koglist September 1999

koglist@maillist.ttk.hu

7 participants
19 discussions

by László E. Szabó

Prof. Ivo Schneider (Munchen) "The philosophical, juridical and mathematical preliminaries of probability theory" cimmel eloadas-sorozatot tart oktober folyaman hetfonkent ( 4.,11.,18.,25.) d.u 4 orakor, a BME Kozp. epulet (Muegyetem rkp. 3) I.emelet 59-ben, angol nyelven. Erdeklodoket szivesen latunk! BME GTK Filozofia es Tudomanytortenet Tanmszek -- Laszlo E. Szabo Department of Theoretical Physics Department of History and Philosophy of Science Eotvos University, Budapest H-1518 Budapest, Pf. 32. Phone: (36-1)2090-555/6671 Fax: (36-1)372-2509 Home: (36-1)200-7318 http://hps.elte.hu/~leszabo

26 years, 7 months

TUDOMANYFILOZOFIA SZEMINARIUM, T. P l a c e k

by László E. Szabó

ELTE TTK Tudomanytortenet es Tudomanyfilozofia Tanszek Budapest, Pazmany P. setany 1/A TUDOMANYFILOZOFIA SZEMINARIUM (http://hps.elte.hu) ________________________________________________ 1999. oktober 4. (hetfo) 12:30 6. em. 654. (661 a regi szamozas szerint) T o m a s z P l a c e k Department of Philosophy, Jagiellonian University, Cracow OUTCOMES IN BRANCHING SPACE-TIME (OBST) -AN ANALYSIS OF BELL'S THEOREM- The framework of BRANCHING SPACE-TIME (BST; cf. Belnap 1992, SYNTHESE 92, pp. 385--434) has recently been extended to allow for the introduction of outcomes of events and the analysis of GHZ theorems. (Kowalski & Placek, forthcoming in BRIT. J. PHIL. SCI. and INT. J. THEOR. PHYS.) In BST, space-time and modality are incorporated in the very structure of the models, which consist of a pair $\langle W, \leq \rangle$, where $W$ is a non-empty set weakly ordered by $\leq$, which is interpreted as `causally accessible from.' Maximal upward directed subsets of $W$ are called `histories,' and proper subsets of histories are called `events.' Two events are called `space-like separated' if neither causally precedes the other. `Atomic outcomes' of an event $E$ are those parts of the event's causal future that split in $E$. The main result of Kowalski & Placek is that the family of outcomes of an event forms a Boolean algebra. The paper also proves that in GHZ setups, there is always a common cause (CC) in the sense of Reichenbach if directions are held fixed, but that there is no single COMMOM common cause (cf. Hofer-Szabo et al., forthcoming in BRIT. J. PHIL. SCI.) accounting for the outcomes of incompatible settings. For an analysis of Bell's theorem, I assign probabilities to outcomes by imposing a classical probability measure on the Boolean algebra of the outcomes of each given event. In the derivation of Bell's theorem, I use probability measures of the form $p_{L\alpha \cup R\beta}(Lx \cap Ry)$, $x,y \in \{+,-\}$, where the subscript indicates that the result is an outcome of the event of measuring the spin projections along directions $\alpha$ on the left and $\beta$ on the right. Probabilities for single results on the left or on the right are calculated from these measures, allowing us to express correlations as $p_{L\alpha \cup R\beta}(Lx \cap Ry) \neq p_{L\alpha \cup R\beta}(Lx) \times p_{L\alpha \cup R\beta}(Ry)$. Since correlations between space-like separated results appear disturbing, it is natural to look for an explanation in terms of a CC located in the results' common past. The CC's outcomes divide histories in such a way that actual runs of a correlation experiment are seen as belonging to two or more varieties differentiated by hidden factors. You may think of these hidden factors as restoring the deterministic order. You may also be more modest and require only that the hidden factors restore the causal order, i.e., that in each sub-population, the correlations disappear. Formally, for space-like separated events $E$ and $F$ with correlated outcomes $e$ and $f$, respectively, a CC is an event C preceding both $e$ and $f$, such that for every atomic outcome $\omega_{i}$ of $C$, $$ p_{E\cup F\cup C}(e \cap f|\omega_{i}) = p_{E\cup F\cup C}(e |\omega_{i}) \times p_{E \cup F\cup C}(f|\omega_{i})$$, where $p_{E \cup F \cup C}$ is defined on the enlarged probability space. Now, for any correlated pair $e,f$, we CAN construct mathematically an enlarged probability space containing such a CC. Moreover, for any finite number of correlations we CAN construct a single large probability space containing a set of distinct CCs, each CC taking care of one correlation. However, in the Bell/Clauser-Horne argument, one wants something more: one postulates a single common CC accounting for all the correlated outcomes of $L\alpha\cup R\beta$, $L\alpha\cup R\beta--\prime$, $L\alpha--\prime\cup R\beta$, and $L\alpha--\prime\cup R\beta--\prime$. Given the standard assumptions of locality and `no conspiracy,' which in our framework take the form \begin{equation*} \begin{split} & \forall \alpha, \beta, \varphi, x p_{L\alpha \cup R\beta\cup C}(Lx) = p_{L\alpha \cup R\varphi\cup C}(Lx)\ & \forall \alpha, \beta, \gamma, y p_{L\alpha \cup R\beta\cup C}(Ry) = p_{L\gamma \cup R\beta\cup C}(Ry) \end{split} \tag{LOCALITY} \end{equation*} \begin{equation*} \forall \alpha, \beta, \gamma, \varphi, i p_{L\alpha \cup R\beta\cup C}(\omega_i) = p_{L\gamma \cup R\varphi\cup C}(\omega_i), \tag{NO CONSPIRACY} \end{equation*} we derive the Bell/CH inequalities, which are empirically violated. Thus, there cannot be a common common cause accounting for the Bell/CH correlations. -- Laszlo E. Szabo Department of Theoretical Physics Department of History and Philosophy of Science Eotvos University, Budapest H-1518 Budapest, Pf. 32. Phone: (36-1)2090-555/6671 Fax: (36-1)372-2509 Home: (36-1)200-7318 http://hps.elte.hu/~leszabo

