Rejected message: sent to koglist(a)cogpsyphy.hu by CERULO(a)RCI.RUTGERS.EDU follows.
Reason for rejection: sender not subscribed.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dear Colleagues,
I am writing to tell you about an exciting conference
planned for this November. Please take a moment to
note the details of this event.
TOWARD A SOCIOLOGY OF CULTURE AND COGNITION
November 12-13, 1999
In recent years, a small but growing chorus of voices
has argued for the utility of a sociology of the mind.
Proponents of this agenda, a group rooted primarily in
the study of culture, contend that targeted sociological
work on culture and cognition would greatly enhance the
existing literatures on human thought.
In order to firmly establish a coherent sociology of
culture and cognition, I have organized a two day
national conference designed to engage this topic.
The conference, entitled "Toward a Sociology of Culture
and Cognition,"will take place on November 12-13, 1999.
The event will be held on the Rutgers University campus.
This conference will consist of both formal panels and
informal discussion sessions. In this way, participants
will have the opportunity to engage in lively and in-depth
discussion of issues. A complete conference schedule is
available at our web site:
http://sociology.rutgers.edu/conference/
The site also provides information about meeting room
locations, registration, lodging, and directions to
the campus.
Should you have further questions or require additional
information, please contact me at (908) 317-9727 or at
cerulo(a)rci.rutgers edu
I look forward to seeing you at what promises to be a
most engaging event.
Karen A. Cerulo
Associate Professor of Sociology
Tisztelt Kollegak!
2000-ben megrendezesere kerul a Magyar Megismerestudomanyi
Alapitvany immar szokasos evi konferenciaja a
VIII. MAKOG
A konferencia temaja:
A KOGNITIV FUNKCIOK FEJLODESE ES ZAVARAI
-Helyszin: Szeged
-Idopont: 2000. februar, elso hetvegeje (pentek-vasarnap)
-Koltsegek: a mult evhez hasonlo
Eloadasokra jelentkezoket varunk a fenti temakorben es termeszetesen
a kognitiv tudomanyok egyeb teruleteirol is.
Eloadasok idotartama: 15-20 perc
Jelentkezni absztraktokkal az alabbi cimen lehet:
Keri Szabolcs, SZOTE Pszichiatriai Klinika, Szeged, Semmelweis u. 6,
6725
Elozetes jelentkezeseket e-mail-en is elfogadunk, de a vegleges
absztraktokat postan varjuk. Az absztraktok terjedelme max. 1 A4-es
oldal, kerjuk mind lemezen, mind kinyomtatva is elkuldeni. Az
anyagokat a szervezo bizottsag elbiralja, az elfogadasrol a szerzoket
e-mail-en ertesiti.
Tovabbi informaciokkal a kesobbiekben jelentkezunk.
Udvozlettel a szegedi szervezok neveben:
Pleh Csaba Keri Szabolcs Szendi Istvan
ELTE TTK Tudomanytortenet es Tudomanyfilozofia Tanszek
Budapest, Pazmany P. setany 1/A
Tudomanyfilozofia Szeminarium
________________________________________________
1999. Szeptember 27. (hetfo !)
12:30
6. em. 661.
B a r r y L o e w e r
Rutgers University
Collegium Budapest
PROBABILITY AND DETERMINISM
Although probability is essential to the formulation (and evaluation) of
scientific theories and although a great deal is known about how to
employ probabilistic concepts, there is still philosophical controversy
concerning the nature of probability. Some hold that only probability
concerns only degrees of belief (either subjective or constrained by
"objective" rules) while others hold that it concerns mind-independent
features of reality. The latter view divides among those who hold that
it concerns only frequencies (actual or hypothetical) and those who hold
that it concerns a "causal propensity." The nature of probability is
especially puzzling when the underlying dynamics is completely
deterministic as in classical mechanics and Bohm's version of quantum
mechanics. Some claim that when the dynamics is deterministic then all
objective probabilities are 1 or 0. But this seems at odd with the
scientific practice. In my talk I will review some of the main ideas
concerning the nature of probability and also an idea suggested by David
Lewis. According to Lewis probability concerns an objective feature of
reality that supervenes on the totality of propositions not concerning
chance. Whether or not Lewis' account is correct for dynamical chances I
argue that it provides a good account of chance statements when the
dynamics are deterministic.
