Csaba Pleh Pleh Csaba
Cognitive Science Group Megismerestudomanyi Csoport
Department of Psychology Pszichologiai Tanszek
University of Szeged Szegedi Tudomanyegyetem
Szeged
Petofi sgt 30-34, 6722 Hungary
Telefon/Phone: (36)(62) 544000
Lakas/Home: Budakeszi Zichy P. u. 4 2092 Hungary
(36)(23) 453932 or 933
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WEB: http//www.jate.u-szeged.hu/~pleh
Hungarian Review of Psychology Magyar Pszichologiai Szemle
editor foszerkeszto
---------- Forwarded message ----------
Date: Fri, 28 Jan 2000 19:14:11 +0000
From: Stevan Harnad <harnad(a)coglit.ecs.soton.ac.uk>
Reply-To: "PSYC: PSYCOLOQUY: Refereed Electronic Journal of Peer Discussion
in" <PSYC(a)PUCC.PRINCETON.EDU>
To: PSYC(a)PUCC.PRINCETON.EDU
Subject: Ashley Montagu (1905 - 1999)
Resent-Date: Fri, 28 Jan 100 20:14:20 +100
Resent-Date: Fri, 28 Jan 2000 20:15:14 +0100
Resent-From: pleh(a)izabell.elte.hu
Resent-From: <pleh(a)ludens.elte.hu>
Resent-To: pleh(a)sol.cc.u-szeged.hu
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ASHLEY MONTAGU (1905-1999)
Ashley Montagu, born Israel Ehrenberg in East London in 1905, was one
of those rare men of learning who succeeded in making substantive
scholarly contributions to their academic disciplines while at the same
time maintaining contact with the educated layman, indeed contributing
substantively to the latter's learning. In addition, he was a dedicated
and articulate social critic, concerned with bringing to bear the
findings of the social and biological sciences toward the betterment of
man's lot, while subjecting some of those very findings to critical
social scrutiny. His accomplishments in these three domains, the
scientific, the public-educational, and the socioethical, will be
treated as a unity in what follows, in accordance with what is
evidently the spirit of the program that has guided his life's work.
Although Montagu's contributions span a variety of fields in the social
and biological sciences -- including work on problems as diverse as
Australian aborigines' concepts of sexuality and reproduction, the
measurement of internal anatomical landmarks on the heads of intact
living human beings, adolescent infertility in girls, the role of
cooperative behavior in evolution, and the biological and cultural
factors in aggression and in sex roles -- his principal legacy will
indisputably consist of his critical analysis of the concept of race.
The problem of race preoccupied Montagu from the beginning of his
intellectual career (Montagu 1925; 1926), more than a quarter century
before the 1954 U.S. Supreme Court desegregation decision in Brown v.
Board of Education of Topeka (347 U.S. 483), which heralded the civil
rights activism that has since followed in America. Montagu's work
played a role in that Supreme Court decision, as well as in shaping the
social consciousness that ushered it in and has attended it ever
since. If some of his ideas, as they are discussed below, appear to be
relatively uncontroversial and a matter of common knowledge and assent,
let it not be forgotten that that very knowledge and assent is in some
measure due to the work and efforts of Montagu, and that he was also
forcefully expounding those ideas at an earlier time, when they were
far from accepted, and indeed being brutally violated on a scale
unparallelled in human history (Montagu 1939; 1941a).
Montagu's papers on race in the late 1930s, culminating in his book
"Man's Most Dangerous Myth; The Fallacy of Race" (1942a) and followed
by a series of works (including Montagu 1951; 1964; 1975), had the
effect of upsetting the traditional concept of race accepted by most
anthropologists in that it challenged the reality of anything
corresponding to that notion. Montagu emphasized that gene-frequency
analysis of traits would tell us more about the evolution of human
populations, arguing that the omelet conception of racial mixing was
totally artificial and did nothing to explain the origins and
consequences of the differences between populations. Since men were all
originally gatherer-hunters, wherever they were, the environmental
challenges faced by different populations tended to be very similar;
hence, one would not expect mental differences. This theory, as set
forth in an article coauthored with the geneticist Theodosius
Dobzhansky (1947), subsequently became generally accepted by
anthropologists. Montagu was also asked to draw up the United Nations
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organizations Statement on Race
(1951) in 1950.
In addition to his work on race, Montagu was among the first to present
a number of views, since widely accepted, on such familiar social and
psychological themes as aggression and war (1946b; 1976), social
factors in crime (Montagu & Merton 1940), women's rights (1953b),
psychoanalysis and psychiatry in anthropology (194 1b), love (1953a),
home birth and prenatal care (1950; 1962), AfroAmerican studies (1944),
sociobiology (1940), birth order (1948), privacy (1956a), and even
smoking (19421) and natural foods (1958). In these and other works
Montagu was always a strong advocate of gene-environment interactionism
(1926; 1940; 1956b; 1959; 1962), stressing that heredity is not
biologically given in the genes, and that man's constitution is a
dynamic process arising out of the interaction between his unique
experiential history and the constraints and potential encoded in his
genetic material.
This interactionist stance allowed Montagu to be an effective exponent
of the often polarized realms of cultural and biological anthropology.
He could adduce evidence on behalf of the biosocial nature of man
(1956b) while at the same time showing the virtually limitless capacity
of education and culture to shape that very nature (1962). His
interactionism attempted to reconcile these two poles, not only in
terms of the history of the dual influences acting during one man's
lifetime, but also those in mankind's evolutionary history. Montagu
emphasized social cooperation and love (1953a; 1974) as critical
selectional factors in evolution -- ideas that considerably predated
the sociobiological preoccupation with altruism (in the new inclusive
fitness sense) in the late 1970s.
Other works by Montagu had fewer social repercussions, but still
represented important contributions to anthropology. "Coming Into Being
Among the Australian Aborigines" (1937) is one of the classic works on
this subject and continues to be a useful source, treating such topics
as awareness of the facts of maternity and paternity and the
significance of ritual sexual mutilation. This was not only a pioneer
study which served to stimulate many students and research workers, but
its approach systematized a field which, aside from Bronislaw
Malinowski's Sexual Life of Savages (1929), had been only vaguely and
poorly understood previously. In addition, Montagu's work on the
adolescent sterility period (1946a) solved a perplexing problem
encountered by many anthropologists -- most notably by Malinowski in
his studies on the Trobrianders (1929) -- that although adolescent
girls engaged in extensive premarital sexual relations, they rarely
became pregnant.
Montagu also worked on technical problems in anthropometry. He
established certain craniometric reference points on the scalp and
devised measuring instruments to determine homologous points on the
underlying skull in living subjects (1960). His anatomical work on
nonhuman primates and on fossils culminated in the publication of one
of the earliest textbooks of physical anthropology (1945), which
continued for a long time to be a widely used and authoritative work on
the subject. Montagu's other texts include reference works on heredity
(1959) and anatomy and physiology (Montagu's & Steen 1959), an
excellent biography of Edward Tyson (1943), and a large variety of
elegant and informative books written for the educated layman.
