Kedves Kollegak,
az ELTE Altalanos Pszichologiai Tnaszekenek kognitiv programjai
kereteben a mar emlitett Kovacs Ilona fele Vision ora mellett egy
masik januari kurzusunk is lesz:
Csibra Gergely: Naiv fizika
Mellekelten kuldom a tematikat s a hozza keszulo szovegvalogatast.
A szoveggyujtemny igenyeket kerem december 19-ig eljuttatni Kurgyis
Jozsefnek. Izabelle utca 46, vagy kurgyis(a)izabell.elte.hu.
A kurzust magyarul tartja Csibra, annak ellenere, hogy az
olvasnivalok angolul vannak.
Idopont:17-en, hetfon kezdodhetnenek az orak. 24/ig, kesobb
pontositando idoben.
Ay orara jelentkezok kerem ertesitsek Gergelyt: csibra(a)cogpsyphy.hu
Udvozlettel Pleh Csaba
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NAIVE PHYSICS: OBJECTS, MOTION, CAUSALITY
Gergely Csibra
In their everyday life people often make predictions and draw
inferences about the physical world around them. It has been
shown that the underlying principles and rules that we use when
interpreting events involving physical objects form a coherent
theory (or several sub-theories) which might be called a naive
or intuitive physics. The principles of this naive physics govern
not only the reasoning about the world but some of them seem to
be embedded in the perceptual processes thereby constraining
what kind of entities and events can be seen. Recent researches
have demonstrated that the most fundamental principles and
constraints of these naive theories are already operating in
early infancy and providing the baby with an initial interpretation
of the physical world.
This seminar aims at reviewing the experimental data on object
concept and event interpretation in infancy and the theoretical
speculations about what role this early naive physics plays in
the cognitive development and in the adults' conception of the
physical world. Only those parts of naive physics are covered
by this reader that can be traced back to the early infancy,
namely, the interpretation of kinematic and mechanical phenomena
involving solid objects; later occurring conceptions of heat,
electricity etc. are omitted. On the other hand, I included some
papers on the origins of causal reasoning, although the scope of
the causal principles goes well beyond the physical domain.
Nevertheless, some data suggest that a kind of causal
interpretation, which seems to arise in the first year of life,
is tied in with the perception of moving objects and may form a
core element of the mature concept of causality.
The first two papers represent recent theoretical efforts to
define the role of naive theories in cognitive development. Carey
and Spelke attempt to reconcile two seemingly incompatible views:
the view, that the development is progressing through the
enrichment of innate domain-specific core knowledge, and the
notion of major conceptual changes which override earlier
theories and create new ones at certain points of the
development. Harris asserts that this approach is misleading; the
child is not a little scientist and the notion of theoretical
thinking is questionable even in adults.
Since the early 80s numerous studies have investigated how
infants perceive objects and what kind of inferences they can
draw about the invisible events involving physical objects.
Spelke and Van de Walle review the main results of these research
and conclude that the same fundamental principles operate in
perception of and reasoning about objects. Baillargeon presents
several experiments which demonstrate that young infants not only
understand that the occluded objects continue to exist but are
able to reason about invisible events on the bases of their
physical knowledge.
Several pieces of evidence show that sometimes even educated
people fail to apply the principles of Newtonian mechanics when
reasoning about objects' motion. McCloskey argues that these are
not random failures but manifestations of a naive theory which
resembles the medieval 'impetus theory' of motion. The results
of experiments carried out by Spelke et al. suggest that some
principles of the Newtonian physics such as inertia are not parts
of the innate physical knowledge, though some of them are
acquired very rapidly. Leslie's paper offers a new theoretical
framework for understanding the infants' conception of the
physical world, emphasizing the dynamic aspect of the interacting
objects.
The two short passages from Michotte's classic book are included
to illustrate how he attempted to explain the direct perception
of causality to which we are exposed by certain stimuli (e.g.
when billiard balls collide). Schlottmann and Shanks demonstrate
elegantly that the judgement on causality based on the predictive
values of events is independent from the direct perception of
causality, which is solely a function of the spatio-temporal
parameters of the events. Showing that neither real objects nor
real movement is necessary for the causal percept, Gordon et al.
support the illusory character of the phenomenon. Leslie suggests
that an innate module is responsible for creating the causal
illusion because even six-month-old babies seem to perceive the
causal structure of such events. In addition to Leslie's result,
Cohen and Oakes present evidence showing that even infants can
evaluate causal relations between events, although these authors
do not accept the modular view.
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NAIVE PHYSICS: OBJECTS, MOTION, CAUSALITY
INTUITIVE THEORIES AND COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT
Carey, S., & Spelke, E. (1994). Domain-specific knowledge and
conceptual change. In L.A. Hirschfeld & S.A. Gelman (Eds.),
Mapping the Mind. Domain Specificity in Cogntion and Culture (pp.