1999. oktober 4. (hetfo)
12:30
6. em. 661.
T o m a s z P l a c e k
Department of Philosophy, Jagiellonian University, Cracow
OUTCOMES IN BRANCHING SPACE-TIME (OBST)
-AN ANALYSIS OF BELL'S THEOREM-
The framework of BRANCHING SPACE-TIME (BST; cf. Belnap 1992, SYNTHESE
92, pp. 385--434) has recently been extended to allow for the
introduction of outcomes of events and the analysis of GHZ theorems.
(Kowalski & Placek, forthcoming in BRIT. J. PHIL. SCI. and INT. J.
THEOR. PHYS.)
In BST, space-time and modality are incorporated in the very structure
of the models, which consist of a pair $\langle W, \leq \rangle$, where
$W$ is a non-empty set weakly ordered by $\leq$, which is interpreted as
`causally accessible from.' Maximal upward directed subsets of $W$ are
called `histories,' and proper subsets of histories are called `events.'
Two events are called `space-like separated' if neither causally
precedes the other. `Atomic outcomes' of an event $E$ are those parts of
the event's causal future that split in $E$.
The main result of Kowalski & Placek is that the family of outcomes of
an event forms a Boolean algebra. The paper also proves that in GHZ
setups, there is always a common cause (CC) in the sense of Reichenbach
if directions are held fixed, but that there is no single COMMOM common
cause (cf. Hofer-Szabo et al., forthcoming in BRIT. J. PHIL. SCI.)
accounting for the outcomes of incompatible settings.
For an analysis of Bell's theorem, I assign probabilities to outcomes by
imposing a classical probability measure on the Boolean algebra of the
outcomes of each given event. In the derivation of Bell's theorem, I use
probability measures of the form $p_{L\alpha \cup R\beta}(Lx \cap Ry)$,
$x,y \in \{+,-\}$, where the subscript indicates that the result is an
outcome of the event of measuring the spin projections along directions
$\alpha$ on the left and $\beta$ on the right. Probabilities for single
results on the left or on the right are calculated from these measures,
allowing us to express correlations as $p_{L\alpha \cup R\beta}(Lx \cap
Ry) \neq p_{L\alpha \cup R\beta}(Lx) \times p_{L\alpha \cup
R\beta}(Ry)$.
Since correlations between space-like separated results appear
disturbing, it is natural to look for an explanation in terms of a CC
located in the results' common past. The CC's outcomes divide histories
in such a way that actual runs of a correlation experiment are seen as
belonging to two or more varieties differentiated by hidden factors. You
may think of these hidden factors as restoring the deterministic order.
You may also be more modest and require only that the hidden factors
restore the causal order, i.e., that in each sub-population, the
correlations disappear.
Formally, for space-like separated events $E$ and $F$ with correlated
outcomes $e$ and $f$, respectively, a CC is an event C preceding both
$e$ and $f$, such that for every atomic outcome $\omega_{i}$ of $C$,
$$ p_{E\cup F\cup C}(e \cap f|\omega_{i}) = p_{E\cup F\cup C}(e
|\omega_{i}) \times p_{E \cup F\cup C}(f|\omega_{i})$$,
where $p_{E \cup F \cup C}$ is defined on the enlarged probability
space. Now, for any correlated pair $e,f$, we CAN construct
mathematically an enlarged probability space containing such a CC.