26 years, 7 months

ICCNS 2000 (fwd)

by Csaba PLEH

Csaba Pleh Cognitive Science Group Department of Psychology Attila Jozsef University, Szeged Petofi sgt 30-34, 6722 Hungary Phone: (36)(62) 454000, extension 3273 Home: Budakeszi Zichy P. u. 4 2092 Hungary, (36)(23) 453932 or 933 Editor, Hungarian Review of Psychology ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Tue, 28 Sep 1999 10:51:47 -0400 From: Cynthia Bradford <cindy(a)cns.bu.edu> To: cindy(a)cns.bu.edu Subject: ICCNS 2000 Resent-Date: Tue, 28 Sep 99 18:55:19 +100 Resent-From: PLEH(a)izabell.elte.hu Resent-To: pleh(a)sol.cc.u-szeged.hu Enclosed below is a conference announcement. If you would prefer not to receive further emails of this type from us, please email me back and your name will be removed from our mailing list. Please accept our apologies in advance if you had asked to be removed from this mailing list at an earlier time. There was some miscommunication with our previous computer systems manager, but please be assured that you will be removed this time, should you make such a request. Sincerely, Cynthia Bradford Department Administrator email: cindy(a)cns.bu.edu ***** CALL FOR PAPERS ***** FOURTH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON COGNITIVE AND NEURAL SYSTEMS Tutorials: May 24, 2000 Meeting: May 25-27, 2000 Boston University 677 Beacon Street Boston, Massachusetts 02215 http://cns-web.bu.edu/meetings/ Sponsored by Boston University's Center for Adaptive Systems and Department of Cognitive and Neural Systems This interdisciplinary conference has drawn about 300 people from around the world each time that it has been offered. Last year's conference was attended by scientists from 30 countries. The conference is structured to facilitate intense communication between its participants, both in the formal sessions and during its other activities. As during previous years, the millennium conference will focus on solutions to the fundamental questions: How Does the Brain Control Behavior? How Can Technology Emulate Biological Intelligence? The conference will include invited tutorials and lectures, and contributed lectures and posters by experts on the biology and technology of how the brain and other intelligent systems adapt to a changing world. The conference is aimed at researchers and students of computational neuroscience, connectionist cognitive science, artificial neural networks, neuromorphic engineering, and artificial intelligence. A single oral or poster session enables all presented work to be highly visible. Abstract submissions encourage submissions of the latest results. Costs are kept at a minimum without compromising the quality of meeting handouts and social events. CALL FOR ABSTRACTS Session Topics: * vision * spatial mapping and navigation * object recognition * neural circuit models * image understanding * neural system models * audition * mathematics of neural systems * speech and language * robotics * unsupervised learning * hybrid systems (fuzzy, evolutionary, digital) * supervised learning * neuromorphic VLSI * reinforcement and emotion * industrial applications * sensory-motor control * cognition, planning, and attention * other Contributed abstracts must be received, in English, by January 28, 2000. Notification of acceptance will be provided by email by February 29, 2000. A meeting registration fee of $50 for regular attendees and $35 for students must accompany each Abstract. See Registration Information for details. The fee will be returned if the Abstract is not accepted for presentation and publication in the meeting proceedings. Registration fees of accepted abstracts will be returned on request only until April 14, 2000. Each Abstract should fit on one 8.5" x 11" white page with 1" margins on all sides, single-column format, single-spaced, Times Roman or similar font of 10 points or larger, printed on one side of the page only. Fax submissions will not be accepted. Abstract title, author name(s), affiliation(s), mailing, and email address(es) should begin each Abstract. An accompanying cover letter should include: Full title of Abstract; corresponding author and presenting author name, address, telephone, fax, and email address; and a first and second choice from among the topics above, including whether it is biological (B) or technological (T) work. Example: first choice: vision (T); second choice: neural system models (B). (Talks will be 15 minutes long. Posters will be up for a full day. Overhead, slide, and VCR facilities will be available for talks.) Abstracts which do not meet these requirements or which are submitted with insufficient funds will be returned. Accepted Abstracts will be printed in the conference proceedings volume. No longer paper will be required. The original and 3 copies of each Abstract should be sent to: Cynthia Bradford, Boston University, Department of Cognitive and Neural Systems, 677 Beacon Street, Boston, MA 02215. REGISTRATION INFORMATION: Early registration is recommended. To register, please fill out the registration form below. Student registrations must be accompanied by a letter of verification from a department chairperson or faculty/research advisor. If accompanied by an Abstract or if paying by check, mail to the address above. If paying by credit card, mail as above, or fax to (617) 353-7755, or email to cindy(a)cns.bu.edu. The registration fee will help to pay for a reception, 6 coffee breaks, and the meeting proceedings. STUDENT FELLOWSHIPS: Fellowships for PhD candidates and postdoctoral fellows may be available to cover meeting travel and living costs. This will be confirmed one way or the other, and broadly advertised if confirmed, before the deadline to apply for fellowship support, which will be January 28, 2000. Applicants will be notified by email by February 29, 2000. Each application should include the applicant's CV, including name; mailing address; email address; current student status; faculty or PhD research advisor's name, address, and email address; relevant courses and other educational data; and a list of research articles. A letter from the listed faculty or PhD advisor on official institutional stationery should accompany the application and summarize how the candidate may benefit from the meeting. Students who also submit an Abstract need to include the registration fee with their Abstract. Fellowship checks will be distributed after the meeting. REGISTRATION FORM Fourth International Conference on Cognitive and Neural Systems Department of Cognitive and Neural Systems Boston University 677 Beacon Street Boston, Massachusetts 02215 Tutorials: May 24, 2000 Meeting: May 25-27, 2000 FAX: (617) 353-7755 http://cns-web.bu.edu/meetings/ (Please Type or Print) Mr/Ms/Dr/Prof: _____________________________________________________ Name: ______________________________________________________________ Affiliation: _______________________________________________________ Address: ___________________________________________________________ City, State, Postal Code: __________________________________________ Phone and Fax: _____________________________________________________ Email: _____________________________________________________________ The conference registration fee includes the meeting program, reception, two coffee breaks each day, and meeting proceedings. The tutorial registration fee includes tutorial notes and two coffee breaks. CHECK ONE: ( ) $75 Conference plus Tutorial (Regular) ( ) $50 Conference plus Tutorial (Student) ( ) $50 Conference Only (Regular) ( ) $35 Conference Only (Student) ( ) $25 Tutorial Only (Regular) ( ) $15 Tutorial Only (Student) METHOD OF PAYMENT (please fax or mail): [ ] Enclosed is a check made payable to "Boston University". Checks must be made payable in US dollars and issued by a US correspondent bank. Each registrant is responsible for any and all bank charges. [ ] I wish to pay my fees by credit card (MasterCard, Visa, or Discover Card only). Name as it appears on the card: _____________________________________ Type of card: _______________________________________________________ Account number: _____________________________________________________ Expiration date: ____________________________________________________ Signature: __________________________________________________________

