F E L H I V A S ! ! !
A Budapesti Muszaki Egyetem Kognitiv Tudomanyi Kozpontja szimpoziumra
invital minden, a latorendszer kutatasa es modellezese irant
erdeklodot. A forum kivalo lehetoseget nyujt a hallgatosag szamara
hogy nemzetkozi szintu eloadasokat halljon es szemelyes kontaktust
teremtsen a szakma hazai kepviseloivel. A szimpozium immaron a
kilencedik ilyen evenkent tartott osszejovetel, melyet a mostanra
megszokotta valt formaban szervezunk az alabbi modon.
I. Cim:
Kilencedik Magyar Latas Szimpozium
II. Idopont, idotartam, hely:
2002 augusztus 31, szombat, Budapesti Muszaki Egyetem, Muegyetem
Rakpart (pontosabb cim kesobb)
III. Cel:
A szimpoziumnak fo celja, hogy forumot, talalkozasi lehetoseget
biztositson azon hazai es kulfoldon dolgozo kutatoknak
(neuroanatomusoknak, neurofiziologusoknak, pszichologusoknak es
neuralis halozatokat modellezo elmeleti szakembereknek), akik a latas
kozponti idegrendszeri feldolgozasanak problemajaval kapcsolatos
teruleteken dolgoznak.
IV. Forma:
A szimpozium formaja nagyon kotetlen, nyelve magyar.
Minden eloado 15-perces eloadast tart, 5-10 perces vitalehetoseggel az
eloadas utan. Celunk nem a formalitas hanem, hogy minel tobb es minel
kozvetlenebb parbeszedre adjunk lehetoseget
V. Resztvevok,eloadasok:
A resztvevok nevsora nem rogzitett. Szivesen latott mindenki, aki
egyetert a szimpozium celjaival, es ugy erzi, hogy abba illo eloadast
tudna tartani, vagy csak egyszeruen erdekli a fenti temakor. A
talalkozo profiljanak
megfeleloen az eloadasok a latorendszeri anatomia es fiziologia,
vizualis pszichofizika, magasabb szintu latas, pszichologia,
matematikai es szamitogepes modellezes temakorokbol allnak ossze, de
szivesen latunk mindenkit akit altalaban a percepcio, a felismeres
temakore erdekel.
VI. Jelentkezes:
Aki eloadast szeretne tartani a szimpoziumon, kerjuk, lepjen
kapcsolatba az alabbi szervezok egyikevel:
Fiser Jozsef -- fiser(a)bcs.rochester.edu
Kovács Gyula -- g.kovacs(a)itm.bme.hu
Vidnyanszky Zoltan -- vidnyanszky(a)ana.sote.hu
Felkerjuk azokat is, akik hallgatokent szeretnenek resztvenni, hogy
jelezzek reszveteli szandekukat a szervezok egyikenek. Ily modon
hozavetoleges kepet tudunk alkotni a varhato letszamrol, es
nevreszoloan tudunk mindenkit tajekoztatni a tovabbi fejlemenyekrol.
VII. Dijak, szallas:
Reszveteli dij nincs. A szimpozium egy napos igy szallas ra csak
azoknak van szuksege akik hosszabb tartozkodast terveznek. Ilyen
esetekben a szallas onkoltseges, aminek megszervezeseben a szervezok
segitenek.
VIII. Tarsas osszejovetel:
Mint az elozo szimpoziumoknal mar megszokhattuk, iden is tervezzuk a
szimpozium kotetlen vacsoraval valo zarasat.
------------------------------------------------------------------
Non-member submission from [CogSci WWW Account
<cogsci(a)cogprints.soton.ac.uk>]
---
Date: Fri, 7 Jun 2002 16:04:06 +0100 (BST)
From: CogSci WWW Account <cogsci(a)cogprints.soton.ac.uk>
To: PSYCOLOQUY <psyc(a)pucc.princeton.edu>
Subject: Cogprints
I am forwarding this good advice, originally from Dan Sperber to
his Pragmatics list. It applies to all the cognitive
sciences. -- Stevan Harnad
---------- Forwarded message ----------
Date: Thu, 30 May 2002 18:16:24 +0200
From: Dan Sperber
To: relevance(a)linguistics.ucl.ac.uk
Subject: Use Cogprints!
Dear fellow-members of this list,
This is a personal message to everyone of you. It is about making our
papers available to one another and to other people interested in
pragmatics.
As most of you probably know, there is an easy to use, free, electronic
self-archiving service, Cogprints, created by Stevan Harnad, where you
can archive your own papers, whether published or not, refereed or not,
and, where you can, of course, read or download the papers of others.