Moreover, for any finite number of correlations we CAN construct a
single large probability space containing a set of distinct CCs, each CC
taking care of one correlation. However, in the Bell/Clauser-Horne
argument, one wants something more: one postulates a single common CC
accounting for all the correlated outcomes of $L\alpha\cup R\beta$,
$L\alpha\cup R\beta--\prime$, $L\alpha--\prime\cup R\beta$, and
$L\alpha--\prime\cup R\beta--\prime$. Given the standard assumptions of
locality and `no conspiracy,' which in our framework take the form
\begin{equation*}
\begin{split}
& \forall \alpha, \beta, \varphi, x p_{L\alpha \cup R\beta\cup C}(Lx)
= p_{L\alpha \cup R\varphi\cup C}(Lx)\ & \forall \alpha, \beta, \gamma,
y p_{L\alpha \cup R\beta\cup C}(Ry) = p_{L\gamma \cup R\beta\cup
C}(Ry)
\end{split}
\tag{LOCALITY}
\end{equation*}
\begin{equation*}
\forall \alpha, \beta, \gamma, \varphi, i p_{L\alpha \cup R\beta\cup
C}(\omega_i) = p_{L\gamma \cup R\varphi\cup C}(\omega_i),
\tag{NO CONSPIRACY}
\end{equation*}
we derive the Bell/CH inequalities, which are empirically violated.
Thus, there cannot be a common common cause accounting for the Bell/CH
correlations.
1999. oktober 11. (hetfo)
12:30
6. em. 661.
E. S z a b o L a s z l o
ELTE, MTA Elmeleti Fizikai Kutato Csoport
ELTE, Tudomanytortenet es Tudomanyfilozofia Tanszek
EINSTEIN MEGOLDOTTA AZ EPR-BELL PARADOXONT?
Úgy tunik igen, sot meg egy sereg mas problemajat a kvantumelmeletnek.
"Prizma-modell" neven Arthur Fine 1982-ben egy olyan megoldast javasolt
az EPR-Bell problemara, es altalaban a kvantummechanika lokalis-realista
interpretaciojara, amelyrol, mint kesobb o maga kideritette, mar
Einstein is emlitest tett egy 1936-os cikkeben, illetve nehany Rosenhez
es Schrodingerhez irt leveleben. E megoldas nem kapott kulonosebb
visszhangot, sot maga Fine sem vette igazan komolyan, hiszen kesobbi
cikkeiben úgy ir a Bell-tetelrol, mintha az Einstein-Fine-interpretacio
nem is letezne. Ennek oka, hogy tevesen, Fine ezt a megoldast a
valosagban vegrehajtott kiserletekben hasznalt detektorok nem 100%-os
hatasfokaval hozta kapcsolatba.
Az eloadasban az Einstein-Fine-interpretaciot egy új megvilagitasban
mutatom be. Megmutatom, hogy semmi koze nincs a detektorok hatasfokanak
sokat diszkutalt problemajahoz. A valosagban elvegzett EPR-Bell
kiserletek elemzesevel megmutatom, hogy e kiserletek logikai
szerkezetuknel fogva teljesen kompatibilisek az
Einstein-Fine-interpretacioval, amely viszont tokeletesen feloldja az
EPR-Bell paradoxont.
1999. oktober 18. (hetfo)
12:30
6. em. 661.
K a t a l i n B a l o g
Yale University
CONCEIVABILITY, POSSIBILITY AND THE MIND-BODY PROBLEM
I want to take on the question of what a class of arguments, usually
called the Conceivability Arguments, have to say about the mind-body
problem. These arguments have two different versions. In one version,
considerations of conceivability are taken to support the claim that
phenomenal consciousness is not identical, realized by, or supervenient
on, physical properties (for example, Kripke 1972, 140-162, Nagel 1974,
Robinson 1993, White 1986, Jackson 1998, and Chalmers 1996). According
to the other version, there is an explanatory gap between phenomenal and
physical levels of description, that does not exist with respect to
other higher level descriptions, and that may have metaphysical
ramifications. (This argument is formulated by Joseph Levine 1998,
although he is himself hesitant to accept the conclusion.) My claim is
that these arguments do not succeed in establishing their conclusions.
That is because, and I take this to be the primary lesson of the
Conceivability Arguments, what they reveal does not have to do with
phenomenal consciousness itself, it rather has to do with the nature of
phenomenal concepts.