Montagu's doctorate in anthropology was conferred by Columbia
University in 1937. His early academic and intellectual background had
been as richly varied as his later contributions. After a long-standing
childhood interest in skulls, fossils, and medical matters, fostered by
encouragement from the anatomist - anthropologist Arthur Keith, of the
Royal College of Surgeons in London, Montagu enrolled at 17 years of
age at University College London, for a diplomate in psychology, with a
view to transferring to anthropology. Among his professors in
psychology were C. E. Spearman and the father of modern statistics and
biometrics, Karl Pearson; in anthropology he was taught by Elliot Smith
and C. G. Seligman. At that time in Europe the new anthropology was
just developing, with the functional school of Malinowski. The earlier
sticks/stones/bones approach was being replaced by an analysis of the
functional interrelations among the elements of culture. Montagu became
Malinowski's first student, and surely bears the latter's imprint
(along with an even stronger one, some feel, from his other great
teacher, Franz Boas); but he soon diverged in favor of a strong
biological orientation, particularly in matters pertaining to
psychology. (Montagu was one of the first exponents of Sigmund Freud in
anthropology, although he later became a critic of the psychoanalytic
approach.)
C. Loring Brace, an anthropologist at the University of Michigan, feels
that "Montagu has done more than anyone except Margaret Mead to bring
the findings of anthropology to the attention of the public." Weston
LaBarre of Duke University describes him as "the most prolific and
effective popularizer of humanistic subjects since H. G. Wells." Not all
anthropologists take such a favorable view of popularization, however;
and this may have adversely affected Montagu's own intradisciplinary
popularity; yet more than one of his colleagues have suggested that
this negative attitude may well reflect sour grapes.
Popularization has not been the only factor diminishing Montagu's
professional popularity. According to Marcus Goldstein of Tel Aviv
University: "The reason for this, in my opinion, has been his
forthrightness, his fearless and blunt attack on works and issues that
he felt were scientifically wrong, and perhaps more important, were or
could be socially harmful. Two examples come to mind. At one of the
early meetings of the American Association of Physical Anthropologists,
he sharply criticized Prof. E. A. Hooton's work on a typology of U.S.
criminals, a virtual return to Lombrosoism. One must remember in this
connection that Hooton was the revered teacher of nearly all of the
young physical anthropologists of the day! In a subsequent paper
co-authored with Robert Merton (Crime and the anthropologist," 1940),
Hooton's premises and methodology were systematically demonstrated to
be invalid. At another meeting of the Association, Montagu proposed a
motion to censure the German anthropologists who were patently misusing
the discipline to conform with the vicious Nazi ideology. The motion
was defeated, yet the following year the very man instrumental for its
defeat proposed the same motion, which passed unanimously."
The final arbiter as to the value of popularization will of course have
to be history. Whether in the mid- to later part of the twentieth
century, with its unprecedently well-educated and well-informed
general population and its pervasive and powerful communications media
it was still possible for scientists, particularly social scientists,
to pursue their research, particularly on socially sensitive or
otherwise significant topics, without simultaneously assuming an
advocates, or at least an exegete's role vis-a-vis the educated
populace, is an empirical question that only the actual turn of events
can answer. In any case, it is clear that Ashley Montagu cast his lot
with the new dual role of the social scientist, and fulfilled both
aspects of it admirably.
STEVAN HARNAD
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
WORKS BY MONTAGU
1925 The Colour Question. Vincula (Journal of the University of Londons
Student Union) Dec. 14: 66 only.
1926 Intelligence Tests and the Negro in America. Wasu (Journal of the
West African Students Union of Great Britain) 1, no. 1:57.
(1937) 1938 Coming Into Being Among the Australian Aborigines. New
York: Dutton. -- -> Includes a foreword by Bronislaw Malinowski,
1939 Race and Kindred Delusions. Equality 1, no. 7: 2024.
1940 The Soclo-biology of Man. Scientific Monthly 50:483490.
1940 MONTAGU, ASHLEY; and MERTON, ROBERT K. Crime and the
Anthropologist. American Ant hropologist 42:384408.
l941a The Concept of Race in the Light of Genetics. Journal of Heredity
32:243247.
1941b Nescience, Science, and Psycho-analysis. Psychiatry 4:4560.
1942a Mans Most Dangerous Myth: The Fallacy of Race. New York: Columbia
Univ. Press. ---> A paperback edition was published in 1974 by Oxford
University Press.
1942b Nothing Can Be Said in Favor of Smoking. In Fact 4, no. 10:23.
1943 Edward Tyson, M.D., F.R.S., (16501708), and the Rise of
Comparative Anatomy in England. Philadeiphia: American Philosophical
Society.
1944 The African Origins of the American Negro and His Ethnic
Composition. Scientific Monthly 58: 5865.
1945 An Introduction to Physical Anthropology. Springfield, Ill,:
Thomas.
1946a Adolescent Sterility. Springfield, Ill.: Thomas.
1946b Racism, the Bomb, and the Peoples of the World. Asia and the
Americas 46:533 535.
1947 MONTAGU, ASHLEY; and DOBZHANSKY, THEODOSIUS Natural Selection and
the Mental Capacities of Mankind. Science 105:587590.
1948 Sex-order of Birth and Personality. American Journal of
Orthopsychiatry 18:351 353.
1950 Constitutional and Prenatal Factors in Infant and Child Health.
Supplement 2, pages 130 in Problems of In fancy and Childhood. New
York: Josiah Macy, Jr., Foundation.
(1951) 1972 Statement on Race. 3d ed. New York: Oxford Univ. Press.
1953a MONTAGU, ASHLEY (editor) The Meaning of Love. New York: Julian.
(1953b) 1974 The Natural Superiority of Women. Rev. ed. New York:
Macmillan.
1956a The Annihilation of Privacy. Saturday Review Mar. 31:911, 32.
1956b The Biosocial Nature of Man. New York: Grove Press.
1958 Are We Forgetting How to Eat? House and Garden 114:178179.
1959 Human Heredity. New York: World Publishing.
1959 MONTAGU, ASHLEY; and STEEN, EDWIN B. Anatomy and Physiology. 2
vols. New York: Barnes & Noble.
1960 A Handbook of Anthropometry. Springfield, Ill.: Thomas.
1962 MONTAGU, ASHLEY (editor) Culture and the Evolution of Man. New
York: Oxford Univ. Press.
1964 The Concept of Race. New York: Free Press.
1974 Culture and Human Development. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
Prentice-Hall.
