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Cognition at Christmas 2006

by Gergely Csibra

A BME Kognitív Tudományi Tanszéke ebben az évben december 21-én rendezi meg a hagyományos Cognition at Christmas szemináriumot, ezúttal a statisztikai tanulás és a nyelvelsajátítás témakörében. Részleteket lásd: http://cogsci.bme.hu/cogxmas.php Csibra Gergely

19 years, 6 months

Fwd: presentation

by Gergely Csibra

> >> Karla Holmboe a londoni Birkbeck College-bol jon es tart egy eloadast >> >> nov 24-en penteken 11 orakor a Victor Hugo u. I. emelet 137 teremben >> >> Correlations across Multiple Measures of Executive Function in >> Infancy and >> Early Childhood >> cimmel. >> >> Az eloadas kivonata alabb. >> >> Gervai Judit >> >>>> Abstract: In this talk I will be talking about a >>>> longitudinal study investigating frontal-executive >>>> functioning in infancy and toddlerhood. The study >>>> had two aims. Firstly, a new, easily administered, >>>> visual inhibition task was developed (the >>>> Freeze-Frame task). Secondly, the study investigated >>>> the relationship between performance on a set of >>>> frontal-executive measures administered to the same >>>> group of children at 9 and 24 months. As predicted, >>>> infants looked less to peripheral distractors when a >>>> central stimulus was dynamic compared to repetitive >>>> in the Freeze-Frame task. Furthermore, infants who >>>> showed this pattern more strongly also tended to >>>> perform better in a classic infant inhibition task, >>>> the A-not-B task. Surprisingly, both Freeze-Frame >>>> and A-not-B performance was negatively correlated >>>> with the frontal-executive measures taken at 24 >>>> months, and these associations were independent of >>>> measures of general development. The results will be >>>> discussed in terms of the validity and >>>> interpretation of frontal-executive measures in >>>> early childhood and possible mechanisms underlying >>>> the negative association found between the infant >>>> and toddler measures. I will also discuss future >>>> directions including a new large-scale longitudinal >>>> study currently in progress. >>>> >> >

19 years, 6 months

invitation to a philosophy talk

by Krisztina Biber

The Budapest Mind Society and CEU Philosophy Department cordially invite you to a talk by Csaba Pléh (Budapest Univ. of Technology and Economics) on 'Epigenetic theories of the human brain and the issue of the organisation of the mind' Tuesday 21 Nov, 5:00pm, Zrinyi 14, Room 412 Abstract: I shall start from the general claims of (now) traditional cognitive science regarding the structure of the mind and its unfolding. Two key conceptual cornerstones of this attitude are the idea of mental modules and their innate organization. Since the mid 80s, several rival proposals have emerged regarding these assumptions. In my talk I shall argue for a biologically tenable structure of the mind where task and domain specific systems are assumed but they are still unfolding through an interaction with the environment. Three types of arguments will support the proposed view. First, general selectionist theories of development and brain organization, like that of Edelman and Changeux, will be presented that claim a role for self organization in structuring the brain and mind, and a stabilizing (selective) role for role the environment. Second, data from studies on language processing will be analyzed to illuminate certain aspects of brain organization. A combination of the high temporal resolution of electrophysiological methods and the high spatial resolution of imaging methods allows us to decompose the complex process of understandings and reveal some of its brain modules, while at those time indicate the constrained flexibility of the architecture. Finally, I shall present some data on the unfolding of mental architecture based on observation in atypical development -- in particular, Williams syndrome. This rare disorder has been regarded by many cognitive researchers as one of the clear cases of simple dissociation: good language and week spatial skill, and within language, good grammar and trouble with exceptions. Genetic disorders, according to this view, have a modular impact on the mind, impairing spatial cognition, wile leaving language intact for example. Our data imply a more subtle image. There are domains, like visual integration, spatial memory, where there is clear dissociation, while in other areas there are only slow downs connected to overall learning difficulties of a less modular nature. On the basis of these data I shall argue for a less compartmentalized and less dissociative image of development and mental organization, that implies a type of genetic determination where epigenesis is directed by the genes but not in a one to one correspondence. The genetic program for behavior is a program for the unfolding of that behavior. This has interesting implications for the way the philosophical claims for modularity have to be reformulated. Kriszta Biber Department Coordinator Philosophy Department Tel: 36-1-327-3806 Fax: 36-1-327-3072 E-mail: biberk(a)ceu.hu

19 years, 7 months

Fw: Derrida Memorial Lectures, Pecs, Hungary

by Kampis

Kollegak, ajanlom figyelmukbe, udv kgy

19 years, 7 months

Fw: Meghívó

by Kampis

----- Original Message ----- From: Gábor Éva To: Kampis György Sent: Saturday, November 18, 2006 10:56 AM Subject: Meghívó Kampis György! Várjuk Önöket az ünnepi műhelyvitára. Üdvözlettel: Gábor Éva