In the paper, I will focus on the most elaborate and sophisticated
version of the Conceivability Argument for dualism. I first provide a
general exposition of the structure of Conceivability Arguments, then I
proceed to describe in greater detail Frank Jackson's and David
Chalmers' new Conceivability Argument. Finally I construct a reductio
that at the same time reveals where the arguments went wrong.
1999. oktober 25. (hetfo)
12:30
6. em. 661.
K o v a c s G y u l a
SZOTE, Elettani Intezet
OUR BRAIN AND OUR MIND
The neuronal bases of consciousness
(Az eloadas magyarul lesz!)
1. Introduction
1.1. Definition of awareness & consciousness for the non-philosopher
1.2. "Components" of consciousness
1.3. Levels of human consciousness, coma, sleep, awake states
1.4. "Prerequisites" of consciousness
2. Recent results on the brain and mind problem
2.1. Visual consciousness
2.2. Blindsight
2.3. Perception vs. action
2.4. Bistable percepts
2.4.1. Ambiguous figures
2.4.2. Binocular rivalry
2.5. Electrical brain stimulation and conscious behavior
2.6. Subliminal and supraliminal stimulus processing
2.7. Time scale of consciousness
Humans & Monkeys:
2.8. NCC - Neural Correlate of Consciousness
Theories & models
--
Laszlo E. Szabo
Department of Theoretical Physics
Department of History and Philosophy of Science
Eotvos University, Budapest
H-1518 Budapest, Pf. 32.
Phone: (36-1)2090-555/6671
Fax: (36-1)372-2509
Home: (36-1)200-7318
http://hps.elte.hu/~leszabo
Rejected message: sent to koglist(a)cogpsyphy.hu by
GARYBARTRU(a)NETSCAPE.NET follows.
Reason for rejection: sender not subscribed.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CONFERENCE ANNOUNCEMENT: The Cognitive Basis of Science.
On November 5 - 7, 1999, the Rutgers Center for Cognitive Science at Rutg=
ers
University and the Hang Seng Centre for Cognitive Studies at the Universi=
ty of
Sheffield will be sponsoring the first of two conferences on The Cognitiv=
e
Basis of Science.
The goal of these conferences is to bring together scientists and scholar=
s
from a variety of disciplines to explore what is known about the cognitiv=
e
mechanisms and processes that underlie scientific reasoning and practice =
and
to chart directions for future research.
This first conference will be held at Rutgers University in New Brunswick=
, New
Jersey, from Friday, November 5th through Sunday, November 7th, 1999. The=
conference is open to all; no registration fee will be required.
Speaking at the Rutgers conference will be:
Susan Carey (Psychology, NYU)
Kevin Dunbar (Psychology, McGill)
Rochel Gelman (Psychology, UCLA)
Ronald Giere (Philosophy, University of Minnesota)
Alison Gopnik (Psychology, Berkeley) =
Philip Kitcher (Philosophy, Columbia)
Howard Margolis (Public Policy, University of Chicago)
Nancy Nersessian (Cognitive Science, Georgia Tech)
Richard Nisbett (Psychology, University of Michigan)
David Papineau (Philosophy, Kings College London)
Michael Siegal (Psychology, University of Sheffield)
Elizabeth Spelke (Psychology, MIT)
Paul Thagard (Philosophy & Cognitive Science, University of Waterloo)
More information may be found at the conference website:
http://philosophy.rutgers.edu/cbs-conference/
Any further questions concerning the conference may be directed to:
Professor Stephen Stich
Department of Philosophy & Center for Cognitive Science
Rutgers University
E-mail: stich(a)ruccs.rutgers.edu
Office phone: (732) 932-9091
Fax: (732) 932-8617
Gary C. Bartlett, Graduate student
Dept. of Philosophy, Rutgers University
26 Nichol Avenue, New Brunswick, NJ 08901
garybartru(a)netscape.net
Office phone: (732) 932-3788
____________________________________________________________________
Get your own FREE, personal Netscape WebMail account today at http://webm=ail.netscape.com.