26 years, 7 months

PSYC Call for Commentators: HYPERSTRUCTURE/BRAIN/COGNITION

by Stevan Harnad

Richardson: HYPERSTRUCTURE IN BRAIN AND COGNITION http://www.cogsci.soton.ac.uk/cgi/psyc/newpsy?10.031 The target whose abstract appears below has just appeared in PSYCOLOQUY, a refereed journal of Open Peer Commentary sponsored by the American Psychological Association. Qualified professional biobehavioral, neural or cognitive scientists are hereby invited to submit Open Peer Commentary on it. Please email or see websites for Instructions if you are not familiar with format or acceptance criteria for PSYCOLOQUY commentaries (all submissions are refereed). To link to the full text of this article: http://www.cogsci.soton.ac.uk/cgi/psyc/newpsy?10.031 To submit articles and commentaries or to seek information: EMAIL: psyc(a)pucc.princeton.edu URL: http://www.princeton.edu/~harnad/psyc.html http://www.cogsci.soton.ac.uk/psyc ----------------------------------------------------------------------- psycoloquy.99.10.031.hyperstructure.richardson Thu Sep 23 1999 ISSN 1055-0143 (71 pars, 60 refs, 6 figs, 1 table, 1389 lines) PSYCOLOQUY is sponsored by the American Psychological Association (APA) Copyright 1999 Ken Richardson HYPERSTRUCTURE IN BRAIN AND COGNITION Target Article on Hyperstructure Ken Richardson Centre for Human Development & Learning The Open University Walton Hall Milton Keynes MK7 6AA United Kingdom k.richardson(a)open.ac.uk ABSTRACT: This target article tries to identify the informational content of experience underlying object percepts and concepts in complex, changeable environments, in a way which can be related to higher cerebral functions. In complex environments, repetitive experience of feature- and object-images in static, canonical form is rare, and this remains a problem in current theories of conceptual representation. The only reliable information available in natural experience consists of nested covariations or 'hyperstructures'. These need to be registered in a representational system. Such representational hyperstructures can have novel emergent structures and evolution into 'higher' forms of representation, such as object concepts and event- and social-schemas. Together, these can provide high levels of predictability. A sketch of a model of hyperstructural functions in object perception and conception is presented. Some comparisons with related views in the literature of the recent decades are made, and some empirical evidence is briefly reviewed. KEYWORDS: complexity, covariation, features, hypernetwork, hyperstructure, object concepts, receptive field, representation http://www.cogsci.soton.ac.uk/cgi/psyc/newpsy?10.031

26 years, 7 months

TUDOMANYFILOZOFIA SZEMINARIUM, B. L o e w e r

by László E. Szabó

ELTE TTK Tudomanytortenet es Tudomanyfilozofia Tanszek Budapest, Pazmany P. setany 1/A TUDOMANYFILOZOFIA SZEMINARIUM (http://hps.elte.hu/~leszabo/szeminar/folap.htm) ________________________________________________ 1999. Szeptember 27. (hetfo !) 12:30 6. em. 661. B a r r y L o e w e r Rutgers University Collegium Budapest PROBABILITY AND DETERMINISM Although probability is essential to the formulation (and evaluation) of scientific theories and although a great deal is known about how to employ probabilistic concepts, there is still philosophical controversy concerning the nature of probability. Some hold that only probability concerns only degrees of belief (either subjective or constrained by "objective" rules) while others hold that it concerns mind-independent features of reality. The latter view divides among those who hold that it concerns only frequencies (actual or hypothetical) and those who hold that it concerns a "causal propensity." The nature of probability is especially puzzling when the underlying dynamics is completely deterministic as in classical mechanics and Bohm's version of quantum mechanics. Some claim that when the dynamics is deterministic then all objective probabilities are 1 or 0. But this seems at odd with the scientific practice. In my talk I will review some of the main ideas concerning the nature of probability and also an idea suggested by David Lewis. According to Lewis probability concerns an objective feature of reality that supervenes on the totality of propositions not concerning chance. Whether or not Lewis' account is correct for dynamical chances I argue that it provides a good account of chance statements when the dynamics are deterministic. -- Laszlo E. Szabo Department of Theoretical Physics Department of History and Philosophy of Science Eotvos University, Budapest H-1518 Budapest, Pf. 32. Phone: (36-1)2090-555/6671 Fax: (36-1)372-2509 Home: (36-1)200-7318 http://hps.elte.hu/~leszabo

26 years, 7 months

Filmvetites

by László E. Szabó

M e g h i v o Az alkotok es az XTV meghivja ont az EMBER VAGY ORDOG - KI VOLT LAKATOS IMRE? c. film vetitesere a Taban moziba (1016 Bp. Krisztina krt. 87-89.) A vetites ideje: 1999. szeptember 22. (szerda) 18 ora Rendezte: MEREI ANNA -- Laszlo E. Szabo Department of Theoretical Physics Department of History and Philosophy of Science Eotvos University, Budapest H-1518 Budapest, Pf. 32. Phone: (36-1)2090-555/6671 Fax: (36-1)372-2509 Home: (36-1)200-7318 http://hps.elte.hu/~leszabo

