The CEU Philosophy Department cordially invites you to a talk (as part of its Departmental Colloquium series) by Gábor Forrai (University of Miskolc) on Bonjour’s Indispensibility Argument for Rationalism Tuesday,18 November, 5.30 PM, Zrinyi 14, Room 412 ABSTRACT In his In Defense of Pure Reason (CUP, 1998) Laurence Bonjour has argued that we have an ability to intuitively grasp necessary truths, which he calls rational insight, and that appealing to this ability counts as genuine epistemic justification just as appealing to experience does. Were we not in possession of such an ability, he argues, we could not justify anything which cannot be justified directly by experience. The reason is that all inferentially justified beliefs depend for their justification on the justification of inferences, and inferences - both deductive and inductive - cannot be justifed otherwise than by invoking rational insight. Hence, denial of rational insight deprives inferences and, therefore, all allegedly inferentially justified beliefs of their justification, and thus leads to a strong form of skepticism. In my paper I’ll argue that in this respect the rationalist is not better off than the empiricist. Kriszta Biber Department Coordinator Philosophy Department Tel: 36-1-327-3806 Fax: 36-1-327-3072 E-mail: biberk(a)ceu.hu