169-200). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Harris, P.L. (1994). Thinking by children and scientists: False
analogies and neglected similarities. In L.A. Hirschfeld & S.A.
Gelman (Eds.), Mapping the Mind. Domain Specificity in Cogntion
and Culture (pp. 294-315). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
OBJECTS
Spelke, E.S., & Van de Walle, G.A. (1993). Perceiving and
reasoning about objects: Insights from infants. In M. Eilan, R.
McCarthy, & B. Brewer (Eds.), Spatial Representation (pp. 132-
161). Oxford: Blackwell.
Baillargeon, R. (1993). The object concept revisited: New
directions in the infants' physical knowledge. In C.E. Granrud
(Ed.), Visual Perception and Cognition in Infancy (pp. 265-315).
NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
MOTION
McCloskey, M. (1983). Naive theories of motion. In D. Gentner,
& A.L. Stevens (Eds.), Mental Models (pp. 299-324). NJ: Lawrence
Erlbaum.
Spelke, E.S., Katz, G., Purcell, S.E., Ehrlich, S.M., &
Breinlinger, K. (1994). Early knowledge of object motion:
continuity and inertia. Cognition, 51, 131-176.
Leslie, A.M. (1994). ToMM, ToBY, and agency: Core architecture
and domain specificity. In L.A. Hirschfeld & S.A. Gelman (Eds.),
Mapping the Mind. Domain Specificity in Cogntion and Culture (pp.
119-148). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
CAUSALITY
Michotte, A. (1963). The Perception of Causality. London:
Meuthen, pp. 217-228, 344-352.
Schlottmann, A., & Shanks, D.R. (1992). Evidence for a
distinction between judged and perceived causality. The Quarterly
Journal of Experimental Psychology, 44A, 321-342.
Gordon, I.A., Day, R.H., & Stecher, E.J. (1990). Perceived
causality occurs with stroboscopic movement of one or both
stimulus events. Perception, 19, 17-20.
Leslie, A.M., & Keeble, S. (1987). Do six-month-old infants
perceive causality? Cognition, 25, 265-288.
Cohen, L.B., & Oakes, L.M. (1993). How infants perceive a simple
causal event. Developmental Psychology, 29, 421-433.
SZEMINARIUM
Az ELTE TTK Tudomanytortenet es Tudomanyfilozofia Tanszeken a
"Tudomanyfilozofiai Teazo" kereteben
Szekely Laszlo
(az MTA Filozofiai Intezet
tudomanyos fomunkatarsa)
"Az antropikus kozmologiai elv: fizika es metafizika"
cimu eloadasara kerul sor.
ELOADASKIVONAT
A hetvenes evek masodik feletol a termeszettudomanyos
megismeres altalanosan elfogadott elofoltevesrendszeren
belul egy uj principium tunt fol a fizikai kozmologiaban: az
antropikus kozmologiai elv. Egy uj termeszettudomanyos
alapelv megjelenese nem mindennapi esemeny, s mar onmagaban
figyelmet erdemel. A gyorsan divatossa valt antropikus
kozmologiai elv azonban joval tobb, mint egy uj principium:
ha az ujkori termeszettudomany egyik legfontosabb
alapeszmeje az a Kopernikuszi gondolat, mely szerint
kozmoszon beluli helyzetunk nem privilegizalt, akkor az
antropikus elv most azt hangsulyozza, hogy kozmikus
pozicionk egy bizonyos ertelemben megiscsak rendkivuli.
Mikeppen jelenhetett meg egy ilyen eszme a
termeszettudomanyon belul? Vajon csak a termeszettudomanyos
kozmologia atmeneti elbizonytalanodasanak vagyunk a tanui,
vagy ennel tobbrol van szo? Egyaltalaban: mennyiben jogos a
termeszettudomanyon belul egy ilyen eszme, s mi a
termeszettudomanyon kivuli, "metafizikai" statusza?
Eloadasomban ezekkel a kerdesekkel fogok fogalkozni. Celom
ennek soran nem az lesz, hogy "vitathatatlan" valaszokat
adjak rajuk, hanem hogy a temakorbe bevezessem hallgatoimat
es gondolkodasra osztonozzem oket.
Az eloadas idotartama 50-60 perc, amelyet rovid szunet
utan kb. 30-60 perc vita kovet.
Idopontja: december 15., csutortok, 17 ora.
Helye: Rakoczi ut 5., II. em. 229.
Udvozlettel,
a szervezok: Kampis Gyorgy (kampis(a)ludens.elte.hu)
Szabo Laszlo (leszabo(a)ludens.elte.hu)
Szecsenyi Tibor (szecska(a)ludens.elte.hu)
Kedves Erdeklodok,
megerkezett Nadasdy Zoltan visegradi eloadasanak szovege, ftp-vel
elerheto az izabellen, a tobbi mellett, nadasdy.txt filenevvel.
Hamarosan felkerul a koglistre is.
Udvozlettel,
Gyori Miklos.
