Kedves Kollégák, Érdeklődők!
Az *Autizmus Világnapja* alkalmából az *ELTE Bárczi Gusztáv Gyógypedagógiai
Kara* szeretettel várja Önöket, az idén is megrendezésre kerülő *"Dialógusok
az autizmusról"* szakmai rendezvényén.
A konferencia témája: Az autizmus és a digitális technológiai perspektívák
A pontos program, időpont és helyszín a csatolt fájlban található.
Kérjük, továbbítsa meghívónkat azoknak, akiknek érdeklődését felkeltheti
konferenciánk.
Üdvözlettel,
Dr. Stefanik Krisztina
tudományos és nemzetközi ügyekért felelős dékánhelyettes
ELTE Bárczi Gusztáv Gyógypedagógiai Kar
*MEGHÍVÓ*
A *Társas-Kognitív Nyelvészeti Kutatócsoport, *
valamint a *DAB Nyelvtudományi Munkabizottsága*
és a *Debreceni Egyetem BTK Hallgatói Önkormányzata*
meghívja
*Csányi Vilmos*(MTA)
*Az emberi kommunikáció evolúciója*
című előadására
*Helyszín: *MTA Debreceni Területi Bizottság (DAB) székháza (Debrecen,
Thomas Mann u. 49. <http://mnytud.arts.unideb.hu/tkny/de-dab_map.html>), I.
emelet "C" terem (Kis előadó)
*Időpont: *2014. március 24. (hétfő) 16:00
Az ember az együttműködő, nyelvet beszélő, azonos hiedelmeket elfogadó és
csoportjainak szerveződését együttesen elhatározó komplex közösségek
létrehozásával vált ki az állatvilágból. Ennek a hosszú, sok millió éves
folyamatnak a főbb állomásait már elég jól körvonalazták az ezzel
foglalkozó tudományok. Az állatok kommunikációja nem hasonlít az emberi
nyelvre, csupán néhány értelmezhető jelet tartalmaz, amelyek természetesen
fontos szerepet játszanak az állatcsoportok életében. Az állati elme zárt
rendszer. Az emberi nyelv viszont nemcsak jelek adására képes, hanem
gondolatok cseréjére is. Az ember elméje ezért nyitott és számtalan
konstrukciós folyamat segítője, amelyekre az állatvilágban nem találunk
példát. Evolúciós kialakulására csak a közösségek kialakulását segítő
összetett folyamatok vizsgálatával nyerhetünk bepillantást.
Az előadásokon minden érdeklődőt örömmel lát a Társas-Kognitív Nyelvészeti
Kutatócsoport, a DAB Nyelvtudományi Munkabizottsága és DE BTK Hallgatói
Önkormányzata.
Debrecen, 2014. március 20.
Kis Tamás
Fehér Krisztina
Tóth Valéria
Szikszai Tamás
A Társas-Kognitív Nyelvészeti Kutatócsoport alapító tagjai
A DAB Nyelvtudományi Munkabizottságának elnöke
A DE BTK Hallgatói Önkormányzat elnöke
Ha előadás-sorozatunk vagy kutatásaink felkeltették érdeklődését,
látogasson el honlapunkra (http://mnytud.arts.unideb.hu/tkny), és
regisztráljon hírlevelünkre (
https://mail.unideb.hu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tarskogny), vagy
csatlakozzon Facebook-oldalunkhoz (https://www.facebook.com/tarskogny),
hogy a későbbiekben is értesítést kapjon előadásainkról, publikációinkról.
Begin forwarded message:
>
>
> Dear Colleagues,
>
> We would like to draw your attention to a one-week summer school on
> infant language development that takes place this July in Potsdam.
> We are pleased to offer the following four courses:
>
> Krista Byers-Heinlein: Bilingual Language Acquisition
> Nivedita Mani: Word Recognition and Lexical Representations
> Luca Bonatti: Words and Structural Properties of Language
> Caroline Junge: Methods in Infant Language Research
>
> This summer school is intended to bring together students as well as
> post-doc researchers working on infant language acquisition in Europe.
