The CEU Philosophy Department cordially invites you to a talk (as part of its Departmental Colloquium series) by Severin Schroeder (University of Reading) on A Tale of Two Problems: Wittgenstein's Discussion of Aspect Perception Tuesday, 24 March 2009, 5.30 PM, Zrinyi 14, Room 412 ABSTRACT What is the point of Wittgenstein's discussion of aspect perception (in `Part II' of the Philosophical Investigations)? I argue that what makes it so difficult to find a convincing answer to this question is that, in fact, in those passages Wittgenstein occupied himself with two connected, but distinct conceptual problems which he was not always careful to keep separate. The two problems are: 1. Are visual aspects actually seen or are they only thought of in an interpretation? 2. How (or in what sense) is it possible to experience an aspect (a thought, the meaning of a picture) in an instant? Considering question (1), visual aspect perception may well be called `seeing', although it is often more concept-laden than seeing just shapes and colours. One crucial consideration for Wittgenstein to justify calling visual aspect perception `seeing' is that it involves a certain attitude towards an object, especially the internal object of a pictorial representation. Here, seeing-as is taken not only in an episodic sense, but also as a continuous and largely dispositional stance. On the other hand, considering question (2), Wittgenstein was particularly interested in the phenomenon of the lighting up of an aspect. Question (2) is just another instance of the paradox of the instantaneous experience of complex contents already discussed in `Part I' of the Philosophical Investigations. There Wittgenstein asks `How is it possible to experience the meaning of a word (for example) in an instant?' and returns a negative answer (`It isn't'). Now, in his later writings he pursues the follow-up questions: `Why do we (feel compelled to) say so then?' and `What are we to think of that odd kind of experience?'. At this point the idea of instantaneous aspect perception is invoked as an object of comparison that might perhaps make the phenomenon of experiencing the meaning of a word appear less puzzling. In the final section of my paper I distinguish between different types of aspect perception and offer a tentative suggestion as to how at least one type (`emotional seeing-as') may possibly be found to shed some light on the phenomenon of experiencing the meaning of a word. Kriszta Biber Department Coordinator Philosophy Department Tel: 36-1-327-3806 Fax: 36-1-327-3072 E-mail: biberk(a)ceu.hu