Kedves Olvasok !
A SZEGEDI UNIVERSITAS kereteben szervezzodik egy kognitiv muhely. Ennek
reszekent ebben a felvbe a Soros Alapitvay tamogatasaval kurzusok is
lesznek. Kerjuk, hivjatok fel rajuk az erdeklodok figyelmet.
Az elso heten a kapcsolatfelvetel az orak helyen tortenik. Szeptember 13-an,
hetfon 16 es 17h30 kozott altalanos oramegbeszelest is tartunk, a
JATE Irinyi epuleteben a foldszinti pszichologia teremben (a HOK-tol
jobbra), ahol tanaraink varjak az erdeklodoket.
Az 1999. oszi szegedi kognitiv kurzusok osszefoglalo tablazata
Bevezetes a kognitiv tudomanyba
Pleh Csaba
hetfo, 16:00- 17:30
Irinyi epulet, tanterem, Boldogasszony
sgt 4, foldszint
pleh(a)edpsy.u-szeged.hu
Tarsasnyelvszeti alapismeretek
Sandor Klara es
Kontra Miklos
csutortok 12:00- 13:30
JGyTF diszterem Boldogasszony sgt 6
A megismeres neurobiologiai alapjai
Kovacs Gyula es
Fiser Jozsef
kedd, 18:00-19:30
SZOT Elettani Intezet tanterme Dom ter 10
Kovacs Gyula
kogyu(a)phys.szote.u-szeged.hu
Human emlekezet
Racsmany Mihaly
hetfo, 12:00- 13:30
Varkonyi terem, Petofi sgt 30, III. emelet
racsmany(a)izabell.elte.hu
Kognitiv neuropszichologia
Keri Szabolcs
az oramegbeszelesen hirdetettek szerint
szkeri(a)phys.szote.u-szeged.hu
Az irodalmi megismeres: Az essze
Mikola Gyongyi
hetfo, 17:30- 19:00
Irinyi epulet, tanterem, Boldogasszony sgt 4, foldszint
mgyongyi@hung..u-szeged.hu
Decemberben varhatoan vendegunk lesz Hernad Istvan (Southampton) : A
nyelv keletkezese
es Szilagyi N. Sandor (Kolozsvar): A metafora elmletei temaban.
Errol kesobb kuldunk ertesitest.
Mindenkit szeretettel varunk az orakon s egyebkent is:
Pleh Csaba es kollegai
Csaba Pleh
Cognitive Science Group
Department of Psychology
Attila Jozsef University, Szeged
Petofi sgt 30-34, 6722 Hungary
Phone: (36)(62) 454000, extension 3273
Home: Budakeszi Zichy P. u. 4 2092 Hungary, (36)(23) 453932 or 933
Editor, Hungarian Review of Psychology
Az ELTE BTK Filozofiai Intezet Logika tanszekenek
doktori kurzusai es specialis kollegiumai
1999 osz
I. DOKTORI KURZUSOK
FL--350.10 Paradigmak a logika Ruzsa Imre prof. emeritus
torteneteben
FL--350.15 Az okori es kozepkori logika Klima Gyula vendegprof.
tortenete Mate Andras docens
Operatorok es modalis logika Sain Ildiko tud. fmts.
(MTA Renyi Alfred Mat.Kut.Int.)
A harom doktori kurzus idopontmegbeszelese szept. 15-en de. 11-kor lesz
a Logika tanszeken (Bp. V. Pesti B. u. 1., felem. 23).
Sain Ildiko oraja csak komoly logikai es algebrai felkeszultseggel
rendelkezo doktoranduszoknak szol. A masik ket kurzust megfeleloen
tajekozott undergraduate hallgatok is felvehetik specialis
szeminariumkent.
II. TOVABBI SPECIALIS SZEMINARIUMOK
FL--350.08 Modalis logika Mate Andras docens
Csaba Ferenc pgr. od.
FL--350.09 Tarsadalomtudomanyi elmeletek Polos Laszlo adj.
logikai rekonstrukcioja
FL--350.14 Intuicionista es klasszikus Mate Andras docens
logika Simonyi Andras pgr. od.
