koglist May 1994

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by likomlosi＠ludens.elte.hu

32 years

Uj_preprintek: eliras

by szepes＠inf.u-szeged.hu

Elnezest kerek mindenkitol, elirtam a koglist ftp cimet. A pontos cim: ftp.cogpsyphy.hu Szepesvari Csaba szepes(a)csilla.inf.jate.u-szeged.hu

32 years

KOGLIST: re: Consciousness conference - if interested in cog. anthr., etc.//tovabbitot anyag

by benke＠sfu.ca

>Date: Fri, 6 May 1994 19:52:52 EST >Reply-To: JOBRIEN(a)UCS.INDIANA.EDU >Sender: General Anthropology Bulletin Board <ANTHRO-L(a)UBVM.CC.BUFFALO.EDU> >From: "John O'Brien" <JOBRIEN(a)UCS.INDIANA.EDU> >Subject: Consciousness conference - if interested in cog. anthr., etc. >To: Multiple recipients of list ANTHRO-L <ANTHRO-L(a)UBVM.CC.BUFFALO.EDU> > >From: PO1::"aki%EGO.PSYCH.MCGILL.CA(a)UICVM.UIC.EDU" "Zografos 'Aki' Caramanos" > 6-MAY-1994 17:49:28.13 >To: Multiple recipients of list BRAIN-L <BRAIN-L(a)MCGILL1.BITNET> >CC: >Subj: Toward a Scientific Basis for Consciousness (fwd) > >---------- Forwarded message ---------- >Date: Fri, 22 Apr 1994 15:32:48 +1000 >From: Kevin Korb <korb(a)bruce.cs.monash.edu.au> >To: Multiple recipients of list PSYCHE-D <PSYCHE-D%NKI.BITNET(a)uga.cc.uga.edu> >Subject: Toward a Scientific Basis for Consciousness > >>From: spotter(a)druggist.gg.caltech.edu (Steve Potter) > >Last week (April 12-17, 1994) I attended the following conference in >Tucson, AZ: > >TOWARD A SCIENTIFIC BASIS FOR CONSCIOUSNESS > >Here I will present a short review of this exciting meeting, along with >some opinions on some of the ideas presented. > >The overall mood at the conference, about 300 attending, was unusually >enthusiastic, due to the fact that this was really the first conference of >its type, bringing together researchers from many fields to talk about what >has been for the major part of this century a taboo subject in scientific >circles. Recent advances in a number of neuroscience methods have made >possible the objective, independently verifiable observation of a number of >phenomena associated with conscious thought. Furthermore, new modeling >paradigms associated with distributed processing in neural networks, chaos, >and emergent phenomena have resulted in simulations displaying many of the >qualities of conscious entities. These forces, and the fact that >consciousness is something we all (hopefully!) have and care about, brought >us together and will most likely result in the expansion of this and >related conferences in the years to come. > >Attending were researchers from very diverse fields, including biological >neuroscientists, computational neuroscientists, philosophers, >anesthesiologists, physicists, mathematicians, psychologists, >neurosurgeons, 'chaoticians' (a la Malcolm, in Jurassic Park), cognitive >scientists, and a fairly large contingent of 'researchers' of the >paranormal (ESP, shamanistic rituals, meditation). I was a little >disappointed that the organizers did not weed out a few of the more flaky >posters and talks, but the diversity was fun. The majority of the posters >and all but a couple of the talks were in the non-flaky category, i.e., >relating to testable hypotheses and the scientific method currently >accepted in the academic world. > >There were no parallel sessions, and the auditorium (at the U. of A. >Medical Center) was packed, making coffee breaks in the small lobby fairly >claustrophobic. A table was set up for anyone to display a book or paper >they were pushing, for people to look at. I learned about a number of >exciting books that I must go out and get ASAP this way, and think this >ought to be done at more conferences. > >Abstracts for all of the talks and posters were provided along with the >program, in a nice binder. It was announced that the complete papers will >be published in a book, but I will not hold my breath, as the presenters >are not even required to submit them for a month or so. A fairly complete >list of those attending was also provided by the end of the conference. >There were a number of field trips arranged that were too pricey for my >taste. I brought my bike and arranged my own field trips for free. > >For official info about the conference or proceedings, dont ask me, ask the >organizers: > >Alfred Kaszniak kaszniak(a)ccit.arizona.edu >Stuart Hameroff srh(a)ccit.arizona.edu >Jim Laukes jlaukes(a)ccit.arizona.edu > >Okay, here are some observations and opinions about the talks (and >posters). >A lot of folks gave whole talks on or at least paid lip service to the >notion of quantum mechanics having something fundamental to do with >consciousness. David Chalmers, in his excellent wrap-up put my opinion of >this issue cleverly: "Consciousness is mysterious. Quantum mechanics is >mysterious. By the 'Law of Minimization of Mystery', if you find two >mysteries, maybe they are the same." I feel like QM may be a useful >metaphor for some aspects of consciousness, but we know _way_ too little >about either to apply QM literally as a basis for consciousness. Let's be >careful not to mix up our metaphors and theories. > >Relating to this issue was something I had not heard about before >(surprising, considering I was a brain biochemist as a grad student) and >was quite interesting, was the possibility that microtubules could be >computational or information-transmitting elements. Microtubules (MTs) are >the major cytoskeletal elements of neurons, and basically all cells. >Several