VI. Dubrovnik Conference on Cognitive Science
Language and Conceptual Development
22-24 May 2014
Dubrovnik, Croatia
Participants are invited to submit their work as a poster (max 200 word abstracts)
Submission deadline: February 17th
Chairs: Judit Gervain & Ágnes Melinda Kovács
Invited speakers
Lisa Feigenson and Justin Halberda
Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, USA
Alex Cristia and Emmanuel Dupoux
Laboratoire de Science Cognitive et Psycholinguistique, ENS-CNRS-EHESS, Paris, France
Nuria Sebastian Galles and Luca Bonatti
Center for Brain and Cognition, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona, Spain
Gergely Csibra and György Gergely
Department of Cognitive Science, Central European University, Budapest, Hungary
Special Session: ERC information Symposium
Panelists: Nuria Sebastian Galles, Emmanuel Dupoux, Csaba Pléh, Gergely Csibra, György Gergely, Ágnes Melinda Kovács
Financial aid available for a limited number of students from Central and Eastern Europe on the basis of the quality of their abstracts.
Early bird registration deadline: March 15th
For more information visit: http://www.cecog.eu/ducog/page_invitation.php
The CEU Department of Philosophy cordially invites you to a talk
(as part of its Departmental Colloquium series)
by
Peter Adamson (LMU Munich)
on
The Five Eternals: the Shocking Cosmology of a 10th Century Muslim Platonist
Tuesday, 18 February, 2014, 5.30 PM, Zrinyi 14, Room 412
ABSTRACT
Among early philosophers in the Islamic world, none is more notorious than Abu Bakr al-Razi (d.925). An expert doctor, he also put forward philosophical ideas that brought accusations of heresy. It's easy to see why: he supposedly denied the validity of prophecy and postulated four eternal principles other than God, namely soul, matter, time and place.
In this presentation I will introduce al-Razi's thought and focus on his innovative cosmology, showing how it draws on sources in Plato's "Timaeus".
Dear all,
The next talk in the CEU Cognitive Science seminar series will by given by:
*Ildikó Király **(ELTE**).*
Date: Wednesday, February 12, 2014, 5 PM
Location: Cognitive Development Center, Hattyú u. 14, 3rd floor
*Title:* Episodic memory: an early available or an emergent complex
capability of humans?
In this talk I would like to summarize research and debate on early
declarative memory competencies: whether young infants can form episodic
memories. First, I will introduce the dispute on how episodic memory is
defined. Taking Tulving's definition, I plan to show that research with
imitation-like methodology cannot be conclusive in this field.
Additionally, I'll present a novel set of relational memory studies and
preliminary data that could highlight that recollective mnemonic processes
(episodic recall) include higher order, top-down processes that emerge
later in development.
PLEASE NOTE: Our seminar room has a limited capacity. Please arrive early
to ensure you get a seat. The talk will begin promptly at 5.
Cognitive Science Events at CEU: http://cognitivescience.ceu.hu/events
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THEORETICAL PHILOSOPHY FORUM
Institute of Philosophy
Faculty of Humanities, Eötvös University
Address: Múzeum krt. 4/i, Budapest
February Program
19 February (Wednesday) 5:00 PM Room 226
Gábor Borbély
Department of Ancient and Medieval Philosophy
Institute of Philosophy, Eötvös University, Budapest
Mi a vallás? Evolúciós magyarázatok
(What is religion? Evolutionary explanations)
26 February (Wednesday) 5:00 PM Room 226
Judit Szalai
Department of Modern Philosophy, Institute of Philosophy
Eötvös University, Budapest
Agency and Mental States in Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder
__________________________________
Abstracts and printable program (poster) are available from the web
site of the Forum: http://phil.elte.hu/tpf (Please feel free to post
the program in your institution!)
The Forum is open to everyone, including students, visitors, and faculty
members from all departments and institutes! Format: 60 minute lecture,
coffee break, 60 minute discussion.
