The next talk in the Cognitive Development Center seminar series at
the CEU will be given by
Agnes Lukacs (Cognitive Science, BME)
Title:
Motor Organization, Sequence Learning and Language Development
Date and time:
Wednesday, 28 October 2009, 5.00 pm
CEU Cognitive Development Center
Hattyuhaz, Level 3, Hattyu u. 14., 1015 Budapest
Map:
http://maps.google.com/maps?q=1015+Budapest,+Budapest,+Hattyu+utca+14,+Hung…
Everyone is welcome to attend.
Our seminars start on time and we may not be able to let latecomers in.
---
Gergely Csibra
The CEU Philosophy Department cordially invites you to a talk
(as part of its Departmental Colloquium series)
by
Michelle Montague (University of Bristol)
on
The Access Problem
Tuesday, 27 October 2009, 4.30 PM, Zrinyi 14, Room 412
ABSTRACT
We enter into many mental states which involve intentional relations
with objects. What mechanism determines which objects our mental states
are of or about? I call this the ‘access problem’. I argue that
there is at least one ineliminable ‘internal’ condition on mental
access to objects, in addition to whatever ‘external’ conditions
there may be.
Kriszta Biber
Department Coordinator
Philosophy Department
Tel: 36-1-327-3806
Fax: 36-1-327-3072
E-mail: biberk(a)ceu.hu
CEU President and Rector John Shattuck and the Department of Philosophy
are pleased to invite you to
the first event of
an important series of lectures and workshops
in the week of 26 - 30 October.
Leading international academics and public intellectuals
comment on a wide range of topics.
Event One:
Monday 26th October Prof. Colin McGinn - Two Types of Science
Time: 11.00 a.m. - 12.00 p.m.
Venue: CEU Auditorium (Nador u. 9.)
(Followed by Q&A and reception.)
Chair: Howard Robinson, Provost and Academic Pro-Rector, CEU
Colin McGinn is a British philosopher currently working at the
University of Miami. McGinn has also held major teaching positions at
the Oxford University and Rutgers University. He is best known for his
work in the philosophy of mind, though he has written on topics across
the breadth of modern philosophy. Chief among his works intended for a
general audience is the intellectual memoir The Making of a Philosopher:
My Journey Through Twentieth-Century Philosophy (2002). Colin’s
lecture "Two Types of Science" deals with the nature of our knowledge in
the physical and the natural sciences. It argues that the knowledge is
different in the two cases, with knowledge of physics being in some
respects inferior to knowledge of psychology. Physics is not the
epistemological paradigm it is often supposed to be. I also discuss the
nature of the knowledge obtained in biology and philosophy.
The next talk in the Cognitive Development Center seminar series at
the CEU will be given by
Levente Littvay (Political Science, CEU)
Title:
Genetic Covariation between Survey Response Style and Personality: A
twins study
Date and time:
Wednesday, 21 October 2009, 5.00 pm
CEU Cognitive Development Center
Hattyuhaz, Level 3, Hattyu u. 14., 1015 Budapest
Map:
http://maps.google.com/maps?q=1015+Budapest,+Budapest,+Hattyu+utca+14,+Hung…
Everyone is welcome to attend.
Our seminars start on time and we may not be able to let latecomers in.
---
Gergely Csibra
The CEU Philosophy Department cordially invites you to a talk
(as part of its Departmental Colloquium series)
by
David Weberman (CEU)
on
A Defense of Anachronistic History of Philosophy
Tuesday, 20 October 2009, 4.30 PM, Zrinyi 14, Room 412
ABSTRACT
As part of a larger project on interpretation, this paper deals with
the nature of interpreting the history of philosophy. Past philosophical
texts often involve questions, assumptions, motivations, strategies,
vocabularies, and styles different from those of the present. The
question is what we should say or do about this sometimes large chasm
between the past and the present. Should we understand older texts in
their terms (antiquarianism, also called historical reconstruction) or
in ours (presentism, also called rational reconstruction)? Can we choose
between the two and must we? I argue against Quentin Skinner’s
meta-interpretive antiquarianism (my term), which says that
antiquarianism is the only proper way to interpret texts. The point of
this argument is to show that texts admit multiple, non-convergent
interpretations.
Kriszta Biber
Department Coordinator
Philosophy Department
Tel: 36-1-327-3806
Fax: 36-1-327-3072
E-mail: biberk(a)ceu.hu
The Opening Conference of the Cognitive Development Center at CEU
Central European University, Budapest
January 15-16, 2010
The speakers of the conference are:
- Susan Carey (Harvard)
- Mark Johnson (Birkbeck, London)
- Alan Leslie (Rutgers)
- Dan Sperber (Institut Jean Nicod, Paris)
- Josh Tenenbaum (MIT)
- Mike Tomasello (MPI EVA, Leipzig)
and the hosts:
- Gergely Csibra (CEU)
- György Gergely (CEU)
Registration is now open. Poster submissions are accepted until
November 1.
To register, go to
http://web.ceu.hu/phil/cogdev/cdc_opening_2010
Dear All,
Colin McGinn will give a lecture on 'Two Types of Science', in the CEU Auditorium (Nador 9 building) between 11 and 12 on Monday 26 October.
It will be followed by a questions and answers session, and a reception. I'll be chairing.
Colin McGinn is a major philosopher, especially distinguished in the philosophy of mind.
He has held post at the universities of London, Oxford, Rutgers and now Miami.
Best wishes,
Howard
Howard Robinson
University Professor in Philosophy
Provost and Academic Pro-Rector
Tel: +36-1-328-3490
email: robinson(a)ceu.hu
www.ceu.hu
The CEU Philosophy Department cordially invites you to a talk (as part
of its Departmental Colloquium series)
by
Martin Schmidt (Matej Bel University)
on
Esfeld's account of structural realism and causation
Tuesday, 13 October 2009, 4.30 PM, Zrinyi 14, Room 412
ABSTRACT
One of the arguments against ontic structural realism (OSR) is that it
can’t explain causation. The critics claim that causation is rooted in
objects but an appeal to objects is inconsistent with a structuralist
position. In his recent defense of OSR, M. Esfeld puts forward a
proposal according to which causal powers are built directly into
relations and, therefore, promises us to shed a structuralist light on
causality. However, Esfeld combines causal view of relations with his
moderate version of OSR that, in order to avoid some conceptual
difficulties, contains a structural view of objects. The aim is to
demonstrate that this account faces a dilemma and that an attempt to
resolve it reveals further difficulties that question a position of
moderate OSR as a real alternative to, for instance, radical OSR or the
bundle theory.
Kriszta Biber
Department Coordinator
Philosophy Department
Tel: 36-1-327-3806
Fax: 36-1-327-3072
E-mail: biberk(a)ceu.hu