26 years, 7 months

PSYC Call for Book Reviewers: Neuropsychology of Lashley & Hebb

by Stevan Harnad

PSYCOLOQUY CALL FOR BOOK REVIEWERS Below is the Precis of "The Neuropsychological Theories of Lashley and Hebb" by Jack Orbach (427 lines). This book has been selected for multiple review in PSYCOLOQUY. If you wish to submit a formal book review please write to psyc(a)pucc.princeton.edu indicating what expertise you would bring to bear on reviewing the book if you were selected to review it. (If you have never reviewed for PSYCOLOQUY or Behavioral & Brain Sciences before, it would be helpful if you could also append a copy of your CV to your inquiry.) If you are selected as one of the reviewers and do not have a copy of the book, you will be sent a copy of the book directly by the publisher (please let us know if you have a copy already). Reviews may also be submitted without invitation, but all reviews will be refereed. The author will reply to all accepted reviews. Full Psycoloquy book review instructions at: http://www.princeton.edu/~harnad/psyc.html http://www.cogsci.soton.ac.uk/psycoloquy/ Relevant excerpts: Psycoloquy reviews are of the book not the Precis. Length should be about 200 lines [c. 1800 words], with a short abstract (about 50 words), an indexable title, and reviewer's full name and institutional address, email and Home Page URL. All references that are electronically accessible should also have URLs. AUTHOR'S RATIONALE FOR SOLICITING COMMENTARY My rationale for seeking open peer commentary is primarily that the book says some things about both Lashley and Hebb that some peers might find controversial and startling if not downright outrageous. To get these views out in the open may be of pedagogical value not only to to me but to the neuropsychological community at large. Obviously, I don't believe that my arguments are wrong or weak. But the feedback I get might conceivably persuade me to rethink the matter. psycoloquy.99.10.029.lashley-hebb.1.orbach Sat Sep 18 1999 ISSN 1055-0143 (16 paragraphs, 16 references, 427 lines) PSYCOLOQUY is sponsored by the American Psychological Association (APA) Copyright 1999 Jack Orbach Precis of: THE NEUROPSYCHOLOGICAL THEORIES OF LASHLEY AND HEBB Precis of Orbach on Lashley-Hebb [University Press of America, 1998 xiv, 395 pp. ISBN: 0-761-81165-6] Jack Orbach Department of Psychology Queens College Flushing, NY U.S.A. jorbach(a)worldnet.att.net ABSTRACT: Beginning in the 1920s, K. S. Lashley startled psychologists with his theories of the memory trace within the cerebral cortex. Using terms such as terms mass action, equipotentiality, and sensory/motor equivalence, Lashley presented evidence that the engram is widely distributed in the brain, and that unactivated synapses, like activated ones, seem to show evidence of learning. His research and nativistic theories made him world famous by 1929, when he was just 39. He spent his professional career searching for a mechanism for the reduplication of the engram. While his contemporaries tried to specify the locus of the engram in the brain, Lashley found it everywhere. He liked to quip that the problem is not to find where the trace is located, but where it is not. Lashley's student, D. O. Hebb, published his empiricistic theories in 1949, in "The Organization of Behavior," and the monograph created a sensation. Hebb used Lorente de No's reverberatory circuit to provide a mechanism to maintain activity in the cerebral cortex after the stimulus terminated, the so-called central autonomous process. This led him to the cell assembly, a complex reverberatory circuit that could be assembled by experience. Changes in resistance at the synapse with learning came to be called the Hebb synapse. That monograph was highly praised for the breadth of its treatment. The present book documents how Lashley anticipated Hebb's introduction of the reverberatory circuit by some 12 years. Lashley's Vanuxem Lectures of 1952 are printed for the first time, together with nine of his previously published theoretical papers. Lashley's and Hebb's theories are reviewed and reevaluated fifty years after publication of Hebb's monograph, and a systematic effort is made to compare and contrast the views of teacher and student. KEYWORDS: cell assembly, central autonomous process, engram, equipotentiality, Hebb, Hebbian learning, Lashley, localization, memory trace, nativism, reverberatory circuit, Vanuxem Lectures 1. Part 1 of the book opens with a summary of Lashley's last public lecture given at the University of Rochester in 1957, one year before his death and eight years after the publication of Hebb's monograph. In this lecture, Lashley was still consumed with the notion of irradiating waves of excitation in the cerebral cortex, a notion he developed in detail in 1942. In citing theories of stimulus equivalence, Lashley wrote 'That of Hebb is most in accord with conditioned reflex theory. He assumes that multiple paths are developed by learning. Such learning is ruled out by a mass of evidence for innate discriminations and equivalencies.' In this unpublished address, Lashley cited Hebb's empiricistic theory for the first and only time. He never cited the monograph itself in the literature. 2. An early chapter entitled 'Setting the Stage' offers another look at Lashley's early critique of the native Watsonian connectionism of his day. Lashley's early efforts to revise and revitalize neuropsychological theory are reviewed. The problem, Lashley suggested in the 1920s, was the omission of the brain from the Watsonian S-R formula. And when a model of cortical function was finally introduced, using the analogy of the telephone switchboard, it was based on the idea of linear reflex activity in the spinal cord, as suggested by Dewey, leaving no room for psychological categories that require sustained activity in the brain such as thought, memory, emotion, motivation, selective attention and the like. And then, along came Pavlov who undercut all contemporary speculations of psychologists with his physiological theories of conditioned reflexes and brain function. It was at this point that Lashley burst upon the scene. 3. Hebb must have experienced an epiphany when he was introduced to the reverberatory circuit of Lorente de N. He realized that this anatomical curiosity provided him with a mechanism for the autonomous central process that he developed so masterfully in the 1949 monograph. Hebb's revelation involving the reverberatory circuit was especially important for it gave neurological meaning to the earlier proposals of central motive state of Morgan and central excitatory mechanism of Beach as well as the putative reduplicated memory trace of Lashley. However, Lashley had already appropriated the reverberatory circuit for neuropsychological theory in 1937, some 12 years before Hebb's monograph was published and some three years before its presentation by Hilgard and Marquis in their Conditioning and Learning of 1940. This is documented with excerpts from Lashley's papers published in 1937, 1938, 1941, 1942 and 1949. The latter two papers are republished in their entirety in this volume. 4. The next chapter deals with the learning theory that synaptic resistance is reduced by the passage of the nerve impulse. Lashley's 1924 assault on this theory is reviewed in detail. (This 1924 paper is also reprinted in this volume.) In Lashley's own words, 'Among the many unsubstantiated beliefs concerning the physiology of the learning process, none is more widely prevalent than the doctrine that the passage of the nerve impulse through the synapse somehow reduces synaptic resistance and leads to the fixation of a new habit . . . but no direct evidence for synaptic resistance has ever been obtained. The hypothesis is not based upon neurological data but is merely a restatement of the observed fact that increased efficiency follows repeated performance . . . Familiar learning curves are obviously an expression of these successive integrations and we have no knowledge of the conditions prevailing in formation of a new simple neural integration. (On the other hand,) the instantaneous character of simpler associations in man . . . suggests that . . . a single performance serves to fix the habit. Even if this were the case for every simple reintegration within the nervous system, we should still get the appearance of gradual improvement through practice because of the formation of many simple associations . . . The fact of gradual improvement in complex functions cannot therefore be taken as evidence for a gradual wearing down of synaptic resistance by repeated passage of the nerve impulse' (Lashley, 1924). The reemergence of this theory in Hebb's monograph as a neuropsychological postulate is documented and evaluated. In the fourth edition of Hebb's Textbook (1994), Donderi refers to the postulate as Hebb's rule. Today, it is frequently referred to as the Hebb synapse. 