The CEU Philosophy Department cordially invites you to a talk (as part
of its Departmental Colloquium series)
by
Ferenc Huoranszki (CEU)
on
The Contingency of Causal Relations
Tuesday,2 December, 5.30 PM, Zrinyi 14, Room 412
One of the most puzzling issues about causation is its modal character.
On the one hand, causation makes the occurrence of certain events
non-accidental and it supports the truth of the corresponding
counterfactuals, both of which imply that the relation between cause and
effect is not contingent. On the other hand, most philosophers have been
persuaded by Hume’s arguments that causal relations are contingent.
Traditional answers to the puzzle assume either - as Hume did - that
‘necessity is not in the objects’ or, alternatively, that there are
different sorts of necessities and hence, although causation is
contingent in one sense (in the sense of ‘absolute’ or ‘metaphysical’
necessity), it can be nevertheless necessary in another ‘nomological’
sense. The first solution is, however, unbelievable to most of us,
whereas the second has never managed to provide a non-circular account
of the notion of nomological necessity as distinct from the metaphysical
one.
In the talk I shall suggest a different understanding of the
contingency of causal relations that may account for all the Humean
insights without endorsing Humean metaphysics. In arguing against the
view that causal relations are necessary Hume formulated two different
claims. On the one hand, he claimed that there is not a necessary
connection between certain powers and (different species of) objects. On
the other hand, he argued that we do not have an idea of powers which
imply necessary connection between distinct existences. The latter claim
is, however, too strong. It seems that we do have a notion of power-like
properties as functions from (kinds of) circumstances to (kinds of)
effects. If causal relations are indeed contingent, they are contingent
for a different reason. The reason is that causation is not always a
transitive relation. I shall argue that there is no single ‘yes or no’
answer to the question concerning the transitivity of causal relations
and that the issue of transitivity - contrary to what most Humeans hold
- is not independent of the issue of contingency. In fact, it is with
reference to intransitivity that we can explain in which sense causation
is contingent.
Kriszta Biber
Department Coordinator
Philosophy Department
Tel: 36-1-327-3806
Fax: 36-1-327-3072
E-mail: biberk(a)ceu.hu
The CEU Philosophy Department cordially invites you to a talk (as part
of its Departmental Colloquium series)
by
Ferenc Huoranszki (CEU)
on
The Contingency of Causal Relations
Tuesday,2 December, 5.30 PM, Zrinyi 14, Room 412
One of the most puzzling issues about causation is its modal character.
On the one hand, causation makes the occurrence of certain events
non-accidental and it supports the truth of the corresponding
counterfactuals, both of which imply that the relation between cause and
effect is not contingent. On the other hand, most philosophers have been
persuaded by Hume’s arguments that causal relations are contingent.
Traditional answers to the puzzle assume either - as Hume did - that
‘necessity is not in the objects’ or, alternatively, that there
are different sorts of necessities and hence, although causation is
contingent in one sense (in the sense of ‘absolute’ or
‘metaphysical’ necessity), it can be nevertheless necessary in
another ‘nomological’ sense. The first solution is, however,
unbelievable to most of us, whereas the second has never managed to
provide a non-circular account of the notion of nomological necessity as
distinct from the metaphysical one.
In the talk I shall suggest a different understanding of the
contingency of causal relations that may account for all the Humean
insights without endorsing Humean metaphysics. In arguing against the
view that causal relations are necessary Hume formulated two different
claims. On the one hand, he claimed that there is not a necessary
connection between certain powers and (different species of) objects. On
the other hand, he argued that we do not have an idea of powers which
imply necessary connection between distinct existences. The latter claim
is, however, too strong. It seems that we do have a notion of power-like
properties as functions from (kinds of) circumstances to (kinds of)
effects. If causal relations are indeed contingent, they are contingent
for a different reason. The reason is that causation is not always a
transitive relation. I shall argue that there is no single ‘yes or
no’ answer to the question concerning the transitivity of causal
relations and that the issue of transitivity - contrary to what most
Humeans hold - is not independent of the issue of contingency. In fact,
it is with reference to intransitivity that we can explain in which
sense causation is contingent.