> Participants should have at least a BA degree in linguistics,
> psychology, or a related field. In addition to the courses, a social
> activity day will provide the opportunity to exchange ideas and share
> experiences.
>
> Registration is open until mid-April. Please note that the number of
> participants is limited to 40.
> We also offer inexpensive accommodation in two hostels in Potsdam.
> More information is available on the ISOLDE website.
>
> Host institution: Universität Potsdam
> Tuition: 100.00 EUR
> Dates: 07-Jul-2014 - 11-Jul-2014 (Mon - Fri)
> Online registration: www.uni-potsdam.de/isolde/registration
> Registration deadline: 15-Apr
> Contact: isolde2014(a)uni-potsdam.de
> Website: www.uni-potsdam.de/isolde
>
> Kind regards,
>
> Katalin Tamasi
>
> ---
> On behalf of the ISOLDE organizing team
>
> Natalie Boll-Avetisyan
> Katalin Tamási
> Tom Fritzsche
>
> University of Potsdam
> Department of Linguistics
> Karl-Liebknecht-Str. 24-25
> 14476 Potsdam
> Germany
>
> isolde2014(a)uni-potsdam.de
> www.uni-potsdam.de/isolde
The CEU Department of Philosophy cordially invites you to a talk
(as part of its Departmental Colloquium series)
by
Pierre Jacob (Institut Jean Nicod, Paris) on
`Assessing radical sophisticated embodiment`
Tuesday, 25 March, 2014, 5.30 PM, Zrinyi 14, Room 412
ABSTRACT
Several related though distinct questions have been raised in recent
philosophy of mind and cognitive science: what makes an individual’s
mind or cognition embodied, situated, grounded, embedded, enactive, and
extended? I’ll focus on the first question: what makes an individual’s
mind embodied? I’ll argue for the following distinctions: embodiment can
be uncontroversial or controversial. Controversial embodiment can be
moderate or radical. Controversial radical embodiment can be crude or
sophisticated. For the purpose of clarifying this last distinction, I
will introduce the doctrine of Cartesian materialism construed as the
conjunction of (i) the computational representational approach to the
mind and mental processes, (ii) the Fodorian trichotomy and (iii)
neurocentrism. I shall examine the respective costs of rejecting each
conjunct and examine the question how radical sophisticated embodiment
relates to the extended mind.
The CEU Department of Philosophy cordially invites you to a talk
(as part of its Departmental Colloquium series)
by
Ryan Cook (CEU)
on
"The Works and Attributes of Soul: A Non-Functionalist Interpretation of Cognitive Contents in Aristotle's De Anima I"
Tuesday, 18 March, 2014, 5.30 PM, Zrinyi 14, Room 412
ABSTRACT
Over the past forty years, it has been increasingly common for scholars of the De Anima to treat Aristotle as a sort of proto-functionalist. On such an interpretation, the Aristotelian souls of living organisms explain psychological activities such as perception, emotion, and desire by subsuming them within the wider context of an organism's purposive behaviours, and all genuinely scientific definitions of these activities will eschew references to private mental contents in favour of functional roles occupied by a variety of material realizers. In this way, it is claimed, Aristotle avoids the traditional pitfalls associated with Platonic Dualism, and provides a uniquely hylomorphic solution to the mind-body problem. Since all putatively psychic states are in fact only bodily states understood in a certain way, there is no question as to how such psychic states might be capable of causing or being produced by various physical changes, and no need to posit a sui generis realm of psychic or mental contents.
I believe we have several reasons to reject this proto-functionalist interpretation, and take
Aristotle's considered explanations of various cognitive activities to require precisely the sorts of irreducibly psychic or mental states it intends to eliminate. In this talk, I will examine some of these reasons, and offer a close reading of two De Anima I passages that are standardly held to require such proto-functionalist construals. When read in their proper context, I shall claim, neither of these texts demands the sorts of reductionist readings favoured by contemporary interpreters, and each in fact contains claims and arguments which suggest the ontologically richer account I favour.