The organizer of the Forum: László E. Szabó
(leszabo(a)phil.elte.hu)
--
L a s z l o E. S z a b o
Professor of Philosophy
DEPARTMENT OF LOGIC, INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY
EOTVOS UNIVERSITY, BUDAPEST
http://phil.elte.hu/leszabo
--
L a s z l o E. S z a b o
Professor of Philosophy
DEPARTMENT OF LOGIC, INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY
EOTVOS UNIVERSITY, BUDAPEST
http://phil.elte.hu/leszabo
Dear all,
The next talk in the CEU Cognitive Science seminar series will by given by:
*Ildikó Király **(ELTE**).*
Date: Wednesday, February 12, 2014, 5 PM
Location: Cognitive Development Center, Hattyú u. 14, 3rd floor
*Title:* Episodic memory: an early available or an emergent complex
capability of humans?
In this talk I would like to summarize research and debate on early
declarative memory competencies: whether young infants can form episodic
memories. First, I will introduce the dispute on how episodic memory is
defined. Taking Tulving's definition, I plan to show that research with
imitation-like methodology cannot be conclusive in this field.
Additionally, I'll present a novel set of relational memory studies and
preliminary data that could highlight that recollective mnemonic processes
(episodic recall) include higher order, top-down processes that emerge
later in development.
PLEASE NOTE: Our seminar room has a limited capacity. Please arrive early
to ensure you get a seat. The talk will begin promptly at 5.
Cognitive Science Events at CEU: http://cognitivescience.ceu.hu/events
_______________________________________________
Subscribe by sending an empty mail to seminars-subscribe(a)cdc.ceu.hu
Unsubscribe by sending an empty mail to seminars-unsubscribe(a)cdc.ceu.hu
_______________________________________________
Subscribe by sending an empty mail to seminars-subscribe(a)cdc.ceu.hu
Unsubscribe by sending an empty mail to seminars-unsubscribe(a)cdc.ceu.hu
The CEU Department of Philosophy cordially invites you to a talk
(as part of its Departmental Colloquium series)
by
Ferenc Huoranszki (CEU)
on
`Hume and Humean Supervenience`
Tuesday, 11 February, 2014, 5.30 PM, Zrinyi 14, Room 412
ABSTRACT
According to a thesis that David Lewis calls Humean supervenience ‘all
else supervenes on the spatiotemporal arrangement of local qualities
throughout all of history, past and present and future’. Local qualities
are understood as ‘perfectly natural intrinsic properties which need no
bigger than a point at which to be instantiated’. Humean supervenience
aims to express the logically or metaphysically necessary connection
between properties at the ‘fundamental level’ and all other properties,
including objects’ dispositions, powers and sensible qualities. I shall
argue that Humean supervenience so understood is not consistent with
Hume’s own metaphysical outlook; and that this inconsistency is not only
of historical interest: it reveals an essential tension in contemporary
Humean metaphysics.
The CEU Department of Philosophy cordially invites you to a talk
(as part of its Departmental Colloquium series)
by
Ulrike Heuer (Leeds)
on
`Acting intentionally`
Tuesday, 4 February, 2014, 5.30 PM, Zrinyi 14, Room 412
ABSTRACT
Generally reasons to act in a certain way are also reasons to form an
intention to do so, some philosophers think. At any rate, the fact that
it would be good to have an intention when there is nothing to be said
for acting as intended is no reason for forming an intention (or
alternatively: it is a reason, but we can’t follow it). Intentions are
like beliefs in that they cannot be formed for state-given reasons.
However, according to an influential account of intentions – Bratman’s
planning conception – intentions enable coordination with oneself and
others. Intentions are useful in that regard. Thus the reasons for
forming them would appear to be instrumental reasons of a certain kind –
not unlike state-given reasons. There is a tension between the two
approaches. I will argue that while the instrumental view of reasons to
intend holds at least a partial truth, the symmetry claim of reasons to
believe and reasons to intend misunderstands the dependence of
intentions on reasons to act.