Az utobbi kurzusok idopontmegbeszelese: szept. 15. 12h, ugyanott.
==============================================================================
Andras Mate CSc, assoc. prof. -- Dept. of Logic
Lorand Eotvos University Budapest, Faculty of Arts and Humanities
H-1364 Budapest, POB 107
Phone: (36 1) 266 9100/5328 -- TAD/Fax: (36 1) 266 41 95
e-mail:mate@isis.elte.hu
Home: H-1119 Budapest, Nandorfehervar koz 11 / Phone: (36 1) 204 0489
Tisztelt Kollegak!
Az ELTE TTK Tudomanytortenet es Tudomanyfilozofia Tanszeke szeptembertol
folytatja tudomanyfilozofiai szeminariumait. Kozkivanatra a
szeminariumot csutortokrol atkoltoztettuk HETFOre. Tehat szeptembertol
kezdve hetfonkent lesz 12:30-tol 14-ig. A novekvo szamú hallgatosagra
tekintettel egy nagyobb terembe koltoztunk: 6. em. 659. (A regi, 662-es
teremtol 5 meterre!) Kave/tea tovabbra is lesz. A deli idopontnak
megfeleloen a szeminarium alatt enni-inni nem szamit illetlensegnek.
Az eloadasok tovabbra is maximum 60 percesek lesznek, amit 5 perc
szunet, majd 25 perc vita kovet.
Mint az eddigi programbol is kitunt, a "tudomanyfilozofiat" meglehetosen
tagan ertelmezzuk. Alkalmasint elofordulnak tudomanytorteneti eloadasok
is, elsosorban olyan temakrol, amelyek vagy az adott tudomanyterulet
ideainak melyebb megerteset szolgaljak, vagy altalanosabb filozofiai
kerdesek atgondolasat segitik elo. Vannak eloadasok, melyek a logika es
elofordulnak olyanok, amelyek az analitikus filozofia teruletebe
tartoznak.
A tanszek fo kutatasi es oktatasi profiljanak megfeleloen azonban a
legszorosabb szalak a TTK fizika, biologia es matematika tanszekeihez
kotodnek. A szeminariumnak az is celja, hogy forumot biztositson a TTK
kulonbozo tanszekein dolgozo kutatok szamara, hogy olyan temakat adjanak
elo es vitassanak meg, melyek interdiszciplinaris jelleguk, vagy
altalanosabb filozofiai vonatkozasuk miatt mas tanszekek kutatoit is
erdekelhetnek. Ezert tehat mindenkit szivesen latunk hallgatokent es
eloadokent. Otletekkel, javaslatokkal kapcsolatban kerjuk, keresse meg a
szeminarium szervezojet:
Szabo Laszlo
E-mail: szabol(a)caesar.elte.hu.
Tel: 6671
A szeminarium weblapja: http://hps.elte.hu/~leszabo/szeminar/folap.htm
Udvozlettel,
Kampis Gyorgy (tanszekvezeto egy. doc., Tudomanyfilozofia Tanszek)
Szabo Laszlo (tud. fomunkatars, Elmeleti Fizikai Tanszek)
_____________________________________________________________
ELTE TTK Tudomanytortenet es Tudomanyfilozofia Tanszek
Budapest, Pazmany P. setany 1/A
Tudomanyfilozofia Szeminarium
SZEPTEMBER
________________________________________________
1999. Szeptember 27. (hetfo !)
12:30
6. em. 659.