19 years, 7 months

new book available ---- Cognition and Multi-Agent Interaction: From Cognitive Modeling to Social Simulation

by Professor Ron Sun

new book available ---- Cognition and Multi-Agent Interaction: From Cognitive Modeling to Social Simulation Edited by Ron Sun Published by Cambridge University Press http://www.cambridge.org/us/catalogue/catalogue.asp? isbn=0521839645 This book explores the intersection between cognitive sciences and social sciences. In particular, it explores the intersection between individual cognitive modeling and modeling of multi-agent interaction (social stimulation). The two contributing fields --individual cognitive modeling (especially cognitive architectures) and modeling of multi-agent interaction (including social simulation and, to some extent, multi-agent systems) -- have seen significant growth in recent years. However, the interaction of these two fields has not been sufficiently developed. We believe that the interaction of the two may be more significant than either alone, leading to better understanding of both individual cognition and sociocultural processes. It is possible that an integrative field of study in cognitive and social sciences is emerging and we are laying the foundation for it. • explore a heretofore largely unexplored area • written by leading researchers in various disciplines • provide provocative new insights into relevant issues and solid research • intended for researchers and students in cognitive, behavioral, and social sciences but may also be read by interested laypersons ----------------------------- Contents Part I. Introduction: 1. Prolegomena to integrating cognitive modeling and social simulation. Ron Sun; Part II. Overviews of Cognitive Architectures: 2. Modeling paradigms in ACT-R. Niel Taatgen, Christian Lebiere and John Anderson; 3. Considering Soar as an agent architecture. Robert Wray and Randolph M. Jones; 4. The CLARION cognitive architecture: extending cognitive modeling to social simulation. Ron Sun; Part III. Modeling and Simulating Cognitive and Social Processes: 5. Cognitive architectures, game playing, and human evolution. Robert West, Christian Lebiere, and Dan Bothell; 6. Simulating a simple case of organizational decision making. Isaac Naveh and Ron Sun; 7. Cognitive modeling of social behaviors. William J. Clancey, Maarten Sierhuis, Bruce Damer, and Boris Brodsky; 8. Cognitive agents interacting in real and virtual worlds. Brad Best and Christian Lebiere; 9. Modeling social emotions and social attributions. Jonathan Gratch, Wenji Mao, and Stacy Marcella; 10. Communicating and collaborating with robotic agents. J. Gregory Trafton, Alan C. Schultz, Nicholas L. Cassimatis, et al; 11. Behavior-based methods for modeling and structuring control of social robots. Dylan Shell and Maja Mataric; 12. Evolution of a teamwork model. Nathan Schurr, Steven Okamoto, Rajiv T. Matheswaran, and Milind Tambe; 13. Sociality in embodied neural agents. Domenico Parisi and Stefano Nolfi; 14. Cognitive architecture and contents for social structures and interactions. Cristiano Castelfranchi; Part IV. A Symposium: 15. Cognitive science and good social science. Scott Moss; 16. Collective cognition and emergence in multi-agent systems. Pietro Panzarasa and Nick Jennings; 17. Social judgement in multi-agent systems. Tom Burns and Ewa Roszkowska; 18. Including human variability in a cognitive architecture to improve team simulation. Frank Ritter and Emma Norling; 19. When does social simulation need cognitive models? Nigel Gilbert. -------------------------------- To order, please go to: http://www.cambridge.org/us/catalogue/catalogue.asp?isbn=0521839645 or http://www.cambridge.org/uk/catalogue/catalogue.asp?isbn=0521839645 ======================================================== Professor Ron Sun Cognitive Science Department Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute 110 Eighth Street, Carnegie 302A Troy, NY 12180, USA phone: 518-276-3409 fax: 518-276-3017 email: rsun(a)rpi.edu web: http://www.cogsci.rpi.edu/~rsun =======================================================

19 years, 7 months

Alzheimer kor es verbalis munkamemoria

by Banreti Zoltan

Kedves Kollégák, Az MTA Nyelvtudományi Intézete Kisérletes nyelvészet programjában a következő előadás: november 16-án, csütörtökön 11 órától a földszinti előadóban (VI. Benczúr u. 33): Hoffmann Ildikó és Szücs Márta: Alzheimer-kór és verbális munkamemória Az előadás absztraktját csatolt fájlban küldöm. Minden érdeklődőt szeretettel várunk. Üdvözlettel, Bánréti Zoltán MTA Nyelvtudomanyi Intezete Research Institute for Linguistics, Hungarian Academy of Sciences H-1068 Budapest Benczúr u. 33 tel: 36-1-351-0413 fax: 36-1-322-9297 email: banreti(a)nytud.hu