1975 MONTAGU, ASHLEY (editor) Race and IQ. New York: Oxford Univ.
Press.
1976 The Nature of Human Aggression. New York: Oxford Univ. Press.
Publications of Ashley Montagu
1. Anthropological Significance of the Pterion to the Primates,
The; Reprint from the American Journal of Physical Anthropology,
1933.
2. Coming Into Being Among the Australian Aborigines, B.P. Dutton,
1938.
3. Edward Tyson, M.D., F.R.S. 1650-1708, American Philosophical
Society, 1943.
4. Human Organism and Reproduction, Heredity and Growth, The,
Delphian Society, 1949.
5. On Being Human, First Edition, Hawthorn, 1950.
6. Darwin, Competition & Cooperation, Henry Schuman, 1952.
7. Direction of Human Development, The, Harper & Bros., 1955.
8. Reproductive Development of the Female, The, Julian Press,
1957.
9. Anthropology and Human Nature, Porter Sargent, 1957.
10. Cultured Man, The, World Publishing, 1958.
11. Education and Human Relations, Grove Press, 1958.
12. Cultured Man, The, Pennabooks, 1959.
13. Handbook of Anthropometry, A, Charles C. Thomas, 1960.
14. Introduction to Physical Anthropology, An, Charles C. Thomas,
1960.
15. Man In Process, World Publishing, 1961.
16. Prenatal Influences, Charles C. Thomas, 1961.
17. Humanization of Man, The, World Publishing, 1962.
18. Dolphin in History, The, with John Lilly , University of
California, 1963.
19. Human Heredity, World Publishing, 1963.
20. Science of Man, The, Odyssey Survey Book, 1964.
21. Life Before Birth, Longmares Green, 1964.
22. Life Before Birth, NAL, 1964.
23. Human Revolution, The, World Publishing, 1965.
24. Idea of Race, The, University of Nebraska, 1965.
25. Up The Ivy, Hawthorn Book, 1966.
26. American Way of Life, The, G.P. Putnam's, 1967.
27. On Being Human, Paperback, Hawthorn, 1967.
28. Anatomy of Swearing, The, Macmillan, 1967.
29. Prevalence of Nonsense, The, with Edward Darling, Harper &
Row, 1967.
30. Man Observed, G.P. Putnam's, 1968.
31. Man's Evolution, with C.L. Brace, Macmillan, 1968.
32. Sex, Man and Society, G.P. Putnam's, 1969.
33. Man: His First Two Million Years, Columbia University, 1969.
34. American Way of Life, The, Kinseido, 1970.
35. Ignorance of Certainty, The, with Edward Darling, Harper &
Row, 1970.
36. Direction of Human Development, The, Hawthorn, 1970.
37. America As I See It, Seibido, 1971.
38. Elephant Man, The, Outerbridge & Dienstfrey, 1971.
39. Elephant Man, The, Allison & Busby, 1971.
40. Immortality, Religion and Morals, Hawthorn Books, 1971.
41. Man and the Computer, with Samuel Snyder, Auerbach Publishing,
1972.
42. On Being Intelligent, Greenwood Press, 1973.
43. Coming into being among the Australian Aborigines, Routledge &
Keegan Paul, 1974.
44. Man's Most Dangerous Myth: The Fallacy of Race, 5th Edition.
Oxford, 1974.
45. Nature of Human Aggression, The, Oxford, 1976.
46. Touching, 2nd Edition, Harper & Row, 1978.
47. Human Connection, The, McGraw-Hill, 1979.
48. Elephant Man, The, Paperback 2nd Edition, E.P. Dutton, 1979.
49. Reproductive Development of the Female, 3rd Edition, PSG
Publishing, 1979.
50. Growing Young, McGraw-Hill, 1981.
51. Dehumanization of Man, The, with Floyd Matson, McGraw-Hill,
1983.
52. Elephant Man, The, Kenkyusha, 1983.
53. Humanity Speaking to Mankind, Asahi, 1985.
54. Touching, 3rd Edition, Hardcover, Harper & Row, 1986.
55. Touching, 3rd Edition, Paperback, Harper & Row, 1986.
56. Peace of the World, The, Kenkyusha, 1987.
57. Story of People, The, Kinseido, 1988.
58. Coming Into Being, Asahi Press, 1988.
59. World of Humanity, The, Seibido, 1988.
60. Growing Young, Bergin Garvey, 1989.
61. Growing Young, 2nd Edition, Bergin Garvey, 1989.
62. What We Know About "Race", Tsurumi Shoten, ND.
63. Living and Loving, Kinseido, ND.
64. Humanization of Man, The, Kinseido, ND.
65. Natural Superiority of Women, The, Kinseido, ND.
66. Times Change - Do People?, Kinseido, ND.
67. Human Dialogue, The, with Arendt Meerion Buber, Kinseido, ND.
68. Elephant Man, The, Acadian House Publishing, 1997.
69. Man's Most Dangerous Myth; The Fallacy of Race, Altamira
Press, 1997.
70. Natural Superiority of Women, The, Altamira Press, 1999.
Edited by Ashley Montagu
1. Studies & Essays in the History of Science & Learning, Schuman,
1944.
2. Meaning of Love, The, Julian Press, 1953.
3. Toynbee and History, Porter Sargent, 1956.
4. Genetic Mechanisms in Human Disease, Charles C. Thomas, 1961.
5. Concept of Race, The, The Free Press, 1964.
6. Culture, Man's Adaptive Dimension, Oxford, 1968.
7. Man and Aggression, Oxford, 1968.
8. Concept of the Primitive, The, The Free Press, 1968.
9. Culture and the Evolution of Man, Oxford, 1970.
10. Textbook of Human Genetics, The, with Max Levitan, Oxford,
1971.
11. Statement on Race, Oxford, 1972.
12. Man and Aggression, 2nd Edition, Oxford, 1973.
13. Frontiers of Anthropology, Putnam's, 1974.
14. Endangered Environment, The, Mason Lipscomb, 1974.
15. Race and IQ, Oxford, 1975.
16. Textbook of Human Genetics, The, Revised by Max Levitan,
Oxford, 1977.
17. Human Evolution, 2nd Edition, with C.L. Brace, Macmillan,
1977.
18. Learning Non-Aggression, Oxford, 1978.
19. Sociobiology Examined, Oxford, 1980.
20. Anatomy and Physiology, 2 vols., with Edwin B. Steen, Harper &
Row, 1984.
CogPrints Open Archive Awarded First of 8000 Psychological Science Sites
<http://www.psychologicalscience.net/psych/award/index.html>
Dear Colleagues,
I bring this award to your attention not out of puffery (who knows what
such awards mean?) but for the following three reasons, of which the
third is by far the most important:
(1) Whatever it means, it is surely a vote of confidence for Open
Archiving: <http://www.openarchives.org/>
(2) It means that CogPrints <http://cogprints.soton.ac.uk/>
is likely to be used still more heavily.