talks (somewhat redundantly) described how tubulin, the monomer >protein of which MTs are made, can switch between its two conformational >states based on the conformational state of neighboring monomers. Anyone >who knows jack about cellular autonoma will recognize certain similarities >here, and they actually did simulations to show waves of conformational >change propagating along the MTs. (Or along organized clusters of water >molecules next to or inside the MTs.) As far as I could tell, this was all >rampant speculation, yet to be borne out by experimental studies on real >MTs, but had a number of testable predictions. Hameroff mentioned that the >lowly single-celled paramecium has quite a complex repertoire of behavior >(not quite on the level with human consciousness, I would argue!) and yet >no nervous system. He proposes that its complex web of MTs may be its >'nervous system'. > >Being fairly well-read in the neural nets literature, I am struck by how >much has been accomplished with models using fairly simplistic 'neurons', >and certainly nothing as sophisticated as _sub_cellular nervous systems >within them. This leads me to believe that, whether MT processors exist or >not, we dont need to invoke such theories to explain consciousness. I must >not slight the boatloads of research that has shown that rearrangement of >MTs and other cytoskeletal elements is important in learning and memory, >but changing the cell's shape is a different issue than what these folks >were proposing. > >Just about every single speaker had a quote from or mentioned the work of >William James, who seems to have figured all this out around the turn of >the century. I am _not_ well read in psychology, but am inspired to track >down his writings, considering how progressive many of his ideas on >consciousness were. For instance, he was well aware of the associational >nature of all concepts, i.e., nothing has any meaning except in relation to >other things. I enjoy taking this concept all the way down to the neural >level, where the associations are between activated ensembles and such. > >I was very pleased to learn of the substantial work of Eric Harth on the >importance of feedback connections in the brain in perception. These >massive tracts, sometimes bigger than the feed-forward ones, are far too >often ignored by neuroscientists, leading them to believe that the brain is >stimulus-driven. Well, of course it is, but I feel (and Harth backed my >feelings) that most of what we see, feel, hear, etc. emanates from our >brain, the environment merely getting the thoughts started. > >One of my heroes, Walter Freeman, described how a stimulus makes the brain >(the smell-centers, specifically) go from a chaotic state to a state of >aperiodic oscillation, a basin of attraction probably corresponding to the >conscious feeling of recognizing the odor. I bet the feedback connections >play a major role in sending the system into its basins. (Perhaps he has >knows this already, I am not sure.) > >I was disappointed that several other prominent Thinkers on Thinking did >not attend the conference--were they invited? Notably, Douglas Hofstadter, >Daniel Dennett, John Searle, Ray Jackendoff, Stephen LaBerge, the >Churchlands, Robert Ornstein, Francis Crick, Geoffrey Edelman, Martha >Farah, and Marvin Minsky, come to my mind. Perhaps next year! > >The conference was mostly synthesis, proposals and speculations, so no >great answers about how consciousness happens yet. The best real data >presented, IMHO, was from Bruce McNaughton, who records from up to 150 >neurons at a time in the hippocampus of a freely behaving rat for weeks at >a time. Beside the fact that this is an extremely impressive technical >feat (I know because I am trying to do very similar things with cultured >neurons, that dont run around all night), it was a real window into the >thought processes (consciousness?) of a rat. He recorded the neurons' >activity while the rat was foraging around a box, and during naps before >and after the foraging. He found 'place cells' that fire only when the rat >is in a specific part of the box. He was able to use the place cell 'map' >to accurately predict the rat's trajectory, based on the neural signals. >He also showed the effect of subsequent learning on previously established >maps. But even cooler was the observation that neurons that had correlated >firing during the foraging and not before (implying that they are learning >preferences to nearby places), also were highly correlated during the >post-forage nap. Thus, the rat may have been dreaming of snippets of its >box experience, reinforcing or consolidating the important associations. >Neat stuff. > >I look toward functional MRI to come up with similar experiments on humans >in the near future. Keep your eye on this amazing new technology: I >predict that it will oust PET studies in a year or two, due to its far >greater spatial and temporal resolution, and the fact that it does not >require the poor subject to dose up on radioactivity. > > >An excellent conference overall, with many speakers referring to other's >talks in their talks. >Subscribe to Psyche-D if you are into this type of thing and want to chat >with like minded individuals who obviously have way more free time than I >do. > > > >Steve Potter, Ph.D. >Division of Biology 156-29 >California Institute of Technology >Pasadena, CA 91125 >spotter(a)druggist.gg.caltech.edu > >

