Begin forwarded message:
Date: Fri, 8 Jan 2010 11:28:41 +0100
From: Stephan Hartmann <s.hartmann(a)uvt.nl>
To: philphys(a)philosophy.elte.hu
Subject: [PhilPhys] PhD position at TiLPS
The Department of Philosophy and the Tilburg Center for Logic and
Philosophy of Science (TiLPS; see http://www.uvt.nl/tilps) invite
applications for a three-year full-time PhD position, commencing
September 1, 2010. The successful candidate is expected to work on a
topic from the philosophy science (including general philosophy of
science, formal philosophy of science, philosophy of economics, and
philosophy of psychology) and complete a PhD thesis within three years.
The salary for a full-time employment agreement increases from 2.042
Euro gross a month in the first year to 2.492 Euro gross a month in the
last year. The position is open to candidates with a master’s degree or
equivalent in philosophy and an interest in working in a very active
international and interdisciplinary research environment. Candidates
are invited to submit a letter of interest, a curriculum vitae, a
research proposal of 1000 to 2000 words, certificates, a transcript of
courses taken (including grades), and two letters of recommendation.
Please send your application package to PhD Position Search Committee,
c/o P & O, Department of Philosophy, Tilburg University, Warandelaan 2,
P.O. 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, The Netherlands, or email to
solliciterenfdl(a)uvt.nl. The deadline for applications is April 15,
2010. Please mention the vacancy number 500.10.01 in your letter.
Informal enquiries may be directed to Professor Stephan Hartmann
(email: S.Hartmann(a)uvt.nl).
--
L a s z l o E. S z a b o
Professor of Philosophy
DEPARTMENT OF LOGIC, INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY
EOTVOS UNIVERSITY, BUDAPEST
http://phil.elte.hu/leszabo
_______________________________________________
PhilPhys - Philosophy of Physics Mail Group
Help & Archives: http://phil.elte.hu/PhilPhys
Enézést, a prorgram helyes linkje:
http://www.cogsci.bme.hu/makog2010/makog_program.pdf
a Szervezők
2010/1/6 MAKOG 2010 <makog2010(a)cogsci.bme.hu>
>
> Kedves Kollégák,
>
> A XVIII. MAKOG--Interfészek a megismeréstudományban konferencia
> programja megtalálható a konferencia honlapján:
>
> http://www.cogsci.bme.hu/makog2010/makog_program.pdf
>
>
> A konferencia ideje: 2010. január 25-26 (hétfő-kedd)
>
> A konferencia helyszíne: Budapesti Műszaki és Gazdaságtudományi
> Egyetem, Műegyetem rkp. 3. I. em. 65., Oktatói klub
>
>
> A regisztrációs díj (5000 forint, diákoknak 3000) befizetése a
> helyszínen történik, de kérünk mindenkit, hogy az alábbi regisztrációs
> felületen jelezze részvételi szándékát:
>
> http://www.cogsci.bme.hu/makog2010/
>
> minden érdeklődőt szeretettel várunk,
>
> a Szervezők
>
>
Dear Colleague,
The 4th annual Rovereto workshop on Concepts, Actions and Objects
(CAOs) will take
place at the Center for Mind/Brain Sciences, May 20th – 23rd, 2010, in
Rovereto, Italy.
Workshop Website
portale.unitn.it/centre/cimec/caos.htm
Speakers at the 2010 CAOs workshop:
-John Assad -Kalanit Grill-Spector -James Haxby -Nancy Kanwisher -
Stephen Macknik
-Maximilian Riesenhuber -Bruno Rossion -Michael Tarr -Simon Thorpe -
Patrik Vuilleumier
In addition, there will be a special session on Computational
Neuroscience in the same place, on the Afternoon of May 20th.
Speakers at the special session:
-Tom Mitchell -Tim Rogers -Lorraine Tyler -Gert Westermann
The Rovereto workshop provides a unique forum for researchers from a
range of perspectives who are interested in Concepts,
Actions, and Objects to come together to discuss their research and
develop new directions and collaborations. There are a small
number of speakers (all invited) and there are no concurrent talks.
There will be a poster session for students, post-docs and young
researchers to present their work. The DEADLINE for submission
of abstracts for the poster session is MONDAY FEBRUARY 22, 2010. A
small number of travel grants will be awarded on a
competitive basis. Decisions will be returned within two weeks of the
deadline.
For more information and to submit an abstract see:
portale.unitn.it/centre/cimec/caos.htm
The CAOs workshop is sponsored by the Center for Mind/Brain Sciences,
at the University of Trento.
Workshop Organizers
Alfonso Caramazza - Mel Goodale - Brad Mahon - Alex Martin - Brian
Murphy
***********PLEASE FORWARD THIS MESSAGE***********
*The Central European Cognitive Science Association (CECOG)* launches
its second international conference in the historical town of
*Dubrovnik, Croatia, 6-9, May, 2010.* The tutorial talks this year will
concentrate on the topic of *perceptual learning*, but the conference is
open for research on *all aspects of cognitive science.*
KEYNOTE SPEAKERS
*J**ózsef **F**iser* <http://www.bio.brandeis.edu/faculty01/fiser.html>
Faculty of Psychology, Brandeis University,Waltham/Boston,
Massachusetts, USA
*I**lona **K**ovács* <http://www.cogsci.bme.hu/%7Eikovacs/>
Department of Cognitive Science, Budapest University of Technology and
Economics, Hungary
*D**ov **S**agi* <http://www.weizmann.ac.il/home/masagi/>
Department of Neurobiology, Brain Research, Weizmann Institute of
Science, Israel
*Steven M. Silverstein*
UMDNJ-Robert Wood Johnson Medical School, Piscataway, New Jersey, USA
for all further information visit our website
www.cecog.eu <http://cecog.eu/>
**
--
The organizing committee
of the 2nd Dubrovnik Conference on Cognitive Science
The CEU Philosophy Department cordially invites you to a talk
(as part of its Departmental Colloquium series)
by
Martina Fürst (Institut für Philosophie Karl-Franzens-Universität,
Graz)
on
A New Version of Quotational Phenomenal Concepts
Tuesday, 12 January 2010, 4.30 PM, Zrinyi 14, Room 412
ABSTRACT
The phenomenal concept strategy is considered as a powerful response to
anti-physicalist arguments such as the knowledge argument, the
explanatory gap or the conceivability argument. The basic idea of this
strategy is to rely on phenomenal concepts which are supposed to explain
why we draw dualistic conclusions from these arguments. Therefore, the
target of this physicalist move is to give a satisfactory account of
dualistic intuitions without being committed to drawing ontological
dualistic conclusions.
In my talk I start by elaborating the phenomenal concept strategy
concentrating on the knowledge argument. Analyzing Jackson’s
Mary-scenario the crucial particularities of phenomenal concepts are
worked out. Next, I focus on physicalist versions of the so-called
quotational account of phenomenal concepts. I demonstrate that these
accounts fail in explaining the cognitive role of phenomenal concepts.
Subsequently, I propose a new version of the quotational account which
captures the decisive uniqueness and explains the cognitive role of
phenomenal concepts. Finally, I argue that this new account implies
phenomenal referents and hence reinforces anti-physicalism.
Kriszta Biber
Department Coordinator
Philosophy Department
Tel: 36-1-327-3806
Fax: 36-1-327-3072
E-mail: biberk(a)ceu.hu