The CEU Department of Philosophy cordially invites you to a talk by Attila Tanyi (CEU -- Graduated 2006) on 'Reason and Desire' 5.00 PM, Tuesday, 13. March, Zrinyi 14, Room 412 Abstract The paper begins with a well-known objection to the Desire-Based Reasons Model. The idea of reason-based desires holds that since desires are based on reasons (first premise), which they transmit but to which they cannot add (second premise), they cannot themselves provide reasons for action. In the paper I investigate two attacks that have recently been launched against the first premise of this argument. Both invoke counterexamples: the first concerns so-called affective desires, the second invokes hedonic desires. The aim of the paper is to defend the premise by bringing the alleged counterexamples under its scope. As to affective desires, I first show that there are several ways a defender of the premise may try to explain away this counterexample. I then argue that the subjective understanding of the premise that underlies the counterexample does not require a conscious normative thought on the part of the agent and in general allows for considerable flexibility. Finally, I question the very idea that we must interpret the premise subjectively and not objectively. In the case of hedonic desires, I first point out that the counterexample presupposes a particular understanding of pleasure, which we might call desire-based. In response I draw up two alternative accounts, the phenomenological and the tracking views. Although several objections can be raised to both accounts, I argue in detail that they are not as implausible as their opponents claim them to be.