32 years

KOGLIST: tovabbitott anyag: re: Psyche in print

by benke＠sfu.ca

>Date: Sun, 24 Apr 1994 12:01:52 +1000 >Reply-To: "PSYCHE: an interdisciplinary journal of research on consciousness" <PSYCHE-L%NKI.BITNET(a)UGA.CC.UGA.EDU> >Sender: "PSYCHE: an interdisciplinary journal of research on consciousness" <PSYCHE-L%NKI.BITNET(a)UGA.CC.UGA.EDU> >From: Kevin Korb <korb(a)bruce.cs.monash.edu.au> >Subject: Psyche in print >X-To: PSYCHE-L%NKI.BITNET(a)cunyvm.cuny.edu >To: Multiple recipients of list PSYCHE-L <PSYCHE-L%NKI.BITNET(a)UGA.CC.UGA.EDU> > > 19 April 1994 > >Hi, > >We at Psyche have printed the first issue in a professional quality >manner and are offering the print version of Psyche for subscription >to individuals and institutions. For distribution to individuals we >will continue to offer Psyche free of charge electronically, as well >as making it accessible at internet archives. We believe it is >nonetheless useful to make Psyche available in a quality printed >version since: many libraries do not yet adequately support the >distribution and archival of electronic journals; many individuals may >wish to keep a printed version on their shelves. Thus, by making >Psyche available in both formats we expect to increase the visibility >and acceptance of consciousness research. > >In order to be successful in this endeavor we require some minimum >number of institutional and individual subscriptions. If you can >subscribe or encourage your library to subscribe please do so. If a >sample issue will aid you in this, please send me an email note to >that effect, with your snail mail address, and I'll send you the >first issue. (Serious inquiries only, please: the first print run is >limited and has cost a good bit of money with no guarantee that the >expenses will be recovered.) > >Subscription info: > >Individual rate: $45 (US; or $55 Australian) >Institutional rate: $90 (US; or $110 Australian) > >Send a check to: > >PSYCHE >Dept. of Computer Science >Monash University >Clayton, Victoria 3169 >AUSTRALIA > >or send VISA or Mastercard account number, expiration date with >signature to the same address. > > >Regards, Kevin Korb > >

32 years

ageing

by Istvan Czigler

Majus 17-en 2 orakor az MTA Pszichologiai Intezete MUHELYBESZELGETESEK sorozataban Czigler Istvan eloadast tart IDOSKORI KOGNITIV VALTOZASOK ES AZ AGYI ESEMENYHEZ KOTOTT POTENCIALOK cimmel. Hely: MTA Pszichologiai Intezete, Bp. VI. Terez krt. 13. eloadoterem. Mindenkit szivesen latunk.