Cogprints has no competitor in its domain and is complementary to
academic institutions' electronic archives. It describes itself as
follows:
CogPrints is a service to two consituencies:
For AUTHORS, it provides a way to make their
pre-refereeing preprints and their refereed, published
reprints available to the world scholarly and scientific
community on a scale that is impossible in paper.
For READERS, it provides free worldwide access to the
primary scholarly and scientific research literature on a
scale that is likewise impossible in paper
CogPrints is an electronic archive for papers in any area of
Psychology, Neuroscience, and Linguistics, and many areas of
Computer Science (e.g., artificial intelligence, robotics,
vison, learning, speech, neural networks), Philosophy (e.g.,
mind, language, knowledge, science, logic), Biology (e.g.,
ethology, behavioral ecology, sociobiology, behaviour
genetics, evolutionary theory), Medicine (e.g., Psychiatry,
Neurology, human genetics, Imaging), Anthropology (e.g.,
primatology, cognitive ethnology, archeology, paleontology),
as well as any other portions of the physical, social and
mathematical sciences that are pertinent to the study of
cognition
It has a Pragmatics category with 45 archived papers at present, but I
am, I believe the only one from this list to have put papers there. Just
think of this: If all the researchers on this list would archive a copy
of their own papers (past, present and future) at Cogprints (whether or
not they are already archived at another institutional or personal site),
Francisco Yus' bibliographic service on RT would be complemented with a
de facto relevance theory archive. Moreover all our papers would reach a
larger readership and be easily accessible to everyone, researchers,
students etc. around the world.
So I beseech you, yes YOU, to START ARCHIVING YOUR PAPERS AT COGPRINTS
NOW!
Go to http://cogprints.soton.ac.uk/ , look at the FAQ page
http://cogprints.soton.ac.uk/faq.html and the help page
http://cogprints.soton.ac.uk/help/ , register and start uploading!
(Once you have learnt the routine, which may take you a good half hour,
uploading a paper takes, in my experience, about 10 minutes.) I would
like to see dozens of RT papers there in the coming weeks, and soon
hundreds. Wouldn't you? Well, it is in YOUR hands.
Cheers, Dan
-----------------------------
Dan Sperber
Institut Jean Nicod
http://www.institutnicod.org
1bis avenue de Lowendal
75007 Paris, France
web site: http://www.dan.sperber.com
------------------------------
The Rector and Permanent Fellows of
COLLEGIUM BUDAPEST
Institute for Advanced Study invite you to a
Public Lecture
by
Daniel Dennett
"Evolution in
animal culture and human culture"
on
Tuesday
18 June 2002, 5.30 p.m.
at
Collegium Budapest
1014 Budapest, Szentháromság u. 2.
The genome is not the only information highway used to transmit design from one organism to another:
culture or "tradition" is another, and it has developed in many species. In our species, this highway has
become an information superhighway. Why? What kinds of replication are possible in human culture that are
not possible in animal culture? (This question will deal with some of the issues raised in Bence Nánay's talk,
"Genes, Memes, and Photocopied Pages" on 6 June.) What features of our evolved brains might be genetic
responses to selective pressures that arise with culture, and what features might be adaptations more directly
shaped by culture thanks to phenotypic plasticity?
Director, Center for Cognitive Studies, Tufts University.
Born in 1942. 1963 BA, Harvard University, cum laude; 1965 DPhil, Oxford; university professor, Tufts
University; memberships: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, American Association of University
Professors, American Philosophical Association (President, Eastern Division, 2000), Cognitive Science
Society, Council for Philosophical Studies (1980-1984), Society for Philosophy and Psychology (President,
1980-1981); editorial: Associate Editor, Behavioral and Brain Sciences and Journal of Cognitive
Neuroscience; Editorial Board: Cognitive Science, Consciousness and Cognition: An International Journal;
Journal of Consciousness Studies; Perception Biology and Philosophy; Brain and Mind.
Selected Publications:
Content and Consciousness (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969).
Brainstorms: Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology (1978).
with Douglas Hofstadter (eds), The Mind's I: Fantasies and Reflections on Self and Soul
(New York: Basic Books, 1981).
Elbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting (MIT Press, 1984).
The Intentional Stance (MIT Press, 1987).
Consciousness Explained (Little, Brown, 1991).
Darwin's Dangerous Idea (Simon and Schuster, 1995).
Kinds of Minds (New York: Basic Books, 1996).
Brainchildren: Essays on Designing Minds (MIT Press and Penguin, 1998).
