scientific Thinking and its Mental Infrastructure
In the Western (academic) world scientific thinking is generally viewed as the
most powerful means to tackle different problems and to find the most effective
solutions for them. The ability to create good theories in order to describe
and explain the phenomena is acknowledged as central to scientific thinking.
Accordingly, a kind of objectivity and pure rationalism are attributed to it.
But scientific thinking is neither a pure cognitive process nor does it take
place in an empty space. In this chapter it is argued that scientific thinking
just like any other normal every day type of thinking is to be understood as a
cognitive-affective process embedded in a mental infrastructure. This thesis
will be elaborated in detail. Every scientist engaged in constructing a theory
(or a model or a hypothesis) starts from some kind of pre-knowledge in order to
formulate his or her first considerations concerning a scientific problem.
These considerations have to be transformed into a consistent pattern so that
they are amenable to further elaboration. Scientists have their own special
theoretical orientation (e.g., a psychodynamic or behavioral one in psychology)
which constitutes the explicit frame for their reasoning, and provides the
major components which function as a guide for research. But there is something
more behind the explicit theoretical orientation affecting theory building.
Researchers have adopted various ways of thinking (e.g., formalistic,
mechanistic, organismic and contextualist thinking), have developed basic
belief systems (mindscapes, root metaphors) about how things are (e.g., man as
machine or man as a living organism), have made decisions in regard to a
special epistemology (e.g., objectivist or constructivist), have demonstrated
preferences for a special philosophy of science (e.g., positivism, critical
rationalism or hermeneutics) and its corresponding scientific methodology
(quantitative and/or qualitative) and methods (e.g., observation, experiment,
simulation, biography). These mental characteristics of researchers may be
conceived and conceptualized as the mental infrastructure of theory building.
The mental infrastructure is characteristic for the individual and reflects his
or her cognitive, motivational, affective and personality characteristics. The
basic argument is that every kind of theory building needs an infrastructure of
this kind which, on the one hand, enables theory building, and on the other
hand, constrains theory building. Thus, the mental infrastructure of theory
building represents the basic ingredients of all researchers' theorizing. In
this chapter an attempt is made to reconstruct these ingredients in detail and
to render them explicit. This is necessary since most scientists most of the
time are not aware of their mental infrastructure. Becoming aware of it may
enable the investigator to recognize its impact on one's theorizing. This may
be helpful for overcoming scientific dead ends and for finding new solutions to
problems.
Varieties of Human Relatedness in Scientific Explorations: Impact on Knowledge
Construction
With very few exceptions human beings are always embedded in some kind of
social relationship. This is true of both laymen and scientists. Thus, skilful
personal boundary management in every day life and scientific laboratories is
required to cope successfully with the various social demands. In this paper an
attempt is made to provide a framework of human relatedness in the context of
scientific explorations and its central role in knowledge construction. It is
argued that knowledge construction cannot be grasped as a purely rational
process since scientific thinking never takes place in emotionally neutral
space. Additionally, the kind of relationship a scientist creates between his
or her research object strongly determines the outcome, especially in the human
and social sciences. Unfortunately, scholars are often not aware of this
influence and even deny it. Hence, every scientist should become very sensitive
to his or her scientific relatedness. To do this in a good way one has to look
at one.s own mode of perception and critically reflect it. Knowledge
construction has to be understood as the result of the transaction of the kind
of relatedness of the scientist to his or her research object based on his or
her perceptual mode.
Reality Testing and Knowledge Production: A Psychological View of the
Realism-Antirealism Controversy
There are two basic positions in regard to knowledge about the world and
reality which can be traced as far back as the times of the philosophers of
ancient Greece. On the one hand, there is the position of those who believe
that there exists a way of knowing allowing an objective access to the
structures of the world and reality beyond observation. On the other hand,
there is the position of those who argue that no such way of ontological
knowing exists. The former is known as (scientific) realism, the latter as
antirealism. Both positions provide a lot of good reasons for their stance and
against the contrary one. From a philosophical point of view the disputation
seems to be held on a pure rational level. However, empirical evidence shows
that in (scientific) reasoning emotional factors are always involved and that
pure rationalism is nothing but a big myth. Starting with a psychological
analysis of human reality testing ability as an important adaptation principle
in every day life, an attempt is made to identify the implicit emotional
factors underlying scientific reasoning and co-determining the preferences for
epistemological positions.
