The CEU Department of Philosophy cordially invites you to a talk
(as part of its Departmental Colloquium series)
by
Elisabeth Pacherie (CNRS Institut Jean-Nicod, Paris –
CEU IAS Fellow 2013)
on
Tuesday, 19 February, 2013, 5.30 PM, Zrinyi 14, Room 412
ABSTRACT
On a traditional philosophical view of the structure of agency, intentions, conceived as conscious mental states, are the causes of actions. In recent times, this traditional view has come under attack from both philosophers and cognitive scientists. Two main worries have been raised. The first worry concerns the causal efficacy of intentions qua conscious states. The second worry concerns the nature of the relation between intentions and action, and whether this relation is best described as a causal relation rather than as a control relation. Current scientific evidence provides strong support for the view that action is hierarchically organized and involves several levels of intentions, action representations and action control processes. I shall argue that the traditional philosophical view, but also some of the objections levelled against it, rest in part on an over-simplified conception of the structure of agency and that taking into account the hierarchical nature of intentions and control processes can lead to a reassessment of the relation between intentions and action and of the role of conscious agency in action production.