Krisztina Biber
Department of Philosophy
Coordinator
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Central European University
Nador u. 9. | 1051 Budapest, Hungary
The CEU Department of Philosophy cordially invites you to two talks
(as part of its Departmental Colloquium series)
by
on
The error in non-cognitivism and the truth in the error theory
Tuesday, 1 March 2016, 5.30 PM, Zrinyi 14, Room 412
ABSTRACT
In this talk, I will compare two versions of irrealism about normativity: non-cognitivism, according to which normative judgements do not represent the world, and the error theory, according to which normative judgements do represent the world but always do so inaccurately. I will argue that non-cognitivism is incompatible with the thought that when two people make conflicting normative judgements, at most one of these judgements is correct. By contrast, I will argue, the error theory is compatible with this thought. I will conclude that the error theory is more defensible than non-cognitivism.
AND
by
on
Assertion, Silence, and the norms of public
Wednesday, 2 March 2016, 3.30 PM, Monument building
(Nador 9) room 203
ABSTRACT
In this talk I argue that there is a presumptive (albeit defeasible) entitlement for participants in a conversation to assume that a hearer’s silence in the face of an observed assertion indicates acceptance. I argue for this on the basis of considerations pertaining to our actual practices with assertion, together with considerations pertaining to the normative dimensions of that practice (deriving from Stalnaker’s account of the "essential effect" of assertion). One result of my thesis is that in contexts in which a hearer is known or observed to have observed an assertion, she is under prima facie normative pressure, if she rejects the assertion, to signal having done so. After defending these claims, I address the variety of contexts in which the entitlement itself is defeated (including but not limited to conditions of "silencing").