5. Next, 'Lashley's Memory Mechanisms', considers: i. Lashley's view that the memory trace is reduplicated in the cerebral cortex and the implications of that view on the interpretation of cerebral localization. In 1952, Lashley wrote 'I have never been able by any operation on the brain to destroy a specific memory' even when the memory is elicited by electrical stimulation of the part of the cerebral cortex that is subsequently removed. ii. Lashley's early introduction of the reverberatory circuit in neuropsychological theory is documented. It is important to note that Lashley never abandoned the principle of synaptic transmission in favor of a cortical field theory, as had been alleged by Hebb and others. This claim is fully documented. iii. Lashley assumed throughout his career that memory is a unitary function. He was of course aware of the distinction between long and short term memory but he never referred to the modern distinction between storage and retrieval. Nor did he ever consider associative and working memory as distinct forms of memory when he searched for the engram in the cerebral cortex. iv. Lashley's position on the continuity-discontinuity debate is reviewed as well as his championing the concept of instinct at a time when the concept was falling into disfavor in America. In 1950, Lashley championed the European ethologists' views of fixed action patterns though he himself preferred the term instinct. His article on instinct in the Encyclopaedia Britannica of 1956 is especially noteworthy. 6. The next chapter, entitled 'Issues of Priority, Opinion and Criticism', includes: i. a reconsideration of Lashley's obsession with theoretical criticism in his later years, as alleged by Hebb. ii. an interpretation of the meaning of Lashley's refusal of Hebb's offer to coauthor the 1949 volume with him. iii. the history of the reverberatory circuit in the psychological literature, and questions of priority as far as the integration of the reverberatory circuit into neuropsychological theory is concerned. iv. the fact that Lashley failed to acknowledge data and theory that were unfavorable to his views, during his search for the engram. This is documented. v. Lashley's opinion of Hebb's theories was never known because Lashley hardly ever spoke of them. But Lashley's 1947 review of Hebb's manuscript-in-progress is revealing in this regard. Revealing as well is Lashley's letter of congratulations to Hebb after publication of his 1949 monograph. Finally, the personal relationship of Lashley, the teacher, and Hebb, the student, is delineated. 7. The next chapter, titled 'Hebb's The Organization of Behavior 50 Years After Publication', offers a contemporary view of Hebb's enduring contributions to neuropsychological theory. Hebb bolstered his theories with the following facts: i. adults seem to be able to sustain brain injury with fewer permanent consequences than can infants and children; ii. learning in children is much more difficult compared to similar learning in adults. Hebb further argued that: iii. distinctions should be made between primitive unity, non-sensory figure and identity in perception; iv. stimulus equivalence and generalization are learned in early life; v. the ratio of association cortex to sensory cortex should be considered in phylogenetic development; vi. the evidence of post-tetanic potentiation supports the importance of the Hebb synapse in learning (this phenomenon was described after the 1949 monograph was published but it found its way into Hebb's later writings); vii. there is a distinction between intelligence A (innate potential) and intelligence B (achievement); viii. following Tolman, Hebb introduced a new way of thinking about neuropsychological problems in his 1960 presidential address to APA. That discourse is today named cognitive psychology; ix. later research on the stabilized retinal image supported cell assembly theory. 8. The Left and Right Cerebral Hemispheres reviews the case of Alex, a nine year old boy whose left hemisphere was removed for the relief of intractable epileptic seizures. Though he never learned to speak before surgery, Alex began to show remarkable gains in speech and language and in cognitive skills in general. Alex's postoperative achievements challenge the widely held view, shared by Hebb, that early childhood is a particularly critical period for the acquisition of cognitive skills. It must be concluded that clearly articulated, well-structured, and appropriate language can be acquired for the first time as late as nine years of age with the right hemisphere alone. Hebb and Lashley did no live to see this case. My guess is that Hebb would have had great difficulty in explaining Alex's achievements, but Lashley would have chuckled and muttered in so many words, 'You see, not only do you have reduplication of the memory trace within a hemisphere but also between hemispheres.' 9. The next chapter is entitled, 'A Comparison of Lashley and Hebb on the Concepts of Attention and Stimulus Generalization'. On the concept of attention, Lashley took off from his observations of attempted solutions in rats during the learning of the maze. It was Spence's concession on this matter that persuaded Lashley that he had bested the neo-behaviorists on the continuity-discontinuity debate. In the 1942 paper (reprinted in this volume), Lashley argued that a pattern of excitation in the cortex in the form of a reverberatory circuit may form a relatively stable and permanent foundation, modifying the effects of later stimulation, as attention determines the selection of stimuli. These ideas precede Hebb's formulation of the central autonomous process by some seven years. And then in the Vanuxem Lectures of 1952, Lashley went way beyond Hebb when he introduced the ideas of a priming or pre-setting of circuits based upon the spacing of the end-feet on the post-synaptic cell. Hebb was by far the more accomplished writer and so, with the publication of his monograph in 1949, he captured the attention of the neuropsychological community with ideas that did not differ substantially from Lashley's. 10. However, on the matter of stimulus generalization their positions were radically different. Lashley's position is nativistic stimulus generalization, if it exists at all, is built into the organism. His conception derived from his critique of the neo-Pavlovian view of a gradient in stimulus similarity underlying stimulus generalization. His discontinuity position on learning led him to write in 1946 'Stimulus generalization is generalization only in the sense of failure to note distinguishing charateristics of the stimulus or to associate them with the conditioned reaction. A definite attribute of the stimulus is abstracted and forms the basis of reaction; other attributes are either not sensed or are disregarded. So long as the effective attribute is present, the reaction is elicited as an all-or-none function of that attribute. Other characteristics of the stimulus may be radically changed without affecting the reaction' (Lashley and Wade, 1946). The neo-Pavlovian gradient of similarity on a stimulus continuum is an artifact of inattention. Such a stimulus generalization is generalization by default. 