(3) I hope this will encourage ever more authors in Cognitive
Science (Psychology, Neuroscience, Behavioral Biology, Artificial
Intelligence, Linguistics, Philosophy) to publicly self-archive
their papers in CogPrints, both pre- and post-refereeing, in order
to maximise its accessibility and research impact.
<http://www.dlib.org/dlib/december99/12harnad.html>
If you already have your papers in your departmental or laboratory
online archive, deposit copies in CogPrints for greater visibility and
accessibility. If your papers are not on the Web yet at all, it is
extremely simple to deposit them in CogPrints; if you haven't the time,
any student can do it for you in a few minutes.
Open Archives also already exist in Physics <http://arXiv.org/>
Generic software will shortly be available for other disciplines
(e.g., http://www.eprints.org/).
--------------------------------------------------------------------
Stevan Harnad harnad(a)cogsci.soton.ac.uk
Professor of Cognitive Science harnad(a)princeton.edu
Department of Electronics and phone: +44 23-80 592-582
Computer Science fax: +44 23-80 592-865
University of Southampton http://www.cogsci.soton.ac.uk/~harnad/
Highfield, Southampton http://www.princeton.edu/~harnad/
SO17 1BJ UNITED KINGDOM
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Date: Thu, 27 Jan 2000 07:25:14 -0700
From: Otto Maclin <omaclin(a)miners.utep.edu>
To: admin(a)coglit.ecs.soton.ac.uk
Subject: Psychological Science Award
First of all let me thank you for the wonderful job and for the service
you are providing for the psychological community on the internet by
developing and maintaining CogPrints.
While there exist many psychology related websites, only a relative
handful provide content such as your site does.
Psychological Science on the Net is developing a web space for
psychology related webpages and we are specially interested in
directing visitors to high quality content sites such as yours.
As such we have decided to award you the Psychological Science Award.
If you visit http://www.psychologicalscience.net/psych/award/index.html
you will see that your site is the first (and only at this point)
award. This is because of the almost 8,000 sites we have listed, yours
is one of a minority of sites that are of high content. Only a few sites
will ever qualify for this award.
Unlike many Internet 'Awards' the Psychological Science Award is not
intended to advertise our site, it is designed to advertise your site
to our viewers as place worth visiting.
Otto H. MacLin, Ph.D.
Department of Psychology
University of Texas at El Paso
El Paso, TX 79968
Office: 915 747-8761
Fax: 915 747-5751
http://www.psychologicalscience.net
Kedves Kollegak !
A SzTE Megismerestudomanyi Csoportjanak szervezeseben
Csibra Gergely (Birbeck College, London)
2000. februar 8-an, kedden 18 orakor eloadast tart
A naiv pszichologiai gondolkodas gyokerei csecsemokorban
cimmel.
Az eloadas helye: Szegedi Tudomanyegyetem Rektori Taaacsterem.
Szeged, Dugonics ter, a rektori epulet masodik emeleten hatul.
Mindenkit szerettel varunk.
A SzTE Pszichiatriai Klinika tovabbkepzo tanfolyama kereteben
Pleh Csaba (SzTE pszichologia Tanszek Megismerestudomaanyi Csoport)
2000. februar 9-en, szerdan 14h30 kor eloadast tart
A teri kifejezes pszicholingvisztikaja
cimmel.
Az eloadas helye: SzTE Uj Klinikai Tomb foldszinti tanterme (Szeged,
Semmelweis u. 6).
Az eloadas vazlata
A teri kifejezesek pszicholingvisztikai vizsgalata klasszikus temaja a
nyelv es gondolkodas kozti kapcsolat elemzesenek. A tema uj
lenduletet kapott azoknak a torekvesekenek koszonhetoen, amelyek
osszekapcsoljak a vizualis rendszerek kettossegeit a nyelvben a
fonevi es a lokalizalo kifejezesek rendszerevel.
Az eloadas kindulaskent ismerteti ezeket a torekveseket, nehany fontos
strukturalis jellemzojukkel (forma erzeketlen es formaerzekeny kifejezesek szembeallitasa,
a teri kifejezesek alap kategoriainak egyetemessege, az elsajatitas
menete).
A magyar nyelv kulonleges erdekessege, hogy mind a ragoknal mind a
nevutoknal rendezetten alkalmazza a statikus es dinamikus (pl.
-ban versus - ba) kulonbsegtetelt. A gyermeki spontan hasznalat tanusaga
szerint itt a CEL kodolasanak elsobbsege figyelheto meg.
Kiraly Ildikoval es Racsmany Mihallyal vegzett ujabb kutatasainkban mesterseges
hely kifejezeseket tanultatunk ovodas gyermekkel. A rendszer 3-6 eves
kor korul meg nem zarul le: a tanulas igen gyors (megertes 2-3 expozicio
utan letrejon), a CELTARGY formajatol fuggetlen, ragoknal konnyebb
mint nevutoknal. Az eloadas az eredmenyeket a nyelvelsajatitas
mechanizmusaival kapcsolatos nyitott kerdesek szempontjabol ertelmezi.
Sziasztok Kognitivek!
En is Csibra vagyok, sot meg Gergo is, de tenyleg Gergo, es
rokonok vagyunk a fonokkel, bar a kozos ost meg nem sikerult kideriteni.
Egyebkent programozassal, es a Hivatalos Csibra Honlap "fenntartasaval"
foglalkozom, meg rendszergazda vagyok egy autoalkatreszeket gyarto
cegnel Mosonszolnokon. Az e-mail cimem csbalint(a)freemail.hu, azert,
hogy ne keverjetek ossze a Gergelyevel (van egyebkent csibra(a)mail.sapu.hu
is, meg csibra(a)freemail.hu is, ezeket szakmai, es maganlevelezesekre
hasznalom, a csbalint a koglistnek van fenntartva).
Ennyit a bemutatkozasrol...
Egy ideje olvasom mar a listat, de hozzaszolni meg nem tudtam
(bar a sok hirdeteshez nincs mit hozzaszolni :).
Mar regota tervezem, hogy kene csinalni egy olyan programot,
ami a leheto leghuebben szimulalja az agy mukodeset, tanulast stb.
Itt jottok a kepbe, hiszen ti valami ilyesmivel foglalkoztok.
Talaltam egy mesterseges inteligencia listat, de amikor megneztem
az archivumot szomoruan kellett megallapitanom, hogy az utolso
level valamikor tavaly novemberben ment el ra, szoval
nem tul biztato a helyzet.
A program linux operacios rendszeren keszulne (meg egy betut se irtam :)
elosztott rendszeren igy tobb gepet is be lehetne allitani a szimulaciora.