Altered States of Consciousness, Scientific Creativity, and Possible Benefits
of State-Specific Knowledge
It is argued that there exists a trans-cultural natural trance capacity in
every human that renders possible the experience of different states of
consciousness and awareness, regardless of whether they are produced
spontaneously or voluntarily. These induced altered states of consciousness
often show not only dramatic alterations in subjective experiences, but also
include from time to time some kind of knowledge, different from our normal day
by day knowledge. Since this special kind of knowledge often appears only in
altered states of consciousness, we will refer to it as "state-specific
knowledge". In this lecture criticism will be levelled against the still often
practised stance of interpreting knowledge produced by altered states of
consciousness as trivial and unimportant. Alternatively, an approach regarding
knowledge produced by altered states of consciousness with special reference to
Charles Tart.s concept of state-specific sciences as a potentially meaningful
resource for human development and personal growth will be presented. First, an
integrative account of altered states of consciousness, states of awareness and
emerging patterns of experience will be provided. After considering the manner
in which people induce altered states, the various kinds of emerging
experiences will be classified into a typology of knowledge patterns. Finally,
the potentialities of these knowledge types to contribute to human development
and personal growth will be outlined and discussed. Various experiential
phenomena and types of knowledge produced by altered states of consciousness
may function as important resources for human development and personal growth.
Thus, the devaluation of this knowledge is rejected. It depends on the
individual's ability to critically reflect on the emerging contents of
consciousness and to integrate them into every life or scientific practice.
World Views and the Meaning of Truth: Dogmatic versus Hypothetical
Interpretations
Every human being needs a kind of orientation to cope with the challenges of
life. This general frame, the subjective world view helps to bring order into
the complexity and variety of events and things. With regard to the
individual.s world view two basic differences may be distinguished. On the one
hand, more and more people become able to recognise that their personal world
views have to be understood as mental constructions offering different accesses
to reality, and that there doesn.t exist a last absolute kind of truth which
can be grasped rationally. On the other hand, more and more people tend to
become convinced that their personal world views (e.g., political or religious
belief systems) represent the absolute truth. This kind of polarisation can be
observed all over the world, in all cultures and societies and leads to
conflicts or even wars. It is argued that the preference of dogmatic or
hypothetical world views with respect to the meaning of truth cannot be
understood in a poor rational way. In this lecture an attempt is made to
reconstruct the underlying generating mechanisms being responsible to produce
and maintain dogmatic or hypothetical meanings of truth.
The Anti-Science Phenomenon: Psychological Roots of Risky Developments
Concerning Science
In recent years we have been witnessing various movements attacking the
position of science. These attacks originated in different domains, such as
political and religious fundamentalism, esotericism, or relativism. They all
share a more or less radical rejection of science emphasizing their own brand
of world view as absolute truth. Some of these attacks on science (e.g., the
New Age Movement) may be considered as a reaction against the extreme version
of science . scientism. Viewing science as the only way of gaining genuine
(true) knowledge, scientism has provoked and promoted anti-scientific
movements. Unsatisfied with the position of scientism, even many students and
young graduates in the Western culture have become susceptible to modern
versions of superstition and pseudo-science. The obvious side-effects are the
loss of the ability of critical thinking and the increase of superstitious
thinking. This lecture offers an attempt to analyse and to understand these
movements from a psychological perspective.
Systematic Self-Reflection for Scientists: Transformations of Belief Systems
Every scientist needs some kind of philosophical orientation to guide his or
her research intentions and projects. This orientation is based on some
fundamental assumptions about the world and its phenomena. Assumptions of this
kind, often called root metaphors, are considered to be largely implicit. Thus,
most scientists are unaware of their basic belief systems in regard to science.