>
>
> RESUS - REpetition SUppression SUmmer School
> 08.09.2014-12.09.2014, Jena, Germany
> REGISTRATION IS NOW OPEN; PROGRAM IS AVAILABLE ONLINE
> One of the most robust experience-dependent adjustments of neural function is repetition suppression (RS): the rapid reduction of neural responses caused by the repetition (or prolonged prior presentation) of a given stimulus. RS is a robust and reliable neural phenomenon that clearly shows the plastic changes of the CNS. In spite of the broad interest and intensive studying no consensus has been reached regarding the neural mechanisms of RS as of today. The aim of RESUS is to bring together eminent researchers from the USA, the UK, and Europe with students of a broad range of disciplines to teach and discuss current views on RS. The speakers are experts in clinical, computational, single-cell, EEG/MEG/ERP, TMS and fMRI studies. We expect that RESUS will give a unique opportunity to present, discuss, and integrate cutting-edge research on this important phenomenon of the CNS.
> 1 intensive week of training with 20 speakers from 8 countries for 40 students as a maximum
> The Friedrich Schiller University, Jena organizes a Summer School aimed at PhD students and post-docs at the early stages in their careers. Places are limited to ensure good interaction in classes.
> RESUS will take place at the Friedrich Schiller University, Jena, Germany between 08 September and 12 September 2014. It will consist of an intensive week of lectures with two keynotes, a student-oriented poster session and a round-table discussion. Lecturers are renowned researchers from the most active research groups in their fields. A list of invited lecturers and the program of the summer school are available on summer school website:
> http://www.cogsci.uni-jena.de/RESUS.html
> In addition to the academic content, RESUS provides a networking opportunity for students to interact with their peers, and to make contacts among those who will be the active researchers of their own generation.
> § Important Dates:
> Registration is open from now.
> Registration deadline: 31 May 2014.
> Summer school: Monday 08 September - Friday 12 September 2014
> Registration fee: 100 Euro.
> It includes all sessions and materials, accommodation (6 nights), refreshments and coffee, finger-foods and wine during poster session and round table discussion, Summer School Dinner.
> Confirmed Speakers: (in alphabetical order)
> Bunzeck N Hamburg, D
> Deco G Barcelona, E
> Grill-Spector K Stanford, CA, US (keynote speaker)
> Friston K London, UK (keynote speaker)
> Kiebel S Jena, D
> Kammer T Ulm, D
> Kohn A New York, USA
> Kovács G Jena, D
> Krekelberg B Newark, USA
> De Lange F Nijmegen, NL
> Obermayer K Berlin, D
> Rossion B Louvain, B
> Schwarzbach J Trento, I
> Schweinberger S Jena, D
> Summerfield C Oxford, UK
> Thiel C Oldenburg, D
> Valentini E Roma, I
> Vidnyánszky Z Budapest, H
> Vogels R Leuven, B
> Weigelt S Bochum, D
>
>
>
---
Gyula Kovács, D.Sc.
Professor of Cognitive Neuroscience Institute of Psychology
Friedrich-Schiller-University of Jena Leutragraben 1
07743 Jena
Germany
Tel: 03641945936
http://www.cogsci.uni-jena.de/
---
Dept.Cognitive Sciences
Budapest Univ. Technology and Economics
Hungary H-1111 Egry J. u 1. T.ep. V.em
T:0036-1463-1176
F:00361463-1072
THEORETICAL PHILOSOPHY FORUM
Institute of Philosophy
Faculty of Humanities, Eötvös University
Address: Múzeum krt. 4/i, Budapest
19 March (Wednesday) 5:00 PM Room 226
Péter Mekis
Department of Logic, Institute of Philosophy
Eötvös University, Budapest
Frege and the Problem of Understanding
__________________________________
Abstracts and printable program (poster) are available from the web
site of the Forum: http://phil.elte.hu/tpf (Please feel free to post
the program in your institution!)