Hogy hogyan fog mukodni, es mire lesz jo azt meg nem tudom,
de a hogyan fog mukodni megoldodik a programozas kozben,
a mire lesz jot meg majd megoldja az elet.
Amit eddig az idegsejtekrol tudok (vagy sejtek, vagy felreertelmeztem :)
(ez lenne a kiindulasi alap, tulajdonkeppen az idegsejtek mukodesenek szimulacioja):
Van egy idegsejt, abbol kilog egy idegszal (axon ha jol emlekszem)
es ez az idegszal kapcsolodik tovabbi idegsejtekhez szinapszisokon (?)
keresztül. Az idegsejtben (matematikailag megfogalmazva, szamitogepes
formara elferditve) van egy fuggveny ami a szinapszisokon keresztul
bejovo "jeleket" osszegzi (talan sulyzottan), es ha az osszeg eler
egy kuszoberteket, akkor a sejt kikuld az idegszalon keresztul egy "jelet".
Ez igy egy tokeletes analog kapcsolo, es az agy egy ilyen analog
kapcsolokbol felepulo szamitogep...
Azt olvastam az Elet es Tudomany (ET) legutobbi (vagy azelotti) szamaban,
hogy egy idegsejt kb. 10000 masikal all kapcsolatban es - uj felfedezes -,
hogy egy idegszal ugyanahhoz a sejthez tobb szinapszison keresztul
is csatlakozhat, valamint, hogy van vagy 100 milliard idegsejt.
Ha jol emlekszem, az idegsejtek az agykeregben csoportokba szervezodnek
(valami olyan dereng, hogy 3 cm hosszu, es talan 3 mm atmeroju,
sok (mondjuk 5) szog alapu hasabokba, aztan ezek is kapcsolodnak masokhoz... ?).
A ti alapkerdesetek (?) (ezt az ET is nyitva hagyta), hogy mi alapjan/miatt no ki egy
idegszalbol egy szinapszis, hogy hozzatapadjon egy sejthez, ami mellett
elhalad, miert tapad hozza, es hogyan valasztja ki azt amihez hozzatapad,
azaz hogyan tanul a rendszer.
Az en kerdeseim egyelore egyszerubbek (de lehet, hogy ezekre sincs valasz):
- Vajon csokken-e a "jel" az idegszal hosszan (elektonikaban csokken ugye,
es mivel kemiai uton keletkezik valoszinuleg csokkennie kene), azaz a "jelet"
kibocsato idegsejthez kozelebb levo sejtek nagyobb jelet kapnak-e mint
a tavoliak.
- Szamit-e az, hogy a szinapszis az idegsejthez hol kapcsolodik,
vagy a sejt teljes felulete egyforman "er".
- Azt gondolom, hogy a szinapszisok sulyai az idegsejt fuggvenyeben
az altal novekedhetnek, hogy milyen surun, es az altal csokkenhetnek,
hogy milyen ritkan hasznaljak. Gondolom ezt abbol, hogy ha valamit sokat
latunk (hallunk, szagolunk, olvasunk stb.) akkor azt konnyebben, es hamarabb
megjegyezzuk, amivel meg ritkabban talalkozunk elfelejtjuk, vagy
"elasodik" valahova, szoval ebben megerositest varok.
- Van e meg valami lenyeges funkcioja az idegsejtnek, ugyanugy
epul-e fel, mint a tobbi sejt (gondolom, sejtmag, sejthartya, plazma stb.),
van-e az idegsejtekben DNS, vagy abbol kihagytak (sajat elmeletileg,
nem kene bele, hiszen uj idegsejtek nem keletkeznek (nonek), bar
mintha olvastam volna olyat, hogy ez is megdolni latszik) mert
nincs ra szukseg.
(ahogy irom ezt a monologot, egyre tobb kerdes jut az eszembe :)
- Kihagytam valamit?
Technikai kerdes: irhatok-e ekezetekkel Windows alol, mert igy
egy-egy ekezet hiany felreertelmezhetove teheti a kerdesemet,
valaszaitokat? Ugyan elegge redundans a magyar nyelv, de
kisse feljebb volt olyan mondat (meg az e-mail cimeknel) ami
mashogyan ekezetezve ertelmetlen, magyartalan stb.
Na hirtelen ennyi.
Elore is koszi a valaszokat.
Gergo
Gergo Csibra programmer, system-admin
The official Csibra homepage:
http://www.extra.hu/csibra
ELTE TTK Tudomanytortenet es Tudomanyfilozofia Tanszek
Budapest, Pazmany P. setany 1/A
TUDOMANYFILOZOFIA SZEMINARIUM
(http://hps.elte.hu/seminar)
________________________________________________
Januar 31
12:30
6. em. 6.54
F a r k a s K a t a l i n
Eotvos, Department of Philosophy
THE PROBLEM OF FREE WILL
I think that understanding free will raises a serious problem, and I
must admit I have no solution for it. As a matter of fact, nor I have
anything particularly novel or original to say about free will. I intend
this talk merely as a starting point for discussion (and accordingly, I
hope to keep it reasonably short).
The problem, in my view, is this: we have free will, but as I shall
argue briefly, compatibilist theories of free will - that is, theories
which claim that free will and determinism are compatible - are
unsatisfactory. This leaves libertarianism: the view that we have free
will, and it is incompatible with determinism, therefore determinism
must be false.
However, the main difficulty has been to understand HOW libertarianism
could make the phenomenon of free will intelligible. If we claim - what
is only natural - that our beliefs and desires cause our actions, then
psychological determinism seems to offer the best interpretation of our
ordinary decision-making procedures. The only alternative to
deterministic explanation seems to be explanation by randomness or
chance - which is hardly what we expect to account for free choice. I
shall present a little idea which might point towards a solution - but
then again, just like a fair number of proposed solutions, it may
easily prove to be a simple relabelling of the problem.
Ha mindenki beszel magyarul, akkor az eloadas magyarul lesz!
A szeminarium szervezoje: E. Szabo Laszlo
--
Laszlo E. Szabo
Department of Theoretical Physics
Department of History and Philosophy of Science
Eotvos University, Budapest
H-1518 Budapest, Pf. 32.
Phone: (36-1)2090-555/6671
Fax: (36-1)372-2509
Home: (36-1)200-7318
http://hps.elte.hu/~leszabo
Place/Catania: THE ROLE OF THE HAND IN THE EVOLUTION OF LANGUAGE
The target article whose abstract appears below has today appeared
in PSYCOLOQUY, a refereed online journal of Open Peer Commentary
sponsored by the American Psychological Association.
http://www.cogsci.soton.ac.uk/cgi/psyc/newpsy?11.007ftp://ftp.princeton.edu/pub/harnad/Psycoloquy/2000.volume.11/
psyc.00.11.007.language-gesture.1.place
OPEN PEER COMMENTARY on this target article is now invited.
