The CEU Department of Cognitive Science cordially invites you to the following talk by:

Richard Moore, Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy, University of Warwick

Date: Wednesday, April 19, 2023

Time: 4 pm (to 5:30 pm) CET

Venue: D002-Tiered* (QS Vienna) and Zoom

https://ceu-edu.zoom.us/j/92477832051?pwd=NG5BNm45a2x3aGZvQ2V5UENCQURmUT09
Meeting ID: 924 7783 2051
Passcode: 142029

Chair: Gergely Csibra

Title: 

A Simple Pragmatics for Language Development Research

Abstract:

The study of language development presents a number of developmental puzzles. For example, according to influential views (Tomasello 2008; Scott-Phillips 2015), children’s acquisition of natural languages is a consequence of uniquely human abilities for acting with and attributing communicative intent. These abilities are thought to be uniquely human, because they require uniquely human abilities for ‘Theory of Mind’ and uniquely human motivations to cooperate.

This view is problematic for a number of reasons. First, in relevant respects, infants’ mindreading abilities are not better than those of great apes; and uniquely human ToM abilities seem to be developmentally dependent upon language, such that they cannot explain language development. Additionally, while infants’ ability to understand informative pointing is often taken to be evidence of uniquely human abilities for understanding communicative intent, dogs also understand pointing, as do enculturated chimpanzees do much better – suggesting that they may also understand communicative intent.

These data can be reconciled if we adopt a ‘minimally’ Gricean account of communication (Moore, 2017), according to which Gricean communication does not require uniquely human ToM. On this view, humans, great apes, and dogs can all be counted as Gricean communicators. However, we still need an account of how agents might come to interpret the content of others’ communicative actions. This account is particularly challenging if one takes seriously what I call Csibra’s challenge: the idea that one can assign contents to utterances only if one has a prior understanding of the (propositional) nature of communication.

In this talk, I sketch an account of the ways in which cognitively unsophisticated agents might come to interpret the contents of others’ communicative intentions. This account presupposes neither a developed ToM, nor any form of propositional attitude psychology, and so is consistent with the hypothesis that propositional attitude psychology is language dependent (Moore 2021). Thus, while sensitive to Csibra’s challenge, I downplay its significance for accounts of language development. Building on recent work done with Kirsty Graham and Federico Rossano, I will also sketch an account of the nature and limitations of utterance interpretation in non-human great apes. I will finish by drawing conclusions about the extent to which human and great ape abilities for pragmatic interpretation are discontinuous.

*Anyone not affiliated with CEU wishing to attend in-person in Vienna must RSVP here to get access to the lecture hall.

Let Gergo know, please, if you would like to schedule a meeting with the speaker.

Best,

Reka