B a r r y L o e w e r
Rutgers University
Collegium Budapest
Probability and Determinism
Although probability is essential to the formulation (and evaluation) of
scientific theories and although a great deal is known about how to
employ probabilistic concepts, there is still philosophical controversy
concerning the nature of probability. Some hold that only probability
concerns only degrees of belief (either subjective or constrained by
"objective" rules) while others hold that it concerns mind-independent
features of reality. The latter view divides among those who hold that
it concerns only frequencies (actual or hypothetical) and those who hold
that it concerns a "causal propensity." The nature of probability is
especially puzzling when the underlying dynamics is completely
deterministic as in classical mechanics and Bohm's version of quantum
mechanics. Some claim that when the dynamics is deterministic then all
objective probabilities are 1 or 0. But this seems at odd with the
scientific practice. In my talk I will review some of the main ideas
concerning the nature of probability and also an idea suggested by David
Lewis. According to Lewis probability concerns an objective feature of
reality that supervenes on the totality of propositions not concerning
chance. Whether or not Lewis' account is correct for dynamical chances I
argue that it provides a good account of chance statements when the
dynamics are deterministic.
A szeminarium szervezoje: Szabo E. Laszlo
--
Laszlo E. Szabo
Department of Theoretical Physics
Department of History and Philosophy of Science
Eotvos University, Budapest
H-1518 Budapest, Pf. 32.
Phone: (36-1)2090-555/6671
Fax: (36-1)372-2509
Home: (36-1)200-7318
http://hps.elte.hu/~leszabo
Csaba Pleh
Cognitive Science Group
Department of Psychology
Attila Jozsef University, Szeged
Petofi sgt 30-34, 6722 Hungary
Phone: (36)(62) 454000, extension 3273
Home: Budakeszi Zichy P. u. 4 2092 Hungary, (36)(23) 453932 or 933
Editor, Hungarian Review of Psychology
---------- Forwarded message ----------
Date: Wed, 1 Sep 1999 09:06:39 +0200 (MET DST)
From: Mark G Lee <M.G.Lee(a)cs.bham.ac.uk>
Subject: AISB`00 Call for Symposium Proposals
Resent-Date: Wed, 1 Sep 99 10:46:06 +100
Resent-From: pleh(a)izabell.elte.hu
Resent-To: pleh(a)sol.cc.u-szeged.hu
Sorry for multiple cross postings...
*****************************************
** **
** AISB'00 CONVENTION **
** **
** ``Time for AI and Society'' **
** **
** FIRST CALL FOR SYMPOSIUM PROPOSALS **
** **
*****************************************
**** DEADLINE: 15th OCTOBER 1999 ****
The Society for the Study of Artificial Intelligence and Simulation of
Behaviour (AISB) is pleased to announce its forthcoming convention and
to invite proposals for the Symposia which will largely constitute the
event.
DATES: from 17th April 2000 until 20th April 2000 inclusive
LOCATION: University of Birmingham, England
FORMAT: up to ten serial/parallel Symposia on AI or Cognitive Science
topics preferably related to the overall Convention theme of
Time for AI and Society
PROGRAMME OVERSEERS and LOCAL ARRANGERS:
John Barnden & Mark Lee
School of Computer Science
University of Birmingham
Birmingham B15 2TT
England
{J.A.Barnden,M.G.Lee}(a)cs.bham.ac.uk
Tel: (+44)(0)121-414-{3816,4765}
SYMPOSIUM WEB PAGE: http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/~mgl/aisb/
(currently doesn't contain much but will be added to later)
***********************************************************************
THE AISB'00 SYMPOSIA
By default an AISB'00 Symposium will last for two days within the four
days of the Convention. However, we will also consider proposals for
one-day and three-day Symposia.
Each Symposium will have a Programme Chair, who will be responsible for
administration of the programme, recruiting a programme committee,
arranging the refereeing of extended abstracts for presentation of
papers at the event, and collecting full papers for a
pre-proceedings. It is hoped that each Symposium programme chair will
try to arrange for post-Convention publication of revised papers from
the Symposia in the form of book, special journal issue, etc.
Given that the name of the Society includes the phrase ``Simulation of
Behaviour'' we welcome Symposia that have a Cognitive Science flavour as
opposed to a more narrowly Artificial Intelligence flavour.
***********************************************************************
OTHER ASPECTS OF THE CONVENTION
We plan for there to be four plenary keynote talks.
We plan for there to be opportunities to demonstrate software or
hardware. A call for demonstrations will be put out in due course.
