The CEU Department of Philosophy cordially invites you to a talk
by
Eugen Fischer (University of East Anglia)
on
'Philosophical Pictures and Secondary Qualities: The Roots of
Sense-data'
5.00 PM, Tuesday, 20. March, Zrinyi 14, Room 412
Abstract
The talk develops the Wittgensteinian notion of 'philosophical
pictures' with the help of some notions adapted from cognitive
linguistics and psychology, and explains how such pictures can drive us
to adopt paradoxical doctrines in the absence of warrant. The account
is developed in response to a puzzle about two of the most lastingly
influential, if paradoxical doctrines of 17th century philosophy: the
doctrine of secondary qualities and the sense-datum doctrine of
perception to which it gave rise. The major arguments for these
doctrines presuppose or even explicitly assume from the start the very
doctrines they are meant to establish. Clearly, these doctrines were
adopted prior to the arguments; these were formulated after the event to
justify what appeared intuitively compelling. This raises the puzzling
question the talk attempts to answer: Why did - and do - claims at odds
with common sense appear intuitively compelling in philosophical
reflection?
Kriszta Biber
Department Coordinator
Philosophy Department
Tel: 36-1-327-3806
Fax: 36-1-327-3072
E-mail: biberk(a)ceu.hu
The CEU Department of Philosophy cordially invites you to a talk
by
Attila Tanyi (CEU -- Graduated 2006)
on
'Reason and Desire'
5.00 PM, Tuesday, 13. March, Zrinyi 14, Room 412
Abstract
The paper begins with a well-known objection to the Desire-Based
Reasons Model. The idea of reason-based desires holds that since desires
are based on reasons (first premise), which they transmit but to which
they cannot add (second premise), they cannot themselves provide reasons
for action. In the paper I investigate two attacks that have recently
been launched against the first premise of this argument. Both invoke
counterexamples: the first concerns so-called affective desires, the
second invokes hedonic desires. The aim of the paper is to defend the
premise by bringing the alleged counterexamples under its scope. As to
affective desires, I first show that there are several ways a defender
of the premise may try to explain away this counterexample. I then argue
that the subjective understanding of the premise that underlies the
counterexample does not require a conscious normative thought on the
part of the agent and in general allows for considerable flexibility.
Finally, I question the very idea that we must interpret the premise
subjectively and not objectively. In the case of hedonic desires, I
first point out that the counterexample presupposes a particular
understanding of pleasure, which we might call desire-based. In response
I draw up two alternative accounts, the phenomenological and the
tracking views. Although several objections can be raised to both
accounts, I argue in detail that they are not as implausible as their
opponents claim them to be.
THEORETICAL PHILOSOPHY COLLOQUIUM
Institute of Philosophy
Faculty of Humanities, Eotvos University
Room 208 Monday 4:00 PM Puskin u. 3, Budapest
Web site: http://philosophy.elte.hu/colloquium
!!! Notice that the location is:
Room 208, 2nd Floor, Building "i" (Puskin u. 3), Faculty of Humanities,
Eotvos University !!!
19 March 4:00 PM Room 208 (Puskin u. 3)
Gabor Kutrovatz
Department of History and Philosophy of Science, Eotvos University
Demarkacio-problema, hatarmunkalatok, publikus tudomanyfelfogas
(Demarcation problem, crossing borders, public understanding of science)
Abstract: http://philosophy.elte.hu/colloquium/2007/March/#3
___________________________________
The Colloquium is open to everyone, including students,
visitors, and faculty members from all departments and institutes!
Format of the colloquium: 60 minute lecture, 10 minute break, followed
by a 30-60 minute discussion.The language of presentation is English or
Hungarian.
A printable poster is available from here:
http://philosophy.elte.hu/colloquium/2007/March/poster.pdf
Please feel free to post it in your institution!
The organizer of the colloquium: Laszlo E. Szabo
(leszabo(a)philosophy.elte.hu)
--
L a s z l o E. S z a b o
Theoretical Physics Research Group of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences
Department of History and Philosophy of Science
Eotvos University, Budapest
http://philosophy.elte.hu/leszabo
György Gergely
Institute for Psychological Research
Hungarian Academy of Sciences
*Learning 'about' versus learning 'from other minds: *
*The role of ostensive cues in triggering pedagogical knowledge transfer
in human infants***
Tuesday, 6 March, 2007, 5 PM
CEU Department of Philosophy, 1051 Budapest, ZrÃnyi u. 14, 4th floor,
rm. 412.**
* Abstract*
By the end of their first year human infants start to exhibit a number
of species-unique social cognitive competences (such as social
referencing, imitative learning of novel means, or proto-declarative
pointing) that involve triadic interactions in ostensive communicative
cuing contexts. The currently dominant interpretation of these early
social-cognitive phenomena assumes that their primary function is to
serve /social motives/ (such as intersubjective sharing of mental
states). In this talk I shall contrast this view with an alternative
interpretation based on the theory of human 'pedagogy' (Csibra &
Gergely, 2006; Gergely & Csibra, 2005, 2006) which assumes that
ostensively cued triadic interactions serve primarily the /epistemic
/function of transferring new and relevant cultural knowledge about
referents to infants. The theory argues that others' referential
manifestations during triadic interactions are typically framed by
specific types of /ostensive-communicative cues/ for which infants show
early sensitivity and preference. These include eye-contact, contingent
turn-taking reactivity, the prosodic intonation pattern of motherese,/
/and/ /addressing infants by their own name/./ Such ostensive cues
trigger in infants the interpretation that the other exhibits a
communicative intention addressed to them to manifest new and relevant
information for them to fast learn about the referent. It is
hypothesized that ostensive cues can act as an 'interpretation switch'
directing infants to construe others' referential knowledge
manifestations as pedagogical 'teaching' events. I shall review recent
evidence from studies of relevance-guided selective imitative learning
and of infants' differential interpretation of others' referential
emotion expressions during the second year that provide convergent
empirical support for the hypothesized interpretation-modulating role of
ostensive cuing in early infancy.