19 years, 7 months

Philosophy of Science Colloquium, cancellation!

by Laszlo E. Szabo

Philosophy of Science Colloquium Department of History and Philosophy of Science Eotvos Lorand University, Budapest Room 1.817 (1st floor) Monday 4:00 PM Pazmany P. setany 1/C Budapest, Hungary Phone/Fax: (36-1) 372 2924 http://philosophy.elte.hu/colloquium Cancellation!!! Janos Tozser's lecture (originally scheduled for 20th November) has been moved to 18th December!!! Reason: Mini-Symposion on philosophy of language Institute for Philosophical Research 20 November 2:00 PM (Szemere u. 10.) See: http://hps.elte.hu/events/ The organizer of the colloquium: Laszlo E. Szabo (email: leszabo(a)philosophy.elte.hu) -- L a s z l o E. S z a b o Theoretical Physics Research Group of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences Department of History and Philosophy of Science Eotvos University, Budapest http://philosophy.elte.hu/leszabo

19 years, 7 months

Reminder: Budapest Mind Society lecture series - Csaba Pléh

by Jakab Zoltán

Csaba Pléh Budapest University of Technomolg and Economics; Hungarian Academy of Sciences epigenetic theories of the human brain and the issue of the organisation of the mind** Tuesday, 21 November, 2006, 5 PM CEU Department of Philosophy, 1051 Budapest, Zrínyi u. 14, 4th floor, rm. 412.** * Abstract* I shall start from the general claims of (now) traditional cognitive science regarding the structure of the mind and its unfolding. Two key conceptual cornerstones of this attitude are the idea of mental modules and their innate organization. Since the mid 80s, several rival proposals have emerged regarding these assumptions. In my talk I shall argue for a biologically tenable structure of the mind where task and domain specific systems are assumed but they are still unfolding through an interaction with the environment. Three types of arguments will support the proposed view. First, general selectionist theories of development and brain organization, like that of Edelman and Changeux, will be presented that claim a role for self organization in structuring the brain and mind, and a stabilizing (selective) role for role the environment. Second, data from studies on language processing will be analyzed to illuminate certain aspects of brain organization. A combination of the high temporal resolution of electrophysiological methods and the high spatial resolution of imaging methods allows us to decompose the complex process of understandings and reveal some of its brain modules, while at those time indicate the constrained flexibility of the architecture. Finally, I shall present some data on the unfolding of mental architecture based on observation in atypical development -- in particular, Williams syndrome. This rare disorder has been regarded by many cognitive researchers as one of the clear cases of simple dissociation: good language and week spatial skill, and within language, good grammar and trouble with exceptions. Genetic disorders, according to this view, have a modular impact on the mind, impairing spatial cognition, wile leaving language intact for example. Our data imply a more subtle image. There are domains, like visual integration, spatial memory, where there is clear dissociation, while in other areas there are only slow downs connected to overall learning difficulties of a less modular nature. On the basis of these data I shall argue for a less compartmentalized and less dissociative image of development and mental organization, that implies a type of genetic determination where epigenesis is directed by the genes but not in a one to one correspondence. The genetic program for behavior is a program for the unfolding of that behavior. This has interesting implications for the way the philosophical claims for modularity have to be reformulated.

19 years, 7 months

reminder:invitation to a philosophy talk

by Krisztina Biber

The CEU Philosophy Department cordially invites you to a talk by Åsa Wikforss (Stockholm University, Sweden) on 'Types of Externalism and Self-Knowledge' Tuesday, 14 November, 5.00 PM , Philosophy Department Zrinyi str. 14 /room 412 Abstract: In the paper I distinguish two central types of externalism that are often conflated, what I call foundational externalism and externalist semantics. I argue that the failure to pay attention to this distinction has caused much confusion, in particular when it comes to the topic of self-knowledge. To illustrate this, I focus on one of the arguments intended to show the incompatibility of externalism and self-knowledge: McKinsey's reductio argument. More precisely, I consider the question whether externalism implies that thinking thoughts about natural kinds, such as Water is wet, requires that there are instances of the kind in the individual's environment. I suggest that, contrary to received opinion the standard versions of externalism do not support the conclusion that the presence of water constitutes a necessary condition for thinking thoughts about water. I end by suggesting what I take to be the real problem underlying the debate over self-knowledge and externalism - the assumption of incomplete understanding. Kriszta Biber Department Coordinator Philosophy Department Tel: 36-1-327-3806 Fax: 36-1-327-3072 E-mail: biberk(a)ceu.hu

19 years, 7 months

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