Various authors have stressed the function of these belief systems as
structuring and simultaneously limiting research and theory construction. With
respect to scientific creativity researchers are advised to take an interest in
transcending their mental scope, gaining new insights into problems and finding
new solutions for them. Since root metaphors are below the level of conscious
awareness it is necessary to make some special effort or apply a specific
method to render them explicit. Such a method, systematic self-reflection, will
be presented in this paper. Systematic self reflection is regarded as a special
way to tackle important areas of science systematically, characterized by
intentionality and regularity. Following a survey of the theoretical
background, the rationale of systematic self-reflection will be discussed,
thereby focussing on its goals ("What should be reached via self-reflection?"),
contents ("What should one reflect about?") and formal aspects ("How should one
reflect?"). Finally, possibilities and limits of systematic self-reflection are
considered.
THEORETICAL PHILOSOPHY FORUM
Institute of Philosophy
Faculty of Humanities, Eötvös University
Address: Múzeum krt. 4/i, Budapest
14 December (Wednesday) 5:00 PM Room 226
András G. Benedek
Institute for Philosophical Research, HAS, Budapest
Dynamic Models of the Growth of Knowledge
___________________________________
Abstracts and printable program (poster) are available from the web
site of the Forum: http://phil.elte.hu/tpf (Please feel free to post
the program in your institution!)
The Forum is open to everyone, including students, visitors, and faculty
members from all departments and institutes! Format: 60 minute lecture,
coffee break, 60 minute discussion.
The organizer of the Forum: László E. Szabó
(leszabo(a)phil.elte.hu)
--
L a s z l o E. S z a b o
Professor of Philosophy
DEPARTMENT OF LOGIC, INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY
EOTVOS UNIVERSITY, BUDAPEST
http://phil.elte.hu/leszabo
PLEASE NOTE: This talk will take place on a different day than usual. Our
seminar room has a limited capacity so please arrive early to ensure you
will get a seat! The talk will start promptly at 5 PM.
The next talk in the CDC Seminar series will be given by:
Sarah-Jane Leslie, Princeton University
Date: THURSDAY, December 8, 2011, 5 PM
Location: Cognitive Development Center, Hattyú u. 14, 3rd floor
*Generics as cognitive defaults
*
Abstract: Generic sentences express generalizations about kinds, such as
"tigers are striped", "ducks lay eggs", and "ticks carry Lyme disease". I
present and review emerging evidence from adults and children that suggests
that generics articulate cognitively default generalizations -- i.e., they
express basic, early-developing inductive generalizations concerning kinds.
Further evidence suggests that these generalizations don't depend solely on
information about prevalence. For example, "ticks carry Lyme disease" is
accepted, but "books are paperbacks" is not, despite the fact - well-known
and acknowledged by participants - that paperbacks are much more prevalent
among books than Lyme-disease-carrying is among ticks. Similarly, both
adults and preschoolers understand that, e.g., only female ducks lay eggs,
yet they are more likely to accept "ducks lay eggs" than "ducks are
female". Rather than depending solely on information about prevalence,
these primitive generic generalizations are sensitive to a number of
content-based factors, such as whether the property in question is
dangerous or otherwise striking (as in "ticks carry Lyme disease"), or is
an essential or characteristic property of the kind (as in "ducks lay
eggs"). This suggests that our most basic means of forming inductive
generalizations about kinds is not guided by prevalence alone, but also
reflects our nature as learners.
Cognitive Science Events at CEU: http://cognitivescience.ceu.hu/events
_______________________________________________
Subscribe by sending an empty mail to seminars-subscribe(a)cdc.ceu.hu
Unsubscribe by sending an empty mail to seminars-unsubscribe(a)cdc.ceu.hu
CALL FOR PAPERS
Aspects of Self and Agency
4th International Philosophy Graduate Conference
March 30-31, 2012
Central European University, Budapest
The 4th International Philosophy Graduate Conference at the Central European
University concerns two rich topics in the philosophy of mind and moral
philosophy: the self and agency.
Keynote speaker: Lucy O'Brien (UCL), second keynote to be confirmed.
The topic includes self-awareness, embodiment, first-person authority, various
aspects of agency, such as the connection between agency and reasons (and
practical rationality), as well as ontological problems about the self/agency and
historical takes on any of these subjects.