32 years

uj_preprintek

by szepes＠inf.u-szeged.hu

Az alabbi ket dolgozat elerheto a koglist-en: -------------------------------------------------------------------- Cim: A tanulas bonyolultsaga a ``mindennapi'' neuronhalokban Olah Beata & Szepesvari Csaba Absztrakt: Dolgozatunkban a neuronhalozatok toltesenek komplexitas-elmeleti kerdeseivel foglalkozunk. A neuronhalozatok, pontosabban a mesterseges neuronhalozatok idegrendszerunk absztrakt, erosen leegyszerusitett modelljei. A dolgozat egy resze Judd ``Neural network design and the complexity of learning'' c. konyve alapjan keszult (1990, A Bradford Book, MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachuttes). Ebben a konyvben Judd bebizonyitott egy tetelt, mely a neuronhalozatok toltesenek NP-teljesseget mondja ki. Dolgozatunkban egy szigurobb, de jol kovetheto matematikai keretbe helyezzuk Judd eredmenyet, kiemelve, hogy Judd tetele a legrosszabb esetu komplexitasra vonatkozik. Kideritjuk, hogy Judd tetele milyen halozat- es feladat-csaladokra vonatkozik. Kovetkezmenykent bebizonyitjuk pl., hogy a teljesitmeny elvu toltesi feladat is NP-teljes problema. Kiderul azonban az is, hogy Judd tetele a ``mindennapi neuronhalozatokra'' nem alkalmazhato, azaz epp azon neuronhalozatok toltesenek nehezsegerol nem mondd semmit, melyeket leggyakrabban hasznalnak. Elsokent bebizonyitjuk, hogy a Judd-fele un. kiterjesztett feladatokra ezen halok toltese is nehez, NP-teljes. Viszont kiderul, hogy a problema nehezsege itt mar a feladatok komplexitasaban rejlik. A ``hagyomanyos'', binaris feladatok koreben a mindennapi halok toltese megoldhato! Vegul, meg utoljara visszaterve Judd gondolatmenetehez, megvizsgaljuk a neuronhalozatok altalanosito kepessegenek problemajat. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Cim: Fogalom formalas altalanositassal adaptiv autonom rendszerben Kalmar Zsolt & Szepesvari Csaba & Lorincz Andras Absztrakt: Az autonom rendszerek epitesenek celja kornyezetevel allando interakcioban allo tanulo rendszerek megvalositasa. A rendszer tanulasa arra iranyul, hogy oroklott szuksegleteit (celjait) a leheto legnagyobb foku kielegitettsegi szinten tartsa. Egy autonom rendszer szamara rendkivul fontos, hogy alkalmas fogalmakat alkosson a kornyezeterol. Megfelelo fogalmak segitsegevel meg nem latott helyzetekben is kepes lehet celjai elerese erdekeben cselekedni. Hogy kell egy ``ures lappal'' indulo rendszernek ilyen fogalmakat alkotnia? Hogyan lehet a megalkotott fogalom-bazist karbantartani? Mi az egyes fogalmak alkalmazhatosagi kore? Hogyan vann a fogalmak abrazolva? A hagyomanyos mesterseges intelligencia paradigman belul mar a fenti kerdesek jo resze is szokatlan. Az itt ismertetett megkozelites meglehetosen ujkeleteu. Nezetunk szerint a fogalom alkotast ``gazdasagossagi'' megfontolasok alapjan kell megkozeliteni. A dolgozatban a fogalom formalas elmeleti alapjait dolgozzuk ki a DC modellre (Cs.Szepesvari & A.Lorincz: Behavior of an adaptive self-organizing autonomous agent working with cues and competing concepts. Adaptive Behavior, 2(2):131--160, 1994). Szamitogepes szimulaciok segitsegevel bemutatjuk, hogy a kiterjesztett DC modell kepes fogalmak alkotasara es hasznalatukra. A kialakult fogalmak, a varakozasoknak megfeleloen, valoban nagyon hasznosnak bizonyultak. A rendszer ``teljesitmenyet'' tobb mint ketszeresere noveltek, s emellett az algoritmus memoriaigenye is csokkent. Az algoritmus es kornyezenek szimulacios szoftvere objektum-orientalt fejlesztoi eszkozokkel C++-ban keszult. A dolgozat az ICANN'94 (Int.Conf.on Artificial Neural Networks) konferencian megjeleno anyag kibovitett valtozata. --------------------------------------------------------------------- A dolgozatokat a get preprints kalmar_szepesvari_lorincz.ps illetve get preprints olah_szepesvari.ps utasitasokkal lehet lekerni a listserv(a)cogpsyphy.hu cimrol. FTP-vel is elerhetok a fenti neveken az ftp.cogpshyphy.hu cimrol a koglist/preprints konyvtarbol. A file-ok POSTSCRIPT formatumuak!!! Mindenfele az anyagokkal kapcsolatos megjegyzest szivesen fogadok Szepesvari Csaba Szeged 6720, Aradi vrt. tere 1. Bolyai Matematikai Intezet, JATE szepes(a)csilla.inf.jate.u-szeged.hu