Az intencionalitás filozófiája [Philosophy of intentionality] (Budapest: Osiris Kiadó, 1998), essays translated
into Hungarian by Csaba Pléh.
Professor Dennett will give his inaugural lecture entitled Explaining the 'magic of consciousness' at the
Hungarian Academy of Sciences on June 19, 2002, at 3 p.m.
Site : Roosevelt tér, the Main Building of the Academy, Felolvasó Terem , I. emelet
Csaba Pleh, Professor of Psychology
Budapest U. of Technology and Economics, Center for Cognitive Science
Presently at Collegium Budapest, Budapest, Szentharomsag u 2 H-1014
cspleh@ colbud.hu, T: 3612248323, Fax: 3612248310 Mobile: (06)303500431
BOUNCE koglist(a)www.cogpsyphy.hu: Non-member submission from ["Collegium
Budapest" <nanay(a)uclink4.berkeley.edu>]
---
From: "Collegium Budapest" <nanay(a)uclink4.berkeley.edu>
To: <koglist(a)cogpsyphy.hu>
Cc: <mafla(a)hps.elte.hu>
Subject: Nanay seminar
Date: Tue, 4 Jun 2002 11:42:41 -0700
The Rector and the permanent fellows of Collegium Budapest invite you to the
following fellow seminar:
Bence Nanay
Genes, Memes, and Photocopied Pages.
Is Replication a Philosophically Interesting Concept?
11.00. am.
Thursday, May 6, 2002.
Seminar Room
Collegium Budapest
Szentharomsag ter 2.
1014
Abstract:
What do photocopied pages, DNA molecules, and memes, the units of
cultural transmission have in common? A simple answer to this question
would be that these entities are being copied in some way or another.
Philosophers of biology call these entities replicators. The concept of
replicator is intended to be a generalisation of genotype, so that
evolutionary explanation could be given for processes in which entities
other than genes are involved.
I question the importance of the concept of replication by suggesting
the possibility that the various definitions of replication either
cannot serve as the basis of evolutionary explanations or they are so
narrow that only the gene counts as replicator, which would make the
general category of replication useless. After analysing various
definitions of replication, it is argued that only one of these could be
used in evolutionary explanations, namely, the one that is involved in
so-called cumulative selection. Finally, I question that anything else
than genes may belong to this category. If the conclusion is correct,
this means that the very popular attempts to provide evolutionary
explanation for various phenomena, such as culture, neural development
or operant conditioning, lack the explanatory power they aim to have.
BOUNCE koglist(a)www.cogpsyphy.hu: Non-member submission from ["Laszlo E.
Szabo" <leszabo(a)reichenbach.elte.hu>]
---
Date: Mon, 03 Jun 2002 23:30:39 +0200
From: "Laszlo E. Szabo" <leszabo(a)reichenbach.elte.hu>
Subject: Philosophy of Science Colloquium, Friedrich Steinle
To: Multiple recipients of list <koglist(a)cogpsyphy.hu>,
fizinfo <fizinfo(a)sunserv.kfki.hu>
Department of HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
Eotvos University, Budapest
Pazmany P. setany 1/A Budapest
Phone/Fax: (36-1) 372 2924
Department's Home Page:http://hps.elte.hu
Philosophy of Science Colloquium
Room 6.54 (6th floor) Monday 4:00 PM
____________________________________
10 June 4:00 PM 6th floor 6.54
Language of presentation: English
Friedrich Steinle
Institute for Philosophy, Bern University
Max-Planck-Institute for the History of Science, Berlin
Discovering? Justifying?
Experiments in History and Philosophy of Science
The philosophical 'standard view' on experiment - finding the only
epistemic function of experiment in the tests of well-formulated
hypotheses - is closely connected to an implicit or explicit distinction
of the contexts of discovery and justification. Recent studies, however,
have opened more differentiated perspectives. In particular, there is a
specific type of experiments discernible which I call "exploratory."
Typically, it occurs in situations in which there is not only no theory
available, but even the very concepts and categories of a subject field
are opened to revision. Periods of exploratory experimentation often end
up with a new conceptualization of the field, providing new outlooks
and, at the same time, rendering other ones literally unspeakable.
Exploratory experimentation can be contrasted to a more theory-driven
type in many respects epistemic, procedural, instrumental, situative.
Though it might be tempting to attribute those two types again to a
dichotomy between discovery and justification, a closer look makes clear
that such a view is inappropriate. At the same time, fundamental
shortcomings of that distinction itself become visible. In my talk, I
shall both explicate those claims in general terms and substantiate them
by cases of experimental research in the history of electricity.