11. Hebb's concept of stimulus generalization was developed in connection with his delineation of the formation of the cell assembly underlying the perception of a triangle. Hebb's contribution was to perceptual theory. He proposed the startling idea that a simple figure like an outline triangle is not perceived as a whole, innately, as alleged by the gestaltists. He went on to show how the elements of line and angle become integrated into a unified perception of a triangle. To persuade the skeptical reader, Hebb introduced the idea of perceptual identity, something that has to be learned. He then proposed a mechanism involving neural fractionation and recruitment. Fractionation eliminates the variable cells that are excited extramacularly. Macular excitation, which is due to ocular fixation, remains constant despite the variable angular size of the stimulus object. 12. In short, stimulus generalization emerges secondarily from the slow development of each complex concept. And yet, there is some doubt regarding the universality of stimulus generalization according to Hebb. His theory cannot always predict stimulus generalization from the learning of a simple discrimination. Take for example the learning to discriminate a vertical from a horizontal line. In this case, the stimuli belong to the category of primitive unity for which, unlike the triangle, no learning is required, according to Hebb, to build a unified percept. Nevertheless, our best guess is that, empirically, after the initial learning to discriminate the two lines, the organism would show stimulus generalization to a vertical rectangle vs. a horizontal rectangle and even to a vertical row of circles vs. a horizontal row of circles. Since there is no initial learning to build a unified perception of the vertical and horizontal lines, it is difficult to see how Hebb would derive the empirical data of stimulus generalization in this case. 13. A late chapter of commentary is entitled, 'Lashley's Enduring Legacy to Neuropsychological Theory'. A contemporary perspective is offered in reviewing the concepts of vicarious functioning, equipotentiality, reduplicated memory trace, the reverberatory circuit. Lashley's lesson that synapses inactive during learning can show the effects of learning is emphasized. Lashley's lesson was never acknowledged by Hebb or any of his students. Lashley derided the use of wiring diagrams in neuropsychological theory especially those derived from computer technology. Neurons are live metabolizing cells, he argued, not inert paths like copper wires. They interact at synapses, which are not solder joints like soldered copper wires. The synaptic contacts are variable. Furthermore, synaptic contacts may be excitatory and/or inhibitory. Soldered wires are always excitatory and fixed. Both are pathways to be sure but the differences between neurons and copper wires far outnumber their similarities. Thus brain organization cannot be modelled by circuit diagrams representing inert pathways. 14. An epilogue presents a number of personal vignettes of both Lashley and Hebb. Lashley's career was reviewed earlier in some detail in Orbach (1982). The most disturbing part of this story has to do with Lashley's racism, as alleged by Weidman (1996). I would not have raised this matter in a scholarly volume concerned with Lashley's contributions to neuropsychological theory were it not for Weidman's allegation that Lashley's racist attitudes influenced his theoretical views. But, did these odious attitudes of Lashley affect his science? I can attest to Lashley's anti-African-American attitudes, but I can find no evidence that Lashley's racism colored his theories. A lifelong student of genetics, Lashley had an abiding interest in the concept of instinct and in the genetics of behavior in general. These facts must have eluded Weidman. Both Hebb and Lashley were honored many times during their lifetimes. It is especially noteworthy that Hebb was appointed Chancellor of McGill University, and that he was nominated, in 1965, for the Nobel Prize. 15. During his freshman year, at the age of 16, Lashley studied general zoology and comparative anatomy with Albert M. Reese at the University of West Virginia. Reese appointed him departmental assistant, at a salary of $0.25 per hour. One of the new assistant's first tasks was to sort out various materials in the basement. The result of this assignment can best be expressed in Lashley's own words: 'Among them I found a beautiful Golgi series of the frog brain. I took these to Reese and proposed that I draw all of the connections between the cells. Then we would know how the frog worked (sic!). It was a shock to learn that the Golgi method does not stain all cells, but I think almost ever since I have been trying to trace those connections' (Beach in Orbach, 1982). Only later did Lashley realize that functional variables such as spatial and temporal summation, excitatory and inhibitory states, and micro-movements of elements influencing synaptic contact need not be represented microscopically. The lesson is that neurons are not inert and static, like soldered wires. They are live metabolizing cells with synaptic contacts that vary. If Lashley were alive today, there is no doubt that he would continue to scold modern neuroscientists who still have not become aware of the importance of this fact. 16. Part 2 of the book consists of nine of Lashley's major theoretical papers reprinted in their entirety. These are listed in the References below. Part 2 also includes Lashley's four Vanuxem Lectures given at Princeton University in 1952, and published here for the first time. In these lectures, Lashley referred to the anatomical observations of Lorente de N and emphasized the neural net as the active neural unit in the cerebral cortex. He introduced the idea of a neural priming or presetting, concepts all highly reminiscent of Hebb's theorizing on the central autonomous process and the cell assembly. The term neural lattice was coined by Lashley in 1949. This term was discarded by Hebb in his 1949 monograph in favor of cell assembly. REFERENCES: http://www.wabash.edu/depart/psych/Courses/Psych_81/LASHLEY.HTM http://www.archives.mcgill.ca/guide/volume2/gen01.htm#HEBB, DONALD OLDING http://www.princeton.edu/~harnad/hebb.html http://www.cogsci.soton.ac.uk/bbs/Archive/bbs.amit.html Hebb, D. O. (1949) The Organization of Behavior: a Neuropsychological Theory. New York: Wiley. Hebb, D. O. and Donderi, D.C. (1994) Textbook of Psychology, fourth edition, revised. Dubuque, Iowa: Kendall/Hunt Publishing Company. Hilgard, E. R. and Marquis, D. G. (1940) Conditioning and Learning, NY: Appleton-Century. Lashley, K. S. (1924) 'Studies of cerebral function in learning. VI. The theory that synaptic resistance is reduced by the passage of the nerve impulse.' Psychol. Rev., 31, 369-375. Lashley, K. S. (1931) 'Mass action in cerebral function.' Science 73, 245-254. Lashley, K. S. 'The problem of cerebral organization in vision.' Biol. Symp, 1942, 7, 301-322. Lashley, K. S. (1949) 'Persistent problems in the evolution of mind.' Quart. Rev. Biol., 24, 28-42. Lashley, K. S. (1950) 'In search of the engram.' In Symp. Soc. Exp. Biol. No. 4, Cambridge, Eng.,: Cambridge Univ. Press. Lashley, K. S. (1951) 'The problem of serial order in behavior.' In Jeffress, L. A. (Ed.) Cerebral mechanisms in behavior, New York, Wiley. Lashley, K. S. (1952) Vanuxem Lectures delivered at Princeton University in Feb. 1952. Untitled. Lashley, K. S. (1954) 'Dynamic processes in perception.' In Adrian, E. D. Bremer, F. and Jasper, H. H. (Eds.) Brain Mechanisms and Consciousness. Illinois, Charles C. Thomas, 422-443. Lashley, K. S. (1968) 'Cerebral organization and behavior.' In The Brain and Human Behavior, Proc. Ass. Res. Nerv. Ment. Dis., 36, 1-18. Lashley, K. S. and Wade, M. (1946) 'The Pavlovian theory of generalization.' Psychol. Rev., 53, 72-87. Lashley, K. S., Chow, K.-L, and Semmes, J., (1951) 'An examination of the electrical field theory of cerebral integration.' Psychol. Rev., 58, 123-136. Orbach, J. (1982) Neuropsychology After Lashley: Fifty Years Since the Publication of Brain Mechanisms and Intelligence. Hillsdale, NJ.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. Weidman, N. (1996) 'Psychobiology, progressivism, and the anti-progressive tradition.' J. Hist. Biol, 29, 267-308.