Also, Symposium proposals can include plans for demonstrations.
***********************************************************************
CONVENTION THEME
The Convention theme ``Time for AI and Society'' alludes to the present
time of change in society at large, as symbolised by the new
millenium. The theme has various aspects:
-- It is timely for AI to contribute further _to_ society, including
its work environments and leisure worlds. More generally, the
possible impact of AI, as it develops, on society is an important topic
of study.
-- It is timely for AI to intensify its study _of_ society in a broad
sense.
-- It is timely for AI to make further advances in dealing with handling
time and change themselves.
The overall theme therefore allows a very broad range of Symposia with
rich interrelationships, and provides a place for many styles of
content: for example,
APPLICATIONS-ORIENTED RESEARCH
STUDIES OF HUMAN-FACTORS ISSUES
BASIC TECHNICAL RESEARCH.
The theme covers technical issues such as
-- the problems of adequately representing and reasoning about time and
change
-- problems of getting artificial agents to interact with each other in
societies
-- issues raised by viewing an individual agent's cognition as partly a
societal matter and not just a matter for processes within that
agent.
However, it is to be emphasised that PROPOSALS IN ALL AREAS OF ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE AND COGNITIVE SCIENCE WILL BE CONSIDERED.
***********************************************************************
INTERNATIONAL NATURE
Although the AISB may be thought of as a national AI society for the
United Kingdom, we enthusiastically welcome Symposium proposals from
anywhere in the world and participants from anywhere in the world in the
Symposium programmes.
***********************************************************************
MAKING A PROPOSAL
Proposals should be made by EMAILING IN PLAIN TEXT to John Barnden at
the above address, enclosing the following information. (Prior informal
email or phone enquiries from possible proposers are welcomed.)
TITLE of Symposium
NAME & AFFILIATION of Symposium Chair - including both postal and
email addresses and both fax and telephone numbers.
ABSTRACT for Symposium - not more than 200 words, explaining the
remit of the Symposium. This should be suitable for inclusion in a
call for papers.
CASE FOR SUPPORT - not more than 1000 words, arguing the case for
including your Symposium at the AISB'00 event. You may put
observations about your own background and suitability in the
Additional Comments section below.
SYMPOSIUM LENGTH JUSTIFIACTION -- if you are proposing a Symposium of
a length other than two days, please briefly indicate the reasons.
PROGRAMME COMMITTEE - names and affiliations of (at least) four people
who have agreed in principle to serve on your Symposium's programme
committee. The programme committee should preferably represent (at
least) four different institutions. It should as far as possible cover
the intended breadth of the Symposium, especially if it is
multidisciplinary.
ADDITIONAL COMMENTS -- no more than 500 words, on, for example, the
relevance of your background to the proposed Symposium.
BIBLIOGRAPHY -- any literature references cited above.
Wording beyond the word limits will be deleted before the proposal is
considered!!
Proposals will be selected with the aid of the Committee of the AISB.
Unless there are very special circumstances, please do not expect us to
consider web pages or other documents referenced by the proposal.
*** TO FACILIATE THE PROPOSAL CONSIDERATION PROCESS,
PLEASE DO NOT SEND ANYTHING OTHER THAN PLAIN-TEXT EMAILS.
SO, no Word attachments, postscript, HTML, etc.
***
***********************************************************************
TIMETABLE
Symposium Proposal deadline 15th October 1999
Notification re Symposium acceptance 29th October 1999
Suggested deadline for Call for Extended Abstracts 5th November 1999
Suggested Extended Abstract submission deadline 10th December 1999
Suggested Extended Abstract notification deadline 28th January 2000
Required submission deadline for Full Papers 12th March 2000
Convention 17th April 2000 - 20th April 2000
************************************************************************
** PLEASE NOTE SYMPOSIUM PROPOSAL DEADLINE: 15th OCTOBER 1999!!! **
************************************************************************
Dept of Computer Science | mgl(a)cs.bham.ac.uk
University of Birmingham | http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/~mgl