Moreover, I shall propose a more promising perspective onto research
practice and discuss where and why some type of discovery-justification
distinction might well be appropriate.
___________________________________
The 60-minute lecture is followed by a 5-minute break. Then
we held a 30-60-minute discussion.The participants may comment the talks and
initiate discussion on the Internet. The comments should be written in the
language of the presentation.
The organizer of the colloquium:
Laszlo E. Szabo (email: leszabo(a)hps.elte.hu)
--
Laszlo E. Szabo
Department of Theoretical Physics
Department of History and Philosophy of Science
Eotvos University, Budapest
H-1518 Budapest, Pf. 32, Hungary
Phone/Fax: (36-1)372-2924
Home: (36-1) 200-7318
Mobil/SMS: (36) 20-366-1172
http://hps.elte.hu/~leszabo
Here are a few models of psychological processes using
hybrid models (involving reinforcement learning models):
I.
R. Sun and C. Terry, Implicit learning of serial reaction time tasks:
Connectionist vs. symbolic models. Proceedings of the 24th
Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society, Fairfax, VA.
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Mahwah, NJ. 2002.
Abstract:
This paper describes simulations of implicit learning experiments.
It compares simulations using connectionist models with existing
simulations using symbolic models. It addresses an interesting issue
raised by proponents of symbolic models, namely, the claim that
implicit learning is better modeled by symbolic rule learning programs.
This paper revisits such an issue by quantitatively comparing
connectionist simulations with symbolic ones, in the context of
the serial reaction time task of Lewicki et al (1987). This
comparison is interesting because it helps to clarify, to some extent,
some long standing confusions compounded by many claims and
counter-claims. It also points to the idea of hybrid connectionist
and symbolic models.
II.
R. Sun and X. Zhang, Top-down versus bottom-up learning in skill
acquisition. Proceedings of the 24th Annual Conference of the
Cognitive Science Society, Fairfax, VA. Lawrence Erlbaum
Associates, Mahwah, NJ. 2002.
Abstract:
This paper studies the interaction between implicit and explicit
processes in skill learning, in terms of top-down learning
(that is, learning that goes from explicit to implicit knowledge)
vs. bottom-up learning (that is, learning that goes from implicit
to explicit knowledge). Instead of studying each type of
knowledge (implicit or explicit) in isolation, we highlight the
interaction between the two types of processes,
especially in terms of one type giving rise to another.
The work presents an integrated model of skill learning
that takes into account both implicit and explicit processes
and both top-down and bottom-up learning. We examine and
simulate human data in the Tower of Hanoi task.
The paper shows how the quantitative data in this task may be
captured using either top-down or bottom-up approaches,
although top-down learning is a more apt explanation of the
human data currently available. The results demonstrate the
difference between the two different directions of learning
(top-down vs. bottom-up), and also provide a new perspective on
skill learning in the Tower of Hanoi task.
III.
An earlier paper:
P. Slusarz and R. Sun, The interaction of explicit and implicit
learning: An integrated model. Proceedings of the 23rd Cognitive
Science Society Conference, Edinburgh, 2001. pp.952-957. Lawrence
Erlbaum Associates, Mahwah, NJ.
Abstract:
This paper explicates the interaction between the implicit and
explicit learning processes in skill acquisition, contrary to
the common tendency in the literature of studying each type of
learning in isolation. It highlights the interaction between
the two types of processes and its various effects on learning,
including the synergy effect. This work advocates an integrated
model of skill learning that takes into account both implicit
and explicit processes; moreover, it embodies a bottom-up approach
(first learning implicit knowledge and then explicit knowledge
on its basis) towards skill learning. The paper shows that
this approach accounts for various effects in the process control task data,
in addition to accounting for other data reported elsewhere.
IV.
See also:
R. Sun, E. Merrill, and T. Peterson, " From implicit skills to explicit
knowledge: a bottom-up model of skill learning " Cognitive
Science, Vol.25, No.2, pp.203-244. 2001.
These papers are downloadable from my web page:
http://www.cecs.missouri.edu/~rsun
Cheers,
----Ron
===========================================================================
Prof. Ron Sun
http://www.cecs.missouri.edu/~rsun
CECS Department phone: (573) 884-7662
University of Missouri-Columbia fax: (573) 882 8318
201 Engineering Building West
Columbia, MO 65211-2060 email: rsun(a)cecs.missouri.edu
http://www.cecs.missouri.edu/~rsunhttp://www.cecs.missouri.edu/~rsun/journal.htmlhttp://www.elsevier.com/locate/cogsys
===========================================================================