26 years, 7 months

Kampis kognitiv orai

by George Kampis

Annak, akit illet: Kampis Gyorgy: Tudomanyfilozofia hetfo 15 ora (6.em. 662) Kampis Gyorgy: Bev. a kognitiv tud.-ba hetfo 17 ora (6.em. 662) hely: ELTE TTK Lagymanyosi Campus udv kgy ===================================================================== George Kampis, Associate Professor, Chairman, Department of History and Philosophy of Science, ELTE University, 1518 Budapest, P.O. Box 32, Hungary Phone/FAX: (36) 1 372 2924 email: gk(a)hps.elte.hu http://hps.elte.hu/~gk ftp://hps.elte.hu =====================================================================

26 years, 7 months

PSYC Call for Commentators: INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN COLOR STROOP

by Stevan Harnad

Koch/Gobell/Roid: INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN COLOR STROOP The target article below has just appeared in PSYCOLOQUY, a refereed journal of Open Peer Commentary sponsored by the American Psychological Association. Qualified professional biobehavioral, neural or cognitive scientists are hereby invited to submit Open Peer Commentary on it. Please email or see websites for Instructions if you are not familiar with format or acceptance criteria for PSYCOLOQUY commentaries (all submissions are refereed). To submit articles and commentaries or to seek information: EMAIL: psyc(a)pucc.princeton.edu URL: http://www.princeton.edu/~harnad/psyc.html http://www.cogsci.soton.ac.uk/psyc AUTHORS' RATIONALE FOR SOLICITING COMMENTARY: We have found a pattern of individual differences on the Stroop color-word test that do not seem to be among those reported previously (MacLeod, 1991). Two separate attempts to identify the source of these individual differences have failed, although we kept finding the same patterns of responding. We hope the article will draw attention to the need to examine individual differences in Stroop processing and and that the Psycoloquy it elicits will help identify their basis. ----------------------------------------------------------------------- psycoloquy.99.10.025.stroop-differences.1.koch Thu Sep 16 1999 ISSN 1055-0143 (27 paragraphs, 29 references, 599 lines) PSYCOLOQUY is sponsored by the American Psychological Association (APA) Copyright 1999 Christopher Koch, Joetta Gobell, & Gale H. Roid EXPLORING INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN STROOP PROCESSING WITH CLUSTER ANALYSIS Target Article on Stroop-Differences Christopher Koch, Joetta Gobell, & Gale H. Roid Department of Psychology George Fox University 414 N. Meridian St. Newberg OR 97132 USA ckoch(a)georgefox.edu http://www.georgefox.edu/people/faculty/ckoch/ ABSTRACT: A relatively small number of studies of the Stroop task has examined individual differences in age, sex, hemispheric processing, and language. The amount of interference is the primary dependent measure in most studies, not the factors that contribute to the interference. In the present target article, cluster analysis is used to identify groups of participants who respond similarly on the Stroop task. Integrated color-word Stroop stimuli were presented for varying durations in the first study. Significant individual differences were found. A cluster analysis identified two groups of subjects. One group responded consistently across durations and conditions while the other responded more erratically. Potential sources of individual differences were examined in a second study. 120 subjects were given the Color and Word Test along with selected subtests of the Stanford Binet Intelligence Test, age appropriate Wechsler tests, and the Detroit Tests of Learning Aptitude. Again, cluster analysis found two groups of subjects. The group with higher scores on visual reasoning and short-term memory produced more interference. KEYWORDS: cluster analysis, individual differences, short-term memory, Stroop interference, visual reasoning