THEORETICAL PHILOSOPHY COLLOQUIUM
Institute of Philosophy
Faculty of Humanities, Eotvos University
Room 208 Monday 4:00 PM Puskin u. 3, Budapest
Web site: http://philosophy.elte.hu/colloquium
!!! Notice that the location is:
Room 208, 2nd Floor, Building "i" (Puskin u. 3), Faculty of Humanities,
Eotvos University !!!
12 March 4:00 PM Room 208 (Puskin u. 3)
Miklos Marton
Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Law and Political Sciences
Eotvos University
A mentalis antirealizmus eselyei
(Perspectives of mental anti-realism)
Abstract: http://philosophy.elte.hu/colloquium/2007/March/#2
___________________________________
The Colloquium is open to everyone, including students,
visitors, and faculty members from all departments and institutes!
Format of the colloquium: 60 minute lecture, 10 minute break, followed
by a 30-60 minute discussion.The language of presentation is English or
Hungarian.
A printable poster is available from here:
http://philosophy.elte.hu/colloquium/2007/March/poster.pdf
Please feel free to post it in your institution!
The organizer of the colloquium: Laszlo E. Szabo
(leszabo(a)philosophy.elte.hu)
--
L a s z l o E. S z a b o
Theoretical Physics Research Group of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences
Department of History and Philosophy of Science
Eotvos University, Budapest
http://philosophy.elte.hu/leszabo
THEORETICAL PHILOSOPHY COLLOQUIUM
Institute of Philosophy
Faculty of Humanities, Eotvos University
Room 208 Monday 4:00 PM Puskin u. 3, Budapest
Web site: http://philosophy.elte.hu/colloquium
!!! Notice that the location is:
Room 208, 2nd Floor, Building "i" (Puskin u. 3), Faculty of Humanities,
Eotvos University !!!
5 March 4:00 PM Room 208 (Puskin u. 3)
Janos Laszlo Farkas
Institute for Philosophical Research
Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest
Megjeleno mozgas es igaz mozgas
(Apparent motion vs. true motion)
Abstract: http://philosophy.elte.hu/colloquium/2007/March/#1
___________________________________
The Colloquium is open to everyone, including students,
visitors, and faculty members from all departments and institutes!
Format of the colloquium: 60 minute lecture, 10 minute break, followed
by a 30-60 minute discussion.The language of presentation is English or
Hungarian.
A printable poster is available from here:
http://philosophy.elte.hu/colloquium/2007/March/poster.pdf
Please feel free to post it in your institution!
The organizer of the colloquium: Laszlo E. Szabo
(leszabo(a)philosophy.elte.hu)
--
L a s z l o E. S z a b o
Theoretical Physics Research Group of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences
Department of History and Philosophy of Science
Eotvos University, Budapest
http://philosophy.elte.hu/leszabo
The CEU Department of Philosophy cordially invites you to a talk
by
Gergely Ambrus (University of Miskolc)
on
'(Indirect) Arguments for a Structuralist Realist Account of
Consciousness'
5.00 PM, Tuesday, 27 February, Zrinyi 14, Room 412
Abstract
"In the lecture I survey the most important naturalist views about
consciousness, i.e. (1) analytic behaviorism/functionalism; (2)
eliminativism; (3) type-identity with pure belief theory; (4)
supervenient
materialism with logical supervenience (a priori materialism); (5)
supervenient materialism with strong metaphysical supervenience (a
posteriori materialism); (6) structuralist realist materialism, and
(7)
naturalist dualism. I shall argue that among these it is only
(epistemic)
structural realist materialism that can be squared with two plausible
assumptions, namely that we are not zombies, and that there are no
strong
metaphysical necessities."
Kriszta Biber
Department Coordinator
Philosophy Department
Tel: 36-1-327-3806
Fax: 36-1-327-3072
E-mail: biberk(a)ceu.hu
The CEU Department of Philosophy cordially invites you to a talk
by
Gergely Ambrus (University of Miskolc)
on
'(Indirect) Arguments for a Structuralist Realist Account of
Consciousness'
5.00 PM, Tuesday, 27 February, Zrinyi 14, Room 412
Abstract
"In the lecture I survey the most important naturalist views about
consciousness, i.e. (1) analytic behaviorism/functionalism; (2)
eliminativism; (3) type-identity with pure belief theory; (4)
supervenient
materialism with logical supervenience (a priori materialism); (5)
supervenient materialism with strong metaphysical supervenience (a
posteriori materialism); (6) structuralist realist materialism, and
(7)
naturalist dualism. I shall argue that among these it is only
(epistemic)
structural realist materialism that can be squared with two plausible
assumptions, namely that we are not zombies, and that there are no
strong
metaphysical necessities."
