Az MTA Pszichológiai Kutatóintézet "fiatal kutatói" két részes elõadás
sorozatot tartanak.
Az 1. alkalom: nov 7. Helyszín: Teréz krt 13 (az Intézet volt épüéete az
Oktogonnál).
2. alkalom: dec. 5. Helyszín: Victor Hufo u 18-22.
A rendezvény 9-kor kezdõdik és kb. 4-ig tart.
A program megtekinthetõ az Intézet honlapján (www.mtapi.hu)
Minden érdeklõdõt szeretettel várunk.
22 Oct, 4.30pm
Zoltán Jakab (Cognitive Science, BME) & Szabolcs Kiss (Psychology, Pécs)
Understanding privileged access to mental states in preschoolers and
first graders
Venue:
Room 137, Institute for Psychology, Hungarian Academy of Sciences
Victor Hugo u. 18-22, 1132 Budapest
Everyone is welcome to attend.
---
Gergely Csibra
THEORETICAL PHILOSOPHY FORUM
Institute of Philosophy
Faculty of Humanities, Eotvos University
Room 226 Monday 4:00 PM Muzeum krt. 4/i, Budapest
Web site: http://phil.elte.hu/tpf
November Program
3 November 4:00 PM Room 226
Gyorgy Inzelt
Institute of Philosophy, Eotvos University, Budapest
Game theoretic reconstruction of some classical problems of political
philosophy
Abstract: http://phil.elte.hu/tpf/2008-2009/November/#1
10 November 4:00 PM Room 226
Tamas Mihalydeak
Department of Computer Science, University of Debrecen
Mi tortenne, ha komolyan vennenk elofelteveseinket?
(What if we took our pre-assumptions seriously?)
Abstract: http://phil.elte.hu/tpf/2008-2009/November/#2
17 November 4:00 PM Room 226
Jeno Pontor
Institute of Philosophy, Eotvos University, Budapest
A tudas mint mentalis allapot, es a szkepticizmus
(Knowledge as a mental state; and the skepticism)
Abstract: http://phil.elte.hu/tpf/2008-2009/November/#3
24 November 4:00 PM Room 226
Janos Tozser
Philosophy of Language Research Group of the
Hungarian Academy of Sciences
Eotvos University, Budapest
Fenomenalis es intencionalis tulajdonsagok
(Phenomenal and intentional properties)
Abstract: http://phil.elte.hu/tpf/2008-2009/November/#4
___________________________________
The Forum is open to everyone, including students,visitors, and faculty
members from all departments and institutes!
Format: 60 minute lecture, 10 minute coffee break, followed by a 30-60
minute discussion. The language of presentation is English or Hungarian.
A printable poster is available from here:
http://phil.elte.hu/tpf/2008-2009/November/poster.pdf
Please feel free to post it in your institution!
The organizer of the Forum: Laszlo E. Szabo
(leszabo(a)phil.elte.hu)
--
L a s z l o E. S z a b o
Department of Logic, Institute of Philosophy
Faculty of Humanities, Eotvos University, Budapest
http://phil.elte.hu/leszabo
The CEU Philosophy Department cordially invites you to a talk (as part
of its Departmental Colloquium series)
by
Gerard O'Brien (University of Adelaide)
on
How Does Mind Matter?
Tuesday, 21 October 2008, 5.30 PM, Zrinyi 14, Room 412
ABSTRACT
Nothing could be more obvious than that minds matter. Specifically,
nothing could be more obvious than that mental phenomena-beliefs,
desires, thoughts, perceptions, and so forth-have a causal impact on
behaviour. Yet it has proved notoriously difficult to explain how this
can be so. The problem of “mental causation” takes a number of forms
in the philosophy of mind. One of these arises from the conjunction of
two widely accepted theses about the mind. The first is that
representation is the mark of the mental: that mental phenomena are
essentially contentful. The second is that the representational
properties of mental phenomena fail to supervene on the intrinsic
physical properties of states of the brain. The standard response to
this form of the problem has been to accept that representational
properties are causally inert, but to argue that there is enough room
between explanation and causation for representational properties to be
“explanatorily relevant”. In their heart of hearts, however, most
philosophers know this response is deeply unsatisfactory, and this
discontent has motivated a flirtation in the contemporary philosophy of
mind with “extended mind” hypotheses and even forms of
“anti-representationalism”. In this paper I will present a simple
solution to this construal of the problem of mental causation. Rather
than toying with ways of redrawing the boundaries of the mind or
abandoning representation completely, I will develop an account of
mental representation according to which representational content
supervenes on the intrinsic physical properties of states of the brain.
Kriszta Biber
Department Coordinator
Philosophy Department
Tel: 36-1-327-3806
Fax: 36-1-327-3072
E-mail: biberk(a)ceu.hu
THEORETICAL PHILOSOPHY FORUM
Institute of Philosophy
Faculty of Humanities, Eotvos University
Room 226 Monday 4:00 PM Muzeum krt. 4/i, Budapest
Web site: http://phil.elte.hu/tpf
20 October 4:00 PM Room 226
Gabor Hofer-Szabo
Institute for Communication and Cultural Studies
King Sigismund College, Budapest
Department of Logic, Institute of Philosophy
Eotvos University, Budapest
Objektivista kalauz a szubjektiv valoszinuseghez
(Objectivist guide to subjective probability)
Abstract: http://phil.elte.hu/tpf/2008-2009/October/#3
___________________________________
The Forum is open to everyone, including students,visitors, and faculty
members from all departments and institutes!
Format: 60 minute lecture, 10 minute coffee break, followed by a 30-60
minute discussion. The language of presentation is English or Hungarian.
