As part of the general psychology department Cognitive programs Oramegbeszeles: Izabella 46, februar 5, 17h30 209, Seminar in Philosophy of Mind (formerly titled and could still be subtitled "Intentionality and Qualia in a World of Causes") G. Fekete We shall review the development of Cognitive Science from a philosophical perspective as systematically as possible, classifying historical and current views on the subject, standard objections, paradigms, typical examples and thought experiments. I will attempt to provide the necessary tools of philosophical investigation (tools of logical analysis, terminology and methodology) for those who are unfamiliar with them, but conclusions (if any) are to be drawn together in discussions. I expect everyone to contribute to the success of the course drawing from his or her own field of expertise as the realm of cognitive science is interdisciplinary (which includes psychology, philosophy, neurobiology, computer science and arguably even quantum physics).=20 Clearly, where the questions become strictly empirical in their nature philosophy should give way to exact (or at least practical) sciences.=20 However, most issues in this field have not yet reached the stage where we are simply concerned with mapping how things actually are, rather we need to ponder how things could at all be. Such considerations properly belong to the domain of philosophy. (Of course, there are philosophical elements or aspects intrinsic to all sciences.) The interplay of the various disciplines involved and especially that of psychology, neuro-biological=20 research and philosophy will be evident and hopefully mutually fruitful (I expect to learn a lot from you) throughout the course. The intended philosophical perspective is an unambiguously materialist one. Accordingly, we shall concentrate on the possibilities of scientific reduction and the extent to which it is tenable (reductionism, eliminativism, or "integrationism"). We shall review various forms=20 of identity theories, address the problem of the semantic gap between mental and non-mental (physical) terms, and the distinction between private (first person) and public (third person) experiences. We shall meet 13 or 14 times during the semester the exact arrangement of which is subject to agreement. I propose topics formally for ten occasions (see below) leaving room to address unexpected questions that arise in the course of discussion or cope with potential delays. Each participant will be asked to make a formal contribution by introducing a specific topic for discussion at least once during the course. The first time we meet will be spent with administrative and practical matters and you will be asked to=20 read the Introduction from Fodor=92s Representations for the next occasion. 1 Historical overview: form dualism to connectivism (dualism, naturalism, psychoanalysis, behaviorism, cognitive-developmental psychology, "folk-psychology", functionalism, artificial intelligence) Readings: "Introduction" Fodor, J.A. 1981, Representations. Cambridge: MIT= =20 Press Suggested readings: Flanagan, O. 1991. The Science of the Mind. Cambridge: MIT Press. 2 Inverted spectrum, absent qualia and the belief-desire-perception cycle. Chauvinism and liberalism. =09 Readings: "Introduction" Fodor, J.A. 1981, Representations. Cambridge: MIT= =20 Press Suggested readings: Flanagan, O. 1991. The Science of the Mind. Cambridge:= =20 MIT Press. 3 The identity theory and functionalism. Token and type identities. Black=92= s objection.=20 =09 Readings: Smart, J.C.C. "Sensations and Brain Processes." Philosophical Review 68; Armstrong, D.M. "The Causal Theory of Mind". The Nature of the Mind. 1980. Queensland: University of Queensland Press. =09 Suggested readings: Armstrong, D.M. 1968. A Materialist Theory of the Mind. London: Routledge. 4 Kripke=92s critique. Essentialism. Readings: excerpts from Kripke, S. Naming and Necessity. 1972. Cambridge:=20 Harvard University Press; S. Kripke. "Identity and Necessity". Identity and Individuation ed. M.K. Munitz. 1971. New York: New York Univ. Press;=20 Davidson, D. "Mental Events". Experience and Theory. eds. L. Foster and=20 Swanson, J.W. 1970. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press 5 Functionalism, spectrum inversion, absent qualia, and the homunculi head - Part 1 Readings: N. Block. "Troubles with Functionalism". S. Shoemaker. "Functionalism and Qualia". 6 Functionalism, spectrum inversion, absent qualia, and the homunculi head - Part 2 Readings: Nagel, T. "What it is Like to Be a Bat?" The Philosophical Review LXXXIII; Jackson, F. "What Mary Didn=92t Know" The Journal of Philosophy= LXXXIII. Suggested readings: Dennett, D. 1991. Consciousness Explained. New York:=20 Little, Brown and Company. 7 Qualia, the mind-body problem and the new mysterians Readings: F. Jackson. "Epiphenomenal Qualia". Philosophical Quarterly 32; C. McGinn: "Can We Solve the Mind-Body Problem?" Mind 98. Suggested readings: Dennett, D. 1991. Consciousness Explained. New York:=20 Little, Brown and Company. 8 Artificial intelligence Readings: Fodor, J.A. "Methodological Solipsism Considered as a Research Strategy in Cognitive Psychology". Behavioral and Brain Sciences III. 1; Searle, J.R. "Minds, Brains, and Programs". Behavioral and Brain Sciences III. 3. =09 Suggested readings: Dennett, D. 1991. Consciousness Explained. New York:=20 Little, Brown and Company. Searle, J.R. 1992. The Rediscovery of the Mind.= =20 Cambridge: MIT Press. 9 Eliminative Materialism and Folk Psychology Readings: Churchland, P.M. "Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional=20 Attitudes"; excerpts from Dennett, D. 1993. Intentional States. Cambridge: MIT Press, Penrose, R. 1989. The Emperor=92s New Mind. London: Vintage or= the corresponding Pr=E9cis of "The Emperor=92s New Mind". Behavioral and Brain= =20 Sciences. 10 Scientific reduction Readings: Carnap, R. "Logical Foundations of the Unity of Science"; Oppenheim and Putnam. "Unity of Science as a Working Hypothesis"; Fodor, J.A. "Special Sciences". Suggested readings: Searle, J.R. "The Mystery of Consciousness" The New York Review of Books. XLII, 17. Many of the above articles can be found in two antologies: Ed. Block, N. Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology. Vols. 1 & 2. 1980. Cambridge: Harvard University Press or Ed. Rosenthal, D. 1991. The Nature of Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press. If you are not at all familiar with philosophical terminology within the field, you might wish to overview the following=20 Key words and concepts:=20 absent and inverted qualia, adaptation, artificial intelligence, autophenomenology, autoregulation, behavior, belief, bridging laws, category mistake, causation, center of narrative gravity, cognition, conation, connectionism, consciousness, constructivism, Darwinism, de re - de dicto distinction, determinism, disposition, dual-aspect theory,=20 dualism, eliminative materialism, emergent property, emotivism, empiricism, epiphenomenalism, essentialism, evolution, falsifiability, first person perspective, free will, folk-psychology, functionalism, genotype-phenotype, ghost in the machine, heterophenomenology, holism, homonculus, identity theory, information processing, innatism, intensionality, intentionality, intentional stance, intuitionism, knowledge, logical positivism, materialism, mind, , nativism, naturalism, neural Darwinism, nominalism, opacity, other minds, paralellism, perception, personal identity, phenomenology, pragmatism, private events, qualia, rationality, reductionism, representations, semantics, solipsim, supervenience, teleological functionalism, token and type identities, Turing machine, unconscious, verificationism. Gabor Fekete Fekete Gabor & Mady Krisztina 675 Roselawn Ave, #307 Budapest Toronto, ON Bem rkp. 50 Canada M5P 1L2 Hungary 1027 (416) 785-0205 (36-1) 135-0693 gfekete(a)epas.utoronto.ca feketeg(a)vega.ceu.hu