We welcome papers that discuss linguistic self-reference, self-awareness, selfconsciousness,
embodiment, first-person authority, self-attribution of agency as
well ontological problems about the self. We also welcome papers about various
aspects of agency, such as the connection between agency and reasons (and
practical rationality), the authorship account of actions, agency and autonomy,
implications of theories of personal identity and moral philosophy, normative
ethics and applied ethics. In addition, we welcome papers about historical takes on
any of these topics.
Submission deadline: January 20, 2012.
SUBMISSION GUIDELINE AND ONLINE APPLICATION AT
PHILOSOPHY.CEU.HU/GRADCONF
CEU`s Philosophy Department is internationally recognized as
one of the top analytic philosophy programs in continental
Europe. The Department uniquely combines analytic, historical
and continental approaches to philosophy. This feature of our
program allows for a fruitful dialogue between contemporary
philosophy and its history as well as between analytic and
continental approaches.
Meghívó
Kedves Kollégák!
Az ELTE Tudománytörténet és Tudományfilozófia Tanszékén előadást tart
Karl Edlinger
Museum of Natural History, Vienna, Austria
karlfranz.edlinger(a)gmail.com
What is life - the need for a consistent theory of the organism
címmel.
Az előadás helyszíne: 1117 Budapest Pázmány sétány 1/c, Déli tömb 1.711 terem
Időpontja: 2011. december 12, hétfő 18 óra
Az előadáson minden érdeklődőt szívesen látunk!
Abstract
The biological disciplines show us a curious situation, which sets an important
distinct mark between biology on one hand and astronomy, physics, chemistry,
mineralogy, and geology on the other. The development of the non-biological
sciences gave rise to a high level of mathematical sophistication and physical
explanation. They were seen under the perspective of experimental testing and
reliable prediction. In contrast the biological disciplines show this trend in
a restricted way and only in such sections which are overlapping with other
sciences, especially physics and chemistry. However, the very subject of
biology, the living organism as a functioning whole, is not taken into
consideration, it excludes the access of usual scientific procedures.
Attempts to solve this problem were made by formulating new models and theories
on the basis of thermodynamics, synergetics, traditional systems theories, the
theory of chaos or, last but not least, on a new variant of vitalism, called
holism. However these models and theories are helpful for explaining processes
of physics and technology and are of a general importance for a multitude of
natural phenomena, but in no way specific for organisms. Systems theory refers
to interactions and interdependencies of complex entities in general. It does
not provide acceptable definitions of organisms and the special features of
living beings. Holism is also not acceptable because it must postulate forces
and mechanisms which cannot be studied by the methods of natural sciences.
It can easily be shown, that science must be founded on a solid theoretical
basis. This basis is achieved by a fundamental analysis of acts (Handlungen)
and above all by a succession of acts, performed by a craftsman or a scientist.
Each succession of acts enacts a theoretical assumption, a hypothesis about the
nature of the object of handling.
From this presupposition physicians handle living organisms. If they keep up
their living functions, they must conceive of organisms as hydraulic and
mechanic systems, containing other subsystems which are partially of chemical
nature.
In accordance with this approach the theory of organismic constructions
configures organisms as hydraulic systems, consisting of a mechanical
frameworks and a fluid filling. Form and organization are enforced by a complex
system of elements, acting in an antagonistic way. This framework comprises
additional mechanical and chemical mechanisms. The action of all of these are
highly coordinated and function in accordance to the requirements of the system
as a functioning whole.
This concept is consistent with the constructional demands of the mechanical
framework, which allow only a certain order of procedures. As shown by
construtvistic philosophers of science the results of empirical science are
compatible with this view. The same methodological procedures should apply to
biological research but are not yet worked out in a sufficient way.
Üdvözlettel:
Ropolyi László
Dear Professors,
Central European University is announcing a Call for Application for
its PhD program in Cognitive Science.
The application deadline is 25 January, 2012.
For further information please visit www.ceu.hu/admissions
Please distribute/circulate this information among your
students-colleagues.
Thank you and
Kind regards,
Györgyné Finta (Réka)
Department Coordinator
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Central European University
Department of Cognitive Science
H-1023 Budapest
Frankel Leó út 30-34.
tel: (36-1) 887-5138
fax: (36-1) 887-5010
http://www.ceu.huhttp://cognitivescience.ceu.hu
email: szabor(a)ceu.hu