Qualified professional biobehavioural, neural or cognitive
scientists should consult PSYCOLOQUY's Websites or send email
(below) for Instructions if not familiar with format or acceptance
criteria for commentaries (all submissions are refereed).
To submit articles or to seek information:
EMAIL: psyc(a)pucc.princeton.edu
URLs: http://www.princeton.edu/~harnad/psyc.htmlhttp://www.cogsci.soton.ac.uk/psyc
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
psycoloquy.00.11.007.language-gesture.1.place Sun Jan 23 2000
ISSN 1055-0143 (59 paras, 58 refs, 1 figure, 1281 lines)
PSYCOLOQUY is sponsored by the American Psychological Association (APA)
Copyright 2000 Ullin T. Place
THE ROLE OF THE HAND IN THE EVOLUTION OF LANGUAGE
Target Article on Language Origins
Ullin T. Place
School of Philosophy
University of Leeds
School of Psychology
University of Wales,
Bangor, Wales
UK
Charles Catania
Department of Psychology
University of Maryland,
Baltimore County
1000 Hilltop Circle
Baltimore, Maryland 21250
USA
catania(a)umbc.edu
ABSTRACT: This target article has four sections. Section I sets
out four principles which should guide any attempt to reconstruct
the evolution of an existing biological characteristic. Section II
sets out thirteen principles specific to a reconstruction of the
evolution of language. Section III sets out eleven pieces of
evidence for the view that vocal language must have been preceded
by an earlier language of gesture. Based on those principles and
evidence, Section IV sets out seven proposed stages in the process
whereby language evolved: (1) the use of mimed movement to indicate
an action to be performed, (2) the development of referential
pointing which, when combined with mimed movement, leads to a
language of gesture, (3) the development of vocalisation, initially
as a way of imitating the calls of animals, (4) counting on the
fingers leading into (5) the development of symbolic as distinct
from iconic representation, (6) the introduction of the practice of
question and answer, and (7) the emergence of syntax as a way of
disambiguating utterances that can otherwise be disambiguated only
by gesture.
KEYWORDS: evolution, equivalence, gesture, homesigning, iconic,
language, miming, pointing, protolanguage, referring, sentence,
symbolic, syntax, vocalisation
EDITOR'S NOTE: Ullin T. Place died on January 2, 2000. His target
article had been reviewed for PSYCOLOQUY and was essentially
complete at the time of his death. Some minor editing has been done
by PSYCOLOQUY Associate Editor A. Charles Catania, mainly to bring
the manuscript into conformity with PSYCOLOQUY style. Catania will
consider replying to commentaries on this article, but also
welcomes the participation of others who may feel they are
familiar enough with Place's perspectives to do so.
Retrieve the full target article at:
http://www.cogsci.soton.ac.uk/cgi/psyc/newpsy?11.007
or
ftp://ftp.princeton.edu/pub/harnad/Psycoloquy/2000.volume.11/
psyc.00.11.007.language-gesture.1.place
Margolis: WASON'S SELECTION TASK WITH A REDUCED ARRAY
The target article below has today appeared in PSYCOLOQUY, a
refereed online journal of Open Peer Commentary sponsored by the
American Psychological Association.
OPEN PEER COMMENTARY on this target article is now invited.
Qualified professional biobehavioural, neural or cognitive
scientists should consult PSYCOLOQUY's Websites or send email
(below) for Instructions if not familiar with format or acceptance
criteria for commentaries (all submissions are refereed).
To submit articles or to seek information:
EMAIL: psyc(a)pucc.princeton.edu
URLs: http://www.princeton.edu/~harnad/psyc.htmlhttp://www.cogsci.soton.ac.uk/psyc
psycoloquy.00.11.005.reduced-wason-task.1.margolis Sat Jan 22 2000
ISSN 1055-0143 (14 paras, 7 refs, 2 notes, 215 lines)
PSYCOLOQUY is sponsored by the American Psychological Association (APA)
Copyright 2000 Howard Margolis
WASON'S SELECTION TASK WITH A REDUCED ARRAY
Target Article on Reduced-Wason-Task
Howard Margolis
Harris School of Public Policy Studies
University of Chicago
1155 E60th Street Chicago IL
60637 773-702-0867
773-702-0926 (fax)
hmarg(a)uchicago.edu
http://www.harrisschool.uchicago.edu/fac_margolis.html
ABSTRACT: A striking aspect of performance on Wason's (1966)
selection task has been largely ignored. This brief target article
discusses the remarkable remedial effectiveness of Wason's "reduced
array" of alternatives.
KEYWORDS: cognitive illusions, modus tollens, reasoning, selection
task, Wason
1. One very odd feature of the Wason (1966) selection task, noticed long
ago by Wason himself but then almost completely ignored, is the
performance of subjects when the cards which nearly all subjects get
right are removed.
2. Consider this common form of the problem. Cards are labelled "A" or
"D" on one side and "3" or "7" on the other. A rule says that "if A
then 3". Subjects see an array of four of the cards, two letter-side up
(showing "A" and "D") and two number-side up (showing "3" and "7"). A
subject must decide which cards need to be turned over to know whether
this sample of cards is consistent with the rule.
3. The common responses are "A & 3", or "A" alone. The correct response
is "A & 7". So there seem to be two easy cards: "A", which is rarely
missed, and "D", which is rarely chosen; and two hard cards: "3" and
"7", which supply nearly all the errors. Overall, about 90% of subjects
in fact do make errors. So what will happen if subjects are shown only
what Wason called a "reduced array". Delete the two easy cards, and
have subjects judge only the two hard cards. One might suppose, since
essentially all errors are caused in relation to the hard cards, that
subjects will continue to do badly.
4. But they don't! If this test is run on a group of reasonable size
(say a class), those asked to respond to the 4- card version will
typically return the usual 10% correct responses. But those given the
reduced array will return a clear majority of correct responses! What
can possibly account for this large improvement, related to merely
removing the two cards that are ordinarily judged correctly anyway?
5. This odd, even bizarre, improvement can be explained if subjects are
seeing the cards not as particular cards but as indicating categories
of cards. If explicitly asked, subjects understand the intended meaning
of the question. But their responses make logical sense only with
respect to a drastic misreading of the question. The question is
misread as being about which categories of cards should be examined;
for example, any cards with a "D" on either side; rather than about the
particular card shown with a "D" on its upside.
6. This is not a cognitive illusion (cf. Koehler 1993, 1996; Krueger
1998; Margolis 1998) but simply a consequence of the pragmatics of
ordinary language. In everyday conversation, even logicians rarely use
phrasing like "if and only if" (iff) to distinguish this "if/then"
relation from "if but not only if" (if). Distinguishing between "if"
and "iff" is almost always left to context. But the basic Wason problem
provides so little context that if/then here could be interpreted
either way.