26 years, 7 months

Intelligence g Factor/Jensen: PSYC Call for Multiple Book Reviewers

by Stevan Harnad

PSYCOLOQUY CALL FOR BOOK REVIEWERS Below is the Abstract of the Precis of "The g Factor" by Arthur Jensen. This book has been selected for multiple review in PSYCOLOQUY. If you wish to submit a formal book review please write to psyc(a)pucc.princeton.edu indicating what expertise you would bring to bear on reviewing the book if you were selected to review it. (If you have never reviewed for PSYCOLOQUY or Behavioral & Brain Sciences before, it would be helpful if you could also append a copy of your CV to your inquiry.) If you are selected as one of the reviewers and do not have a copy of the book, you will be sent a copy of the book directly by the publisher (please let us know if you have a copy already). Reviews may also be submitted without invitation, but all reviews will be refereed. The author will reply to all accepted reviews. The Full Precis of the book is available at these URLs (bot note that the Reviews are to be of the BOOK, not the Precis: : http://www.cogsci.soton.ac.uk/cgi/psyc/newpsy?10.023 or ftp://ftp.princeton.edu/pub/harnad/Psycoloquy/1999.volume.10/ psyc.99.10.023.intelligence-g-factor.1.jensen Full Psycoloquy book review instructions at: http://www.princeton.edu/~harnad/psyc.html http://www.cogsci.soton.ac.uk/psycoloquy/ Relevant excerpts: Psycoloquy reviews are of the book not the Precis. Length should be about 200 lines [c. 1800 words], with a short abstract (about 50 words), an indexable title, and reviewer's full name and institutional address, email and Home Page URL. All references that are electronically accessible should also have URLs. AUTHOR'S RATIONALE FOR SOLICITING COMMENTARY The g factor arises from the empirical fact that scores on a large variety of independently designed tests of extremely diverse cognitive abilities all turn out to be positively correlated with one another. The g factor appears to be a biological property of the brain, highly correlated with measures of information-processing efficiency, such as working memory capacity, choice and discrimination reaction times, and perceptual speed. It is highly heritable and has many biological correlates, including brain size, evoked potentials, nerve conduction velocity, and cerebral glucose metabolic rate during cognitive activity. It remains to investigate and explain its neurobiological basis. Commentary is invited from psychometricians, statisticians, geneticists, neuropsychologists, psychophysiologists, cognitive modellers, evolutionary psychologists and other specialties concerned with cognitive abilities, their measurement, and their cognitive and neurobiological basis. psycoloquy.023.intelligence-g-factor.1.jensen Wed Sep 15 1999 ISSN 1055-0143 (70 paragraphs, 12 references, 905 lines) PSYCOLOQUY is sponsored by the American Psychological Association (APA) Copyright 1999 Arthur Jensen Precis of : THE G FACTOR: THE SCIENCE OF MENTAL ABILITY [Praeger, 1998 xiv + 648 pp. ISBN 0-275-96103-6 ISSN 1063-2158] Arthur R. Jensen Graduate School of Education University of California, Berkeley Nesnejar(a)aol.com ABSTRACT: The g factor is the highest-order common factor that can be extracted in a hierarchical factor analysis from a large battery of diverse tests of various cognitive abilities. It is the most important psychometric construct in the study of individual differences in human cognitive abilities. Since its discovery by Spearman in 1904, the g factor has become so firmly established as a major psychological construct in terms of psychometric and factor analytic criteria that further research along these lines is very unlikely either to disconfirm the construct validity of g or to add anything essentially new to our understanding of it. In fact, g, unlike any of the primary, or first-order, factors revealed by factor analysis, cannot be described in terms of the knowledge content of cognitive test items, or in terms of skills, or even in terms of theoretical cognitive processes. It is not essentially a psychological or behavioral variable, but a biological one, a property of the brain. But although not itself a cognitive ability, g is what causes positive correlations among individual differences in performance, even on cognitive tasks that differ greatly with respect to sensory motor modality, brain modularity, and learned cognitive skills and knowledge. The g factor derived from conventional nonspeeded psychometric tests shows higher correlations than any other factors independent of g with various measures of information-processing efficiency, such as working memory capacity, choice and discrimination reaction times, and perceptual speed. A test's g loading is the best predictor of its heritability and its sensitivity to inbreeding depression. Psychometric g also has more direct biological correlates than any other independent source of test variance, for example brain size, brain evoked potentials, nerve conduction velocity, and the brain's glucose metabolic rate during cognitive activity. The ultimate arbiter among various "theories of intelligence" must be the physical properties of the brain itself. The current frontier of g research is the investigation of the anatomical and physiological features of the brain that cause g. Research has reached the point at which the only direction left in which to go is that presaged by Spearman himself, who wrote that the final understanding of g must "come from the most profound and detailed direct study of the human brain in its purely physical and chemical aspects" (1927, p.403). KEYWORDS: behavior genetics, cognitive modelling, evoked potentials, evolutionary psychology, factor analysis, g factor, heritability, individual differences, intelligence, IQ, neurometrics, psychometrics, psychophyiology, skills, Spearman, statistics The Full Precis of the book is available at these URLs (bot note that the Reviews are to be of the BOOK, not the Precis: : http://www.cogsci.soton.ac.uk/cgi/psyc/newpsy?10.023 or ftp://ftp.princeton.edu/pub/harnad/Psycoloquy/1999.volume.10/ psyc.99.10.023.intelligence-g-factor.1.jensen Full Psycoloquy book review instructions at: http://www.princeton.edu/~harnad/psyc.html http://www.cogsci.soton.ac.uk/psycoloquy/ Relevant excerpts: Psycoloquy reviews are of the book not the Precis. Length should be about 200 lines [c. 1800 words], with a short abstract (about 50 words), an indexable title, and reviewer's full name and institutional address, email and Home Page URL. All references that are electronically accessible should also have URLs.

26 years, 7 months

2026

2025

2024

2023

2022

2021

2020

2019

2018

2017

2016

2015

2014

2013

2012

2011

2010

2009

2008

2007

2006

2005

2004

2003

2002

2001

2000

1999

1998

1997

1996

1995

1994

1993

koglist September 1999