19:41:50 +100 Return-path: <gfekete(a)epas.utoronto.ca> Dear Folks, Fekete Gabor of U. Toronto will have the following course (in English) as part of our Cognitive Psychology PhD program. We are of course trying to recruite other people as well. Please post this note, and notify of your interest both Gabor at the above adress and me at pleh(a)izabell.elte.hu All the best Pleh Csaba Suggested course title: INTENTIONALITY AND QUALIA IN A WORLD OF CAUSES Abstract: If thinking, feeling and other mental activities are identical to brain processes, then mental events may just supervene upon physical (or at least neuro-biological) processes. This may mean that having translated the vocabulary of psychology into that of the reducing science we should look for a more complete and more appropriate explanatory theory of mental events there and psychologists could soon be out of their jobs. On the other hand, we may want to deny that mental terms could ever be reduced to non-mental ones (even without assuming a Cartesian dualist position) finding ourselves in the same camp with the new mysterians who seem to end up denying a lot more of the well-established a posteriori truth of science than they might have wished to bargain for. Does presumed ontological identity between mind and brain processes imply that psychological theories are deducible from neuro-physiological ones (let alone some unified theory of science)? Or can reasons be causes on their own power? We shall investigate these questions and others, like those pertaining to the existence of qualia, the nature of first person experience versus third person empirical observation and the relation of functional equivalence to structural identity and its consequeces on the possibilities of strong AI. Key words and concepts: absent and inverted qualia, adaptation, artificial intelligence, autophenomenology, autoregulation, behavior, belief, bridging laws, category mistake, causation, center of narrative gravity, cognition, conation, connectionism, consciousness, constructivism, Darwinism, de re - de dicto distinction, determinism, disposition, dual-aspect theory, dualism, eliminative materialism, emotivism, empiricism, epiphenomenalism, essentialism, evolution, falsifiability, first person perspective, free will, folk-psychology, functionalism, genotype-phenotype, ghost in the machine, heterophenomenology, holism, homonculus, identity theory, information processing, innatism, intensionality, intentionality, intentional stance, intuitionism, knowledge, logical positivism, materialism, mind, , nativism, naturalism, neural Darwinism, nominalism, opacity, other minds, paralellism, perception, personal identity, phenomenology, pragmatism, private events, qualia, rationality, reductionism, representations, semantics, solipsim, supervenience, teleological functionalism, token and type identities, Turing machine, unconscious Readings from: Armstrong, Chisholm, Churchland, Davidson, Dennett, Dretske, Fodor, McGinn, Nagel, Searle, Schoemaker, Quine Nem tudom meg pontosan miket valasztanek, a fenti szerzoktol szeretnek szemelvenyeket. Konyvekbol Armstrong: _A Metrialist Theory of Mind_-bol, Davidson: _Actions, Reasons and Causes_-bol, Dennett: _Intentional Stance_-bol, _Elbow Room_-bol, Dretske: _Behavior Explained_-bol, Fodor: _Representations_-bol, tobbi az cikk. Requirements: One, approx. 5000 words long paper at the end of the term. Ez OK?