7. The two points (ambiguity with respect to "if" vs. "iff",
interacting with the illusory "category" response to the task) will
account not only for the usual errors on the basic problem but also for
the remarkable improvement from removing the two easy cards.
8. If a person might respond to Wason's task as if it were about
categories rather than about the particular cards shown, then the
salient correct response (to that incorrect reading!) is either "A & 3"
when "if/then" is read as "iff", or "A" alone when "if/then" is read as
"if": just the pair of responses we do indeed see most often [NOTE 1].
In Margolis 1987 (pp. 151-2) I explained how the illusory "categories"
reading can arise from entrenched expectations, so that we ordinarily
first have to choose what sort of approach to take and only then deal
with details of how to do it. In the absence of sufficient context to
differentiate one situation from the other, we tend to fall into seeing
first what we usually do first. In this impoverished context, that
"usual" tendency turns out to override what the words literally tell
the subject to do.
9. But consider what happens when we eliminate the two easy cards ("A"
& "D"). If the "category" illusion is guiding intuition, then the
proper response (to that illusory interpretation) is "7 & 3" for the
"iff" reading of "if/then", or "7" only for the "if" reading. So we can
expect that subjects will no longer miss the "7". And a norm of
language then favours "7" alone as the response. Other than for
rhetorical purposes, we do not ask questions with obvious answers. This
favours the "if" (rather than "iff") reading, which gives the solver a
bit more to think about - which in turn favours "7" alone over "7 &
3". On this account, subjects still seem to be misinterpreting the
cards as categories. But with the reduced array, the only available
correct response for the "category" reading is also the correct
response for the intended reading! "A" is still salient in the
question, but since it is no longer available, subjects must pick the
"7".
10. Is it plausible that the too-easy character of the question -- when
read to make the checking of all the choices correct -- pushes subjects
toward an "if" (rather than "iff") response? More generally, can subtle
changes in the salience of one reading against another have notable and
substantial effects? Anyone familiar with the ways of stage magicians
will know that the answer to this must be yes. Griggs (1990) confirmed
a particularly startling salience effect in the present context of
performance on the Wason task. A variation in the task was used which
forced responses especially heavily towards "A & 3". But then a
logically insignificant alteration in wording shifts responses very
heavily to the otherwise almost never seen response of "D & 7"!
11. The "D & 7" response (in logical notation, the not-P, not-Q
response) is in fact another correct response to the illusory reading
of the cards as categories (see NOTE 1). That "D & 7" is almost never
seen shows the effect of the salience of "A" and "3" in the rule. But
the wording of the question has a recency advantage over the wording in
the rule. This turns out to be so strong that the predominant response
is reversed by reversing the order in which the two clauses in the
question are presented [NOTE 2].
12. The "categories" account of Wason reviewed here makes sense of BOTH
of the otherwise exceedingly puzzling effects just presented. And it
has other significant consequences. In particular, if merely reducing
the array greatly improves performance, it is hardly surprising that
more strenuous manipulations (making a permission context or social
norm context, etc.) can also greatly improve performance. But, of
course, the converse is not true.
13. Note that on this account the cognitive illusion comes at the stage
of interpreting the task, not from the inability to handle modus
tollens that is the usual explanation. That claimed inability has
always warranted more suspicion than it has received, since anyone who
listens to their children will hear them quite readily make what are
functional equivalents of modus tollens inferences. And not very
surprisingly, since the world provides us with endless occasions to
make such inferences. (If I picked my keys off the desk, they would now
be in my pocket. My keys are not in my pocket. So they are probably on
my desk.)
14. And if this interpretation of Wason is correct, it has relevance to
many issues in the long-continuing debate over the nature and
significance of cognitive illusions.
NOTES
[1] The salient responses are those prompted by the cards mentioned in
the question ("A" and "3"). But three pairs in addition to "A & 3"
would also be correct for a "categories" response to the "iff"
reading: "A & D", "7 & 3", "D & 7". Any of these choices will locate
all violations (A/7 or D/3 cards). And for the "if" reading "7" as well
as "A" would be correct, finding any A/7 cards.
[2] The exceptionally heavy "A & 3" responses are elicited by making
the task read: "Circle two cards to turn over to check whether the rule
has been violated." But "A & 3" as the dominant response switches to "D
& 7" when the instruction is turned around to read: "Figure out which
two cards could violate the rule, and circle them."
REFERENCES
Griggs, R. (1990) "Instructional effects on responses in Wason's
selection task". British Journal of Psychology 81:197-204.
Koehler, J.J. (1993). The Base Rate Fallacy Myth. PSYCOLOQUY, 4(49)
ftp://ftp.princeton.edu/pub/harnad/Psycoloquy/1993.volume.4/
psyc.93.4.49.base-rate.1.koehler
http://www.cogsci.soton.ac.uk/cgi/psyc/newpsy?4.49
Koehler, J.J. (1996). The base rate fallacy reconsidered: Descriptive,
normative, and methodological challenges. Behavioral and Brain Sciences
19(1): 1-53.
http://www.cogsci.soton.ac.uk/bbs/Archive/bbs.koehler.html
Krueger, J. (1998). The bet on bias: A forgone conclusion? PSYCOLOQUY
9(46) ftp://ftp.princeton.edu/pub/harnad/Psycoloquy/1998.volume.9/
psyc.98.9.46.social-bias.1.krueger
http://www.cogsci.soton.ac.uk/cgi/psyc/newpsy?9.46
Margolis, H. (1987) Patterns, Thinking and Cognition. University of
Chicago Press.
Margolis, H. (1998) Tycho's Illusion: How It Lasted 400 Years, and What
That Implies About Human Cognition PSYCOLOQUY 9 (32)
ftp://ftp.princeton.edu/pub/harnad/Psycoloquy/1998.volume.9/
psyc.98.9.32.cognitive-illusion.1.margolis
http://www.cogsci.soton.ac.uk/cgi/psyc/newpsy?9.32
Wason, P.C. (1966) Reasoning. In B. M. Foss (Ed.) New Horizons in
Psychology I. Penguin
Kedves Kollegak !
Szeretnem felhivni a figyelmet nehany uj kognitiv temaju konyvre,
talan elsikkadtak a nagy karacosnyi vasarokban.
Gould, S.J.: Az elmericskelt ember. Typotex, 1999, 2580 Ft.
Az intelligencia teszteles elsopro biralata.
Julesz Bela: Dialogusok az eszlelesrol. Typotex, 200, 1800 Ft.
Igen sok kiserlet, s szemelyes hangsulyu kifejtes a mkai percepcio
kutatasrol.
