The CEU Philosophy Department cordially invites you to a talk (as part of its Departmental Colloquium series) by Philip Goff (University of Hertfordshire) on How should a qualia freak do metaphysics? Tuesday, 19 January, 2010, 4.30 PM, Zrinyi 14, Room 412 ABSTRACT I define a ‘qualia freak’ as someone who holds: (A) that there are phenomenal concepts, i.e. ways of thinking about conscious states – in terms of what it’s like to be in them – which are independent of causal role, (B) that phenomenal concepts are transparent, i.e. reveal what it is to have the phenomenal properties they denote, (C) that we possess certain phenomenal concepts such that there is no epistemic possibility that those concepts are not instantiated. I think a sizeable minority of analytic philosophers count as ‘qualia freaks’ under this definition. In this paper I argue/point out that qualia freaks can and should use conceptual analysis of phenomenal concepts as a solid foundation for metaphysical enquiry. The conjunction of (A), (B) and (C) entails that conceptual analysis of phenomenal concepts gets us all the way to reality: we can know a priori what phenomenal concepts demand of reality, and we are certain that such demands are satisfied. I go to show how this method can help us make progress on various metaphysical questions. Kriszta Biber Department Coordinator Philosophy Department Tel: 36-1-327-3806 Fax: 36-1-327-3072 E-mail: biberk(a)ceu.hu