The Forum is open to everyone, including students, visitors, and faculty
members from all departments and institutes! Format: 60 minute lecture,
coffee break, 60 minute discussion.
The organizer of the Forum: László E. Szabó
(leszabo(a)phil.elte.hu)
--
L a s z l o E. S z a b o
Professor of Philosophy
DEPARTMENT OF LOGIC, INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY
EOTVOS UNIVERSITY, BUDAPEST
http://phil.elte.hu/leszabo
Megjelent a Typotex Kiadónál ingyenesen letölthető elektronikus változatban
A Pszichológiai örök témái c. könyvem, mely témák köré szervezett történeti
bevezető tankönyv a modern pszichológiába.
http://www.interkonyv.hu/konyvek/pleh_a_pszichologia_orok_temai
The CEU Department of Philosophy cordially invites you to a talk
(as part of its Departmental Colloquium series)
by
Ryan Cook (CEU)
on
"The Works and Attributes of Soul: A Non-Functionalist Interpretation of Cognitive Contents in Aristotle's De Anima I"
Tuesday, 18 March, 2014, 5.30 PM, Zrinyi 14, Room 412
ABSTRACT
Over the past forty years, it has been increasingly common for scholars of the De Anima to treat Aristotle as a sort of proto-functionalist. On such an interpretation, the Aristotelian souls of living organisms explain psychological activities such as perception, emotion, and desire by subsuming them within the wider context of an organism's purposive behaviours, and all genuinely scientific definitions of these activities will eschew references to private mental contents in favour of functional roles occupied by a variety of material realizers. In this way, it is claimed, Aristotle avoids the traditional pitfalls associated with Platonic Dualism, and provides a uniquely hylomorphic solution to the mind-body problem. Since all putatively psychic states are in fact only bodily states understood in a certain way, there is no question as to how such psychic states might be capable of causing or being produced by various physical changes, and no need to posit a sui generis realm of psychic or mental contents.
I believe we have several reasons to reject this proto-functionalist interpretation, and take
Aristotle's considered explanations of various cognitive activities to require precisely the sorts of irreducibly psychic or mental states it intends to eliminate. In this talk, I will examine some of these reasons, and offer a close reading of two De Anima I passages that are standardly held to require such proto-functionalist construals. When read in their proper context, I shall claim, neither of these texts demands the sorts of reductionist readings favoured by contemporary interpreters, and each in fact contains claims and arguments which suggest the ontologically richer account I favour.
The CEU Department of Philosophy cordially invites you to a talk
(as part of its Departmental Colloquium series)
by
Ernest Sosa (Rutgers University)
on
"The Unity of Action, Perception, and Knowledge."
Tuesday, 11 March, 2014, 5.30 PM, Zrinyi 14, Room 412
ABSTRACT
“The Unity of Action, Perception, and Knowledge” places virtue
epistemology within a broader project of metaphysical, semantic, and
conceptual analysis that targets human attainments more generally,
whether they take the form of action, perception, or knowledge. We
consider the problem of causal deviance as it arises for Donald
Davidson’s account of intentional action, and for our own account of
human knowledge, and we consider a similar problem for Paul Grice’s
causal analysis of perception. These can be viewed as metaphysical
analyses of their respective targets. Thus viewed they are defensible
against common objections—of either vicious circularity or insufficient
content—that have been thought lethal.
Those accounts are also defensible, moreover, against critiques that
have been thought to favor disjunctivist alternatives. Prominent such
critiques apply only to a specific, and optional, form of analysis:
namely, analysis into logically independent factors merely conjoined in
the analysis. To the contrary, metaphysical analyses can be causal
analyses that do not take that form. Action, perception, and knowledge
are all forms of manifested competence, where a competence is a
disposition to succeed in a given field of aimings—these being
performances with an aim—whether the aim be intentional and conscious,
or teleological and functional.
In conclusion, the chapter sketches a methodology appropriate for our
inquiry.