32 years

Moravcsik eloadasa az MTA NyelvTud Int-ben (majus 6, 11 ora)

by Istvan Bodnar

Julius Moravcsik Stanfordi Egyetem (USA) 1994. majus 6-an, penteken, delelott 11 orakor az MTA Nyelvtudomanyi Intezet Konyvtaraban (Budapest I, Szinhaz utca 1 - a Varszinhaz epuleteben) Generics and Logical Form cimmel eloadast tart. Az eloadasra minden erdeklodot szeretettel varnak a szervezok.

32 years

(Fwd) Martin Prinzhorn

by PLEH＠IZABELL.elte.hu

Forwarded message: From: IZABELL/PLEH To: pleh, konya Date: Tue, 3 May 1994 17:20:49 GMT+100 Subject: Martin Prinzhorn Martin Prinzhorn lecturer at Vienna University will be the guest of our cognitive program at Department of General Psychology ELTE, Izabella utca 46. Martin is a generative linguist with a strong footing in cognitive science. He will talk on theory of mind, folk psychology and cognitive theory. His scehedule is: Monday, May, 9th, 6 P.M. Room 216 General overview of his approach. (Regular cognitive seminar time.) Tuesday, Wednesday, Thrusday, 4 P.M. Room 310. Detailed talks Friday: discussion at agreed upon time. Martin will stay at Izabella utca, and will be available on phone: 1-423-130, and email: martin(a)izabell.elte.hu. All are most wellcome, Csaba Pleh Please post !!!!

32 years

Moravcsik szeminarium Platon matematikafilozofiajarol

by Istvan Bodnar

Julius Moravcsik Stanfordi Egyetem (USA): 1994. ma1jus 5-en, csutortokon, kozvetlenul az eloadasat kovetoen, (elorelathatolag kb. d.u. 5:15-tol) az ELTE BTK Gorog Tsz szeminariumaban kotetlen beszelgetesen szamol be Platon matematikafilozofiajarol (A matematikai objektumok statusa Platon filozofiajaban)

32 years

Moravcsik eloadasa az ELTE BTK-an (Justice as Sharing)

by Istvan Bodnar

A Magyar Filozo1fiai Ta1rsasa1g meghi1vja O2nt e1s munkata1rsait felovaso1 u2le1se1re. Julius Moravcsik Stanfordi Egyetem (USA): Justice as Sharing Az elo3ada1s helye e1s ido3pontja: ELTE BTK Kari Tana1csterem (1052 Budapest V., Pesti B. u. 1, I. emelet 1). 1994. ma1jus 5., csu2to2rto2k d.u. 4 o1ra. Az elo3ada1s a szerzo3nek a ko2zeljo2vo3ben megjeleno3 Individual Ideals and Ideal Communities c. ko2nyve1nek 5. fejezete1r_l sza1mol be. Moravcsik professzor u1r elo3ada1sa1nak tartalma1t a ko2vetkezo3kben foglalja o2ssze: The lecture will start with a few introductory remarks about ``normative communitarianism'', and with a few comments situating this chapter in the framework of the book. a. Sharing posited as a human universal; all humans want to share something with somebody - problem is to the extent domain of beneficiaries and list of goods to be shared. b. Brief sketch of objections to well known alternatives such as Rawls' conception of justice as fairness. c. Defence of the claim of sharing as a psychological universal. Conceptual anatomy of sharing. Sharing non-competitive, competitive goods, spontaneous and reasoned sharing, etc. d. Sketch of how sharing can be the underlying foundation for distributive justice. e. Treatment of some major types of humans resisiting the appeal to share. f. Sharing applied to power (primarily political); power as responsibility, as a good. g. The pragmatics of sharing. No decision procedure. Normative communitarianism as a background. Several of the examples and illustrations are from South Africa, where I spent last September lecturing at several universities, and where I encountered serious problems involving justice, challenging the philosopher

32 years

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koglist May 1994