A printable poster is available from here:
http://phil.elte.hu/tpf/2008-2009/October/poster.pdf
Please feel free to post it in your institution!
The organizer of the Forum: Laszlo E. Szabo
(leszabo(a)phil.elte.hu)
--
L a s z l o E. S z a b o
Department of Logic, Institute of Philosophy
Faculty of Humanities, Eotvos University, Budapest
http://phil.elte.hu/leszabo
please disregard the previous message this is the correct one - sorry
about the mix-up!
*****************************************
The CEU Philosophy Department cordially invites you to a talk
by
Ruth Weintraub (Tel-Aviv University)
What If Scepticism Is True? (An Exercise in Reliabilism)
Friday, 17 October 2008, 3.30pm, Zrinyi 14, Room 412
ABSTRACT
The two prevalent responses to sceptical arguments are to brush them
aside or to attempt to refute them. But there is another kind of
response, the acquiescent, which I propose to consider. It allows that
the sceptical conclusion may be true, and explores its implications,
both practical and theoretical, and proceeds by diagnosing the rationale
behind the assumptions pertaining to justification which the sceptic
exploits to derive his (seemingly devastating) conclusion. My test-case
is the reliabilist conception of justification (hence the sub-title),
which jettisons an internalist assumption responsible for Hume’s
sceptical conclusion vis-a-vis induction.
Kriszta Biber
Department Coordinator
Philosophy Department
Tel: 36-1-327-3806
Fax: 36-1-327-3072
E-mail: biberk(a)ceu.hu
The CEU Philosophy Department cordially invites you to a talk
by
Ruth Weintraub (Tel-Aviv University)
on
What If Scepticism Is True? (An Exercise in Reliabilism)
NOTE: FRIDAY!!! 17 Oct, 3.30 PM, Zrinyi 14, Room 412
ABSTRACT
Our ability to track objects as they undergo change suggests very strongly that we both perceive, and conceive of, objects as things distinct from their properties, as enduring individual substances. This notion that objects are individual substances, rather than simply co-instantiated collections of properties we can call the intrinsic concept of objects. An alternative view, that objects are collections of properties we can call the relational conception of objects. On the relational view when (essential?) properties change, so do objects. I apply some lessons from debates about the nature of objects and our perception of them in order to understand the nature of the experience involved in delusions of misidentification. These delusions report the experience of seeing someone who is perceptually indistinguishable from a familiar person but is not the familiar person. On the relational conception of objects this would be impossible. Yet the standard way of explaining these delusions within cognitive neuropsychiatry assumes the relational conception. Not only that but the standard view also assumes that experience of seeing a particular relational object (in this case a person) is partly constituted by affective experience. This combination of assumptions leads to problems whose resolution is the aim of the final section of this paper
Kriszta Biber
Department Coordinator
Philosophy Department
Tel: 36-1-327-3806
Fax: 36-1-327-3072
E-mail: biberk(a)ceu.hu
The CEU Philosophy Department cordially invites you to a talk
by
Ruth Weintraub (Tel-Aviv University)
on
What If Scpeticism Is True? (An Exercise in Reliabilism)
NOTE: FRIDAY!! 17 Oct 2008, 3.30 PM, Zrinyi 14, Room 412
ABSTRACT
Our ability to track objects as they undergo change suggests very strongly that we both perceive, and conceive of, objects as things distinct from their properties, as enduring individual substances. This notion that objects are individual substances, rather than simply co-instantiated collections of properties we can call the intrinsic concept of objects. An alternative view, that objects are collections of properties we can call the relational conception of objects. On the relational view when (essential?) properties change, so do objects. I apply some lessons from debates about the nature of objects and our perception of them in order to understand the nature of the experience involved in delusions of misidentification. These delusions report the experience of seeing someone who is perceptually indistinguishable from a familiar person but is not the familiar person. On the relational conception of objects this would be impossible. Yet the standard way of explaining these delusions within cognitive neuropsychiatry assumes the relational conception. Not only that but the standard view also assumes that experience of seeing a particular relational object (in this case a person) is partly constituted by affective experience. This combination of assumptions leads to problems whose resolution is the aim of the final section of this paper
Kriszta Biber
Department Coordinator
Philosophy Department
Tel: 36-1-327-3806
Fax: 36-1-327-3072
E-mail: biberk(a)ceu.hu
The CEU Philosophy Department cordially invites you to a talk (as part of its Departmental Colloquium series)
by
Milosz Pawlowski (CEU)
on
The Future of A Parfitian Reductionist
Tuesday, 14 Oct 2008, 5.30 PM, Zrinyi 14, Room 412
ABSTRACT
Derek Parfit is the most influential proponent of the view that persons are logical constructions out of ontologically more basic objects. For Parfit, these are mental events. Parfit's position is intended to be different from Eliminativism about persons. On Parfitian Reductionism, persons are genuine, albeit convention- and thought-dependent, objects. My aim will be to examine an objection to this view, which has it that if such Reductionism is true, it is a mistake to think that we can anticipate "our" futures. I will first show how inconsistencies in Parfit's position are resolved by the account developed by Raymond Martin. On Martin's view, we can anticipate experiences of people who are not identical to us. Yet I will argue that the conventionalist component of Parfitian Reductionism
makes it impossible for it to preserve the distinction between genuine and seeming anticipation. This makes genuine anticipation impossible. Since possibility of anticipation is an essential component of the concept of a person, it follows that there are no people if Parfitian Reductionism is true. The view collapses into Eliminativism.
Kriszta Biber
Department Coordinator
Philosophy Department
Tel: 36-1-327-3806
Fax: 36-1-327-3072