Kriszta Biber
Department Coordinator
Philosophy Department
Tel: 36-1-327-3806
Fax: 36-1-327-3072
E-mail: biberk(a)ceu.hu
Wednesday 26 Nov, 4.30pm
Ádám Miklósi & Edina Pfandler (Ethology, ELTE)
Comprehension of pointing gestures in a comparative perspective:
The case of dogs and humans
Venue:
Room 137, Institute for Psychology, Hungarian Academy of Sciences
Victor Hugo u. 18-22, 1132 Budapest
Everyone is welcome to attend.
---
Gergely Csibra
THEORETICAL PHILOSOPHY FORUM
Institute of Philosophy
Faculty of Humanities, Eotvos University
Room 226 Monday 4:00 PM Muzeum krt. 4/i, Budapest
Web site: http://phil.elte.hu/tpf
1 December 4:00 PM Room 226
Marton Gomori
Department of Logic, Institute of Philosophy
Eotvos University, Budapest
Az elektrodinamika kovarianciaja – logikai-empirista rekonstrukcio
(Covariance of electrodynamics – a logico-empiricist reconstruction)
Abstract: http://phil.elte.hu/tpf/2008-2009/December/#1
___________________________________
The Forum is open to everyone, including students, visitors, and faculty
members from all departments and institutes!
Format: 60 minute lecture, 10 minute coffee break, followed by a 30-60
minute discussion. The language of presentation is English or Hungarian.
A printable poster is available from here:
http://phil.elte.hu/tpf/2008-2009/December/poster.pdf
Please feel free to post it in your institution!
The organizer of the Forum: Laszlo E. Szabo
(leszabo(a)phil.elte.hu)
--
L a s z l o E. S z a b o
Department of Logic, Institute of Philosophy
Faculty of Humanities, Eotvos University, Budapest
http://phil.elte.hu/leszabo
Kedves Kollegak,
Lionel Nowak (Cerveau & Cognition, CNRS Universite Paul Sabatier, Toulouse,
France, http://www.cerco.ups-tlse.fr/fr_vers/annuaire/lionel_nowak.htm)
<http://www.cerco.ups-tlse.fr/fr_vers/annuaire/caroline_fonta.htm>
alabbi eloadasra varunk minden erdeklodot december 2.-en kedden 14.00-kor a
SOTE Anatomia konyvtaraban (1094 Tűzoltó u. 58).
Mechanisms and consequences of contrast adaptation in the visual cortex
Reig, R. Gallego, R., Nowak, L. G., and Sanchez-Vives, M. V. (2006)
Impact of cortical network activity on short-term synaptic depression.
Cerebral Cortex 16, 688-695.
Descalzo, V. F., Nowak, L. G., Brumberg, J. C., McCormick, D. A. and
Sanchez-Vives, M. V. (2005) Slow adaptation in fast spiking neurons of
visual cortex. Journal of Neurophysiology 93, 1111-1118.
Nowak, L. G., Sanchez-Vives, M. V. and McCormick, D. A. (2005) Role of
synaptic and intrinsic membrane properties in short term receptive field
dynamics in cat area 17. Journal of Neuroscience 25, 1866-1880.
Sanchez-Vives, M. V., Nowak, L. G. and McCormick, D. A. (2000) Membrane
mechanisms underlying contrast adaptation in cat area 17 in vivo. Journal of
Neuroscience 20, 4267-4285.
Sanchez-Vives, M. V., Nowak, L. G. and McCormick, D. A. (2000) Cellular
mechanisms of long lasting adaptation in visual cortical neurons in vitro.
Journal of Neuroscience 20, 4286-4299.
udvozlettel,
Negyessy Laszlo
Neurobionics Research Group,
Hungarian Academy of Sciences -
Peter Pazmany Catholic University - Semmelweis University
Tuzolto u. 58
H-1094 Budapest
Hungary
Tel.: +36-12156920 ext. 53712
Fax: +36-12176937
E-mail: negyessy(a)ana.sote.hu,
negyessy(a)gmail.com
Kedves Kollegak,
Caroline Fonta (Cerveau & Cognition, CNRS Universite Paul Sabatier,
Toulouse, France, http://www.cerco.ups-tlse.fr/
<http://www.cerco.ups-tlse.fr/fr_vers/annuaire/caroline_fonta.htm>
fr_vers/annuaire/caroline_fonta.htm)
alabbi eloadasra varunk minden erdeklodot december 4.-en csutortokon
14.30-kor a SOTE Anatomi konyvtaraban (1094 Tűzoltó u. 58).
