The CEU Department of Philosophy cordially invites you to a talk by Jan-Willem van der Rijt (University of Groningen, DSP at CEU Department of Philosophy) on 'Dignity and Domination' 5.00 PM, Wednesday, 28. March, Zrinyi 14, Room 412 Abstract The republican notion of freedom put forth by Quentin Skinner and Philip Pettit holds a person to be free if he or she is not dominated, i.e. if no-one can interfere with him or her arbitrarily. It differs from the standard notion of (negative) freedom as absence of interference in two ways. Firstly, it focuses on the possibility of interference, rather than its actual presence. Secondly, it holds certain kinds of interference compatible with freedom. One of the main reasons why domination is of concern is its incompatibility with the dominated individual's dignity. To be dominated is to be at someone else's mercy, which is humiliating to one's person. However, I will argue that the definition of arbitrary interference introduced by Pettit fails to capture this notion of dignity sufficiently. Pettit's definition relies on the "avowed or readily avowable interests" of the person interfered with, which leaves room for certain types of humiliating paternalistic interference. To ensure personal dignity, I introduce an alternative dominance relation that relies on moral consent. Interference is only compatible with a person's dignity if it does not cause affront, i.e. if it is in accordance with his or her views on how he or she should be treated. This alternative notion of domination has a number of advantages over the interest based notion formulated by Pettit, and some of its implications for political theory will be discussed. Kriszta Biber Department Coordinator Philosophy Department Tel: 36-1-327-3806 Fax: 36-1-327-3072 E-mail: biberk(a)ceu.hu