Ezek, s peldaul Hofstadter, Pinker, Popper, a "magyar PDP" konyv
15 % kedvezmennyel kaphatok a Kiado Retek utcai boltjaban.
Pleh Csaba A lelektan tortenet. Osiris, 2000. 3200 Ft.
A klasszikus lelektant megprobaltam a kognitiv szemlelet
szemuvegen at bemutatni. Aki meg akarja venni (ez itt a rabeszeles
helye), most tegye, mert a kiado rajott, hogy roszul arazta be, s
ez felfele iranyulo elmozdulast szokott jelenteni.
Az Osiris boltjaban vannak kedvezmenyek erre is.
Udv Pleh Csaba
Csaba Pleh Pleh Csaba
Cognitive Science Group Megismerestudomanyi Csoport
Department of Psychology Pszichologiai Tanszek
University of Szeged Szegedi Tudomanyegyetem
Szeged
Petofi sgt 30-34, 6722 Hungary
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(36)(23) 453932 or 933
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Hungarian Review of Psychology Magyar Pszichologiai Szemle
editor foszerkeszto
Tisztelt kogtarsak,
Nyilvan sokan eszrevettek, hogy szeretett listankat megtamadta a
millennium bug, ezert januar 1e ota gyengelkedett. A pontosabb
diagnozis szerint a www archivumot kezelo program volt a kor okozoja,
amit kenytelenek is voltunk a masvilagra segiteni. A koglist viszont
ujra mukodik, amint azt a benneragadt regebbi uzenetek felszabadulasa
jelzi. Nemsokara uj archivalo program is lesz.
Elnezest a kenyelmetlensegert, amit az uzenetek keslekedese esetleg okozhatott.
Csibra Gergely
--
Gergely Csibra Centre for Brain
Research Fellow and Cognitive Development
Senior Lecturer Department of Psychology
g.csibra(a)bbk.ac.uk Birkbeck College
tel: (44) 207 631 6323 Malet Street
fax: (44) 207 631 6587 London WC1E 7HX
Kedves Kollegak es Diakok !
Csibra Gergely a mar korabban is hirdetett Csecsemofejlodes kurzusat a
szegedi Megismerestudomanyi Program kereteben az alabbiak szerint
tartja.
Kerlek, hirdessetek diakjaitok kozott.
Csibra Gergely kurzusa, Birbeck College, London
A megismer�s gy�kerei csecsemokorban
Szeged, febru�r 7-11.
Orak helye: szeged, Boldogasszony sugarut 4, az un. Irinyi epulet,
foldszinti pszichologia tanterem.
Orak ideje: hetfo-pentek, 16-17h30.
A kurzus a csecsemokori kognit�v fejlod�sre vonatkoz� adatokat tekinti �t
a legfrissebb k�s�rleti eredm�nyek alapj�n. Az irodalmi v�logat�sba ez�rt
nem elsosorban �sszefoglal� cikkek, hanem �j eredm�nyek �s vitatott
elm�letek ker�ltek.
Tematika:
1. Vizsg�lati m�dszerek, az �jsz�l�tt k�pess�gei, idegrendszeri fejlod�s,
figyelem, l�t�s, kategoriz�ci� csecsemokorban.
2. T�rgyak: szegment�ci�, �lland�s�g, �thatolhatatlans�g, azonoss�g,
sz�moss�g.
Irodalom: Augiar, A. & Baillargeon, R. (1999). 2.5�month-old infants'
reasoning about when objects should and should not be occluded. Cognitive
Psychology, 39, 116-157. Xu, F., Carey, S., & Welch, J. (1999). Infants'
ability to use object kind information for object individuation.
Cognition, 70, 137-166. Xu, F., & Spelke, E. S. (2000). Large number
discrimination in 6-month-old infants. Cognition, 74, B1-B11.
3. Fizika: gravit�ci�, tehetetlens�g, oks�g, t�rbeli orient�ci�
Irodalom: von Hofsten, C., Voshton, P., Spelke, E. S., Feng, Q., &
Rosander, K. (1998). Predictive action in infancy: Tracking and reaching
for moving objects. Cognition, 67, 255-285. Kotovsky, L. & Baillargeon, R.
(1998). The development of calibration-based reasoning about collision
events in young infants, Cognition, 67, 311-351
Kaufman, J. & Needham, A. (1999). Objective spatial coding by
6.5-month-old infants in a visual dishabituation task. Developmental
Science, 2, 442-447.
4. T�rsas vil�g: arc�szlel�s, tekintetk�vet�s, ut�nz�s, c�lszerus�g
Woodward, A. L. (1998). Infants selectively encode the goal object of an
actor's reach. Cognition, 69, 1-34. Corkum, V., & Moore, C. (1998). The
origins of joint visual attention in infants. Developmental Psychology,
34, 28-38. Johnson, S. C. (2000). The recognition of mentalistic agents in
infancy. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 4, 22-28.
5. Nyelv: fonetika, nyelvtan, lexikon
Christophe, A. & Morton, J. (1998). Is Dutch native English? Linguistic
analysis by 2-month-olds. Developmental Science, 1, 215-219. Gomez, R. L.
& Gerken, LA. (1999). Artificial grammar leraning by 1-year-olds leads to
specific and abstract knowledge. Cognition, 70, 109-135. Balaban, M. T. &
Waxman, S. R. (1997). Do words facilitate object categorization in
9-month-old infants? Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 64, 3- 26.
Gergo keszitett egy OLVASOKONYVET. Ezt a konyvtarban es a laborban
elhelyezem, de ezen kivul aki szeretne belole, kerem jelezze emailben
nekem, mert most szervezem a sozksorositasat, terites elleneben
termeszetesen.
Csibra Gergely egesz heten szegeden lesz, s elotte a MAKOGon is. Aki
szeretne vele konzultalni, talalkozni s hasonlok, kozvetlenul Vele vagy
velem vegye fel a kapcsolatot.
kedden, februar 8-an delutan nyilvanos eloadast is tart, kesobb hirdetendo
helyen es pontositott temaval.
Mindekit szertettel varunk. Kollegiumi erdeklodes, mint midig,
Stacho Lszlonal (l. fent).
Udvozlettel
Pleh Csaba egyetemi tanar Professor Csaba Pleh
Megismerestudomanyi Csoport Cognitive Science Group
Pszichologia Tanszek Department of Psychology
SzTE U. Szeged
Magyar Pszichologiai Szemle Hungarian Review of Psychology
foszerkeszto edito
Szeged
Petofi sgt. 30, H-6722
Hungary
Home: Budakeszi, Zichy P. u 4, 2092
Phone: (36)(23)453933,06203278922
Fax: (36)(23)453932
Mobile: (06) 203278922
email: pleh(a)edpsy.u-szeged.hu
Homepage: www.jate.u-szeged.hu/~pleh