A 3D methodological approach to the study of intra-cortical vessel networks.
The organization of the cerebral micro-vascular network is an important
issue in various biological fields, considering clinical as well as
fundamental questions, such as normal and pathological vascularization,
functional brain imaging interpretation, stroke consequences, therapeutic
strategies or hemodynamic modelling. Investigations aiming at describing
postnatal angiogenesis, defining malignancy criteria in tumours or analysing
the effects of therapies need relevant structural parameters of the network
angiogenesis. However they have to face the complexity of the networks.
Classical methods have been used to describe vasculature and recent
promising techniques provide in vivo functional data. These powerful methods
present however some restrictions : small field of view, exploration of
cortical depth limited to a few hundreds of micrometres, information limited
to qualitative description. We present an alternative method developed to
image volumes as large as several tens of cube millimetres of cortical
tissue with a micro-metric resolution, by using x-ray micro-tomography. We
discuss the interest of the qualitative and quantitative data obtained,
focusing on the comparisons between vessel networks in newborn and adult
monkey cortex, and between normal and tumor brain tissue. This work results
from a tight collaboration between several disciplines (biology, dynamics of
fluids, physics, image analysis and statistics) and has been partly
published.
Plouraboué F, Cloetens P, Fonta C, Steyer A, Lauwers F, Marc-Vergnes JP.
2004. X-ray high-resolution vascular network imaging. J Microscopy 215(Pt
2):139-148.
Risser L, Plouraboué F, Steyer A, Cloetens P, Le Duc G, Fonta C. 2007. From
homogeneous to fractal normal and tumorous microvascular networks in the
brain. J Cereb Blood Flow Metab 27(2): 293-303.
Risser L, Plouraboué F, Descombes X (2008) Gap Filling of 3-D Microvascular
Networks by Tensor Voting IEEE Trans Med Imaging 27: 674-687.
Risser L, Plouraboué F, Cloetens P, Fonta C. 2008. A 3d-investigation shows
that angiogenesis in primate cerebral cortex mainly occurs at capillary
level. Int J Dev Neurosci (accepted for publication).
udvozlettel,
Negyessy Laszlo
Neurobionics Research Group,
Hungarian Academy of Sciences -
Peter Pazmany Catholic University - Semmelweis University
Tuzolto u. 58
H-1094 Budapest
Hungary
Tel.: +36-12156920 ext. 53712
Fax: +36-12176937
E-mail: negyessy(a)ana.sote.hu,
negyessy(a)gmail.com
The CEU Philosophy Department cordially invites you to a talk (as part
of its Departmental Colloquium series)
by
Andres Moles (Central European University)
on
Dworkin, Integrity and Hate Speakers
Tuesday, 25 November, 5.30 PM, Zrinyi 14, Room 412
ABSTRACT
In this paper I analyze three different arguments that Ronald Dworkin
has produced to defend the claim that restrictions on hate speech are
unjust. The focus of the paper is on the interests that citizens have
qua speakers in being allowed to express racist or sexist views, in this
respect the paper claims that Dworkin’s arguments do not show that
such interests are sufficient for protection. Drawing from some research
on social psychology I claim that hate speech is harmful in a
justice-relevant manner. If I am correct, then given Dworkin's ideas
about integrity and equality of resources, he cannot claim that
restricting hate speech fails to treat speakers with less respect and
concern.
Kriszta Biber
Department Coordinator
Philosophy Department
Tel: 36-1-327-3806
Fax: 36-1-327-3072
E-mail: biberk(a)ceu.hu
The CEU Philosophy Department cordially invites you to the next screening
of its Philm Club series:
Rosencrantz & Guildenstern Are Dead
1990, directed by Tom Stoppard, 117 min.
Friday, November 28, 6:00 p.m.
TIGy Room, Nador 11 Courtyard
The Philm Club aims at screening and discussing movies that raise
philosophically relevant issues in accessible as well as entertaining ways.
Find out more on the club's blog: http://philmclub.wordpress.com/
Kriszta Biber
Department Coordinator
Philosophy Department
Tel: 36-1-327-3806
Fax: 36-1-327-3072
E-mail: biberk(a)ceu.hu