The CEU Philosophy Department cordially invites you to a talk (as part of its Departmental Colloquium series) by Martina Fürst (Institut für Philosophie Karl-Franzens-Universität, Graz) on A New Version of Quotational Phenomenal Concepts Tuesday, 12 January 2010, 4.30 PM, Zrinyi 14, Room 412 ABSTRACT The phenomenal concept strategy is considered as a powerful response to anti-physicalist arguments such as the knowledge argument, the explanatory gap or the conceivability argument. The basic idea of this strategy is to rely on phenomenal concepts which are supposed to explain why we draw dualistic conclusions from these arguments. Therefore, the target of this physicalist move is to give a satisfactory account of dualistic intuitions without being committed to drawing ontological dualistic conclusions. In my talk I start by elaborating the phenomenal concept strategy concentrating on the knowledge argument. Analyzing Jackson’s Mary-scenario the crucial particularities of phenomenal concepts are worked out. Next, I focus on physicalist versions of the so-called quotational account of phenomenal concepts. I demonstrate that these accounts fail in explaining the cognitive role of phenomenal concepts. Subsequently, I propose a new version of the quotational account which captures the decisive uniqueness and explains the cognitive role of phenomenal concepts. Finally, I argue that this new account implies phenomenal referents and hence reinforces anti-physicalism. Kriszta Biber Department Coordinator Philosophy Department Tel: 36-1-327-3806 Fax: 36-1-327-3072 E